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Preface 
In a world characterized by increasing interdependence and integration, developing 
countries face a number of challenges, not least in relation to improving their capacity 
to participate effectively in international trade. These tendencies place pressure on 
governments to reform domestic and trade-related policies in order to create an envi-
ronment in which economic agents may respond efficiently to these changes. Given 
the key importance of agricultural production in most developing countries and the 
continued need for improving food security, there is a particular interest in evaluating 
how the agricultural sectors in the developing countries might respond to these chang-
ing national and international economic and policy conditions. This is the underlying 
theme of a Ph.D. project undertaken by Research Analyst Chantal Pohl Nielsen, of 
which the policy description and evaluation documented in this report is an integrated 
part. The project is entitled Supply-Side Issues in Developing Country Agriculture: 
Constraints and Opportunities and financial support hereof from the Danish Council 
for Development Research (Rådet for Ulandsforskning, RUF) is gratefully acknowl-
edged. This Ph.D. project benefits from close affiliation with the research project 
WTO Negotiations and Changes in National Agricultural and Trade Policies: Conse-
quences for Developing Countries. This project is primarily financed by the Royal 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DANIDA.  
 
The overall goal of the Ph.D. project is to analyze selected issues related to the agri-
cultural supply response in developing countries, where Vietnam is the country case 
study. From being a chronic net rice importer in the 1980s, Vietnam has transformed 
itself into the world’s second largest exporter of rice after Thailand in the late 1990s. 
This remarkable achievement has been brought about by economic policy reforms ini-
tiated in 1986 enabling market forces to play a greater role in the disposition of eco-
nomic resources. Vietnam’s future performance on world rice markets depends on the 
continuation of domestic policy reforms, including increased participation of the pri-
vate sector in market transactions, particularly foreign trade. However, it is equally 
clear that continued success of Vietnam’s rice exports depends crucially on increased 
market access and the disciplining of other countries’ use of trade-distorting domestic 
support policies. Hence this report analyzes the policy context in which Vietnam’s 
future rice export potential must be seen. 
 
The author would like to thank Søren Elkjær Frandsen, Finn Tarp, and Christian 
Bjørnskov for comments on an earlier draft. 
 
 
Ole P. Kristensen  
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1. Introduction 
As part of the doi moi (renovation) policy reform program initiated in 1986 the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam began to allow markets to play a greater role in the allocation of 
economic resources. Within agriculture this entailed a decentralization of production 
responsibilities from collectives to individual farm households. These reforms have 
helped transform Vietnam from a chronic rice importer in the 1980s to the world’s 
second largest rice exporter after Thailand in 1997 – a position it has since retained 
with the exception of 1998.   
 
This success of breaking into world markets has created a new trade-off for Viet-
nam’s policymakers between ensuring sufficient supplies of rice at affordable prices 
to domestic consumers on the one hand and generating foreign exchange from rice 
exports on the other. Until very recently the Government has regulated rice exports 
through a national export quota, access to which has been enjoyed exclusively by a 
handful of state-owned trading enterprises.  
 
Vietnam is a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
has therefore committed itself to lowering tariffs and dismantling non-tariff barriers 
over a specified period of time. The country has also applied for membership of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). A step in the direction of liberalizing its own trade 
policy regime has recently been taken in the case of rice: the export quota has been 
lifted as of May 1, 2001. Yet the Government will continue to nominate state-owned 
food companies to deal with Vietnam’s key rice export markets and hence there is 
still a far way to go in terms of increasing private sector participation in rice exports. 
 
Rice producers and exporters in Vietnam do not only face barriers in terms of domes-
tic restrictions and distortions, but self-sufficiency policies in most rice-producing 
countries introduce significant barriers to international rice trade. There is a wide ar-
ray of import protection, domestic support and export promotion policies affecting 
world rice trade including extremely high tariffs, variable levies, import quotas, tem-
porary import bans, production support measures, and export subsidies. This is the 
context into which Vietnam is introducing its rice exports, and a clear understanding 
of which barriers and distortions (domestically and abroad) are the most restrictive 
and in what way, is necessary in order to assess the constraints and opportunities fac-
ing Vietnam’s future rice exports. Hence the objective of this report is to get a handle 
on Vietnam’s rice policies as well as the policies of other major rice traders as they 
impact on international rice trade. An evaluation of the current rice policies of both 
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Vietnam’s competitors and its buyers will help identify which reforms and liberaliza-
tion efforts are most needed in the context of e.g. the WTO agriculture negotiations 
seen from a Vietnamese perspective. 
 
The report is structured as follows. The next chapter provides a brief overview of 
global rice production and usage. Chapter 3 then describes the structure and trends in 
international rice trade, including the export patterns of Vietnam and its main com-
petitors. A review of Vietnam’s rice policy starts off Chapter 4, which then continues 
by describing the policies of its major competitors and partners. Those not particu-
larly interested in a detailed decription of the individual countries’ rice policies can 
skip this chapter since the main features are subsequently summarized in Chapter 5. 
This chapter provides an evaluation of the current rice policies, including a discussion 
of their viability in the context of the multilateral agricultural trade negotiations. Con-
clusions are drawn and prospects from a Vietnamese perspective are laid out in the 
final Chapter 6.  
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2.  Global rice production and usage 
Rice is of overwhelming importance to the developing countries, particularly those in 
Asia. In the year 2000 more than 95% of world rice production and consumption took 
place in developing countries; 90% was produced and consumed in Asia (FAOSTAT 
2001). By far the largest producers of rice are China and India (Table 2.1). Other 
large rice producers in Asia are Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, 
the Philippines and Japan. The largest non-Asian rice producers are Brazil and the 
United States. The European Union also produces rice – in Italy, Greece, Portugal and 
France – but this amounts to just 0.3% of world production. 
 
Table 2.1. Global rice production in 2000, thousand metric tons 
           
China 190,168  Japan 11,863  Nigeria 3,277  South Korea  1,690 
India 134,150  Brazil 11,168  Sri Lanka 2,767  Peru 1,665 
Indonesia 51,000  USA 8,669  Iran 2,348  Ecuador 1,520 
Bangladesh 35,821  S. Korea  7,067  Madagascar 2,300  Australia 1,400 
Vietnam 32,554  Pakistan 7,000  Laos 2,155  Rest world  14,790 
Thailand 23,403  Egypt 5,997  Colombia 2,100  WORLD 598,852 
Myanmar 20,000  Nepal 4,030  Malaysia 2,037    
Philippines 12,415  Cambodia 3,762  EU 1,736    
           
Note: Production in this table is expressed on a paddy (rough) basis.  
Source: FAOSTAT (2001) 
           
 
 
Over the past two decades production and consumption of rice have on average in-
creased by 2% annually. Measured in terms of milled equivalents1, production 
reached slightly more than 400 million metric tons2 in the year 1999/00 and is ex-
pected to have fallen slightly in the production year 2000/01 (Figure 2.1). Production 
varies substantially from year to year: an increase of 7.7% was observed in 1983/84, 
for example, and a decline of -1.2% is expected in 2000/01. As shall be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter, only a relatively limited amount of rice is traded in-
ternationally. Consequently, the year-to-year fluctuations in traded quantities are even 
more dramatic: a 16% increase was noted in 1984/85, for example, against a decline 
of almost -12% in 1987/88. On average rice trade has grown by 1.3% over the past 
twenty years. The fluctuations in production are reflected in the size of the ending 
stocks, which in 2000/01 are predicted to have reached 59 million tons, amounting to 
around 15% of total use.    
                                                 
1  Note that production reported in Table 1, by contrast, is on a paddy (rough) basis. The conver-
sion factor is typically around 2/3. 
2  Unless otherwise stated ‘tons’ in this paper refer to metric tons. 
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Rice is almost exclusively used for human consumption. According to FAOSTAT 
(2001) only 3% of total production is used for animal feed. In Asia rice is by far the 
main cereal consumed. FAOSTAT approximations of annual per capita rice supplies 
show variations (1999 data) from 211 kg/capita in Myanmar and 170 kg/capita in 
Vietnam to 90 kg/capita in China. This compares with just 4 kg/capita in a country 
like Denmark.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. World rice production, utilization, ending stocks and trade (mill. tons) 
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Note: Production, utilization and ending stocks are expressed on a milled basis. The data for 1999/00 are 
preliminary and those for 2000/01 are forecasts as of November 2000. 
Source: ERS (2001) 
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Box 2.1. Facts about rice 
 
Rice is a highly adaptable plant that can be grown both in dry upland soils, in irrigated fields, and along 
flooded riverbeds. Rice is most often grown in flooded fields known as paddies where the roots are kept un-
der water. In most countries small corners of the paddy fields are set-aside as nurseries for sowing rice 
seeds, which are left for about 30 days before being planted into the field. The life cycle of the rice plant is 
between 100 and 210 days where after the grains must be separated from the straw, through a process 
known as threshing. The harvested rice contains from 15% to 25% moisture and must be dried to obtain a 
moisture level of 12-14% to avoid spoilage. The rice is then milled through a process that first removes the 
hull, thereby producing brown rice. White rice then results from further milling that removes the bran layer. 
Since most consumers prefer white rice, the grain is then polished and occasionally glazed with glucose and 
talc. One hundred kilograms of paddy (rough) rice produce 20kg of husk and 80kg of brown, dehusked rice. 
The milling process delivers approximately 68kg of milled rice and 12kg of bran and other by-products. Of 
the 68kg milled rice some 55kg are whole grains and the remaining 13kg are broken grains. (Roche 1992)  
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3. International rice trade 
The international market for rice is often characterized as a thin and volatile residual 
market with elements of instability and uncertainty that distinguish it from world 
markets for wheat and maize (Latham 1998, Barker et al. 1985). The world rice mar-
ket is thin in the sense that the amount of rice traded internationally is small relative 
to total production. Over the period 1961-99 the average trade-in-production shares 
have been 18.2% for wheat, 13.7% for maize and only 4.6% for rice (FAOSTAT 
2001). This small trade share implies that fluctuations in production have magnified 
effects on traded volumes.  
 
Figure 3.1 nevertheless shows that the share of rice being traded internationally has 
been increasing over the past five years with a record high in 1998, a year character-
ized by strong import demand. The extent to which this trend continues will of course 
depend on many factors. As for all other cereals weather is a major source of year-to-
year fluctuations in production and hence supply, particularly in regions where rice 
fields are rain-fed rather than irrigated.3 Improved provision of irrigation and new 
technologies – accompanied by the acquisition of appropriate management skills – 
may therefore contribute to greater stability in yields in the longer term.  
 
Yet government rice policies clearly contribute to the thinness and instability of the 
global rice market. As shall be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, governments in 
many countries exercise strong control over imported and exported quantities of rice 
in their efforts to achieve rice self-sufficiency and domestic price stability. Combined 
with the inevitable variations in harvest performance, this tight control of exports and 
imports means that both the level and sources of demand and supply of rice are rather 
unpredictable.  
 
Thinness in itself is not necessarily a problem if sellers and buyers are the same each 
year. Yet the international rice market is extremely volatile in that sellers and buyers 
enter the market at a given point in time depending on the performance of their own 
domestic crop. A poor harvest in a particular year may pull an exporter out of the 
market and even force a country to resort to imports. Similarly, a good harvest may  
                                                 
3  According to Latham (1998) more than 75% of the world’s rice is now grown on irrigated fields. 
It was the combination of improved irrigation, heavy use of fertilizers, and modern rice varieties 
that allowed for the substantial improvements in yields experienced between the mid-1960s and 
the late 1970s, a period which has become known – not without controversy – as the Green 
Revolution.   
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leave a country with an exportable surplus (Latham 1998). Fluctuations in the partici-
pants’ shares of the market imply that there are very few fixed trade channels, and this 
in turn means that search and transaction costs are high. 
 
Figure 3.1. Traded volumes as a percentage of world production, 1961-99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (a) Traded volumes are measured here as exported volumes in metric tons. (b) Rice exports are con-
verted from milled to paddy equivalents in order to make the correct comparison with production, 
which is measured in metric tons of paddy rice.  
Source: FAOSTAT (2001). 
 
 
 
 
Six large exporters  
Rice exports are concentrated in the hands of just a few large exporting nations. The 
six largest rice exporters in 1999 were Thailand, Vietnam, China, the USA, India and 
Pakistan (in volume terms and in that order). Exporting 7 million tons in 1999, Thai-
land is by far the leading rice exporter, accounting for almost 30% of total world ex-
ports (26 million metric tons, according to FAOSTAT 2001). Vietnam ranked second 
that year, exporting more than 4 million tons, and thereby accounting for 18% of total 
exports. The United States, China and India each accounted for 10-11% of world ex-
ports, and Pakistan settled on 7%. These six exporters have delivered between 73% 
0
5
10
15
20
1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-1995 1996-99
Pe
rc
en
t
Maize 
Rice 
Wheat 
 
 Vietnam in the International Rice Market, FØI  15 
and 85% of total export volumes over the past 20 years, averaging around 80% in the 
1990s. 
 
As discussed above, participation in international rice trade is not stable in the sense 
that producers and exporters of rice are also major consumers of rice, and hence there 
is a clear tendency to ensure that domestic needs are fulfilled before exporting a pos-
sible surplus. Therefore, with the exception of Thailand that has kept its lead for many 
years, the relative ranking of these countries changes each year. Furthermore, only 
Thailand, the United States and Pakistan have consistently ranked among the top-six 
rice exporters over the past two decades. Vietnam, China and India have not always 
been a part of this group (giving way to Italy, Myanmar, Japan and Australia at vari-
ous points in time). In particular, Vietnam was a net importer of rice in the 1980s and 
has only seriously regained its position as a net exporter of rice since 1989, three 
years after the commencement of the doi moi economic reform program (see Chapter 
4). In 1986 Vietnam’s rice exports accounted for just 1% of total world exports 
against 17-18% ten years later. 
 
The rapid intake of Vietnam on world markets over the past few years measured in 
terms of quantities is somewhat deceiving, however. Although Vietnam secured itself 
an impressive second place in world exports in the years 1996, 1997 and 1999 and a 
close fourth in 1998, the value shares show a completely different picture. Figure 3 
compares the shares that the top six-exporters accounted for in 1997 measured in 
terms of export volume and export value. 4 Vietnam’s exports made up 17% of total 
exports measured in volumes, but only a meager 5% in value terms. This is a clear 
indication that Vietnam is primarily serving lower value export markets.  
 
                                                 
4  The year 1997 is chosen because it is the latest year where values from the GTAP database are 
available and where Vietnam ranked second in world exports. Although FAOSTAT also con-
tains data for rice export values by country, the GTAP values are used to describe the overall 
structure in value terms. FAOSTAT data are generally collected directly from national authori-
ties (statistics offices, etc) in the individual countries whereas the GTAP trade data are based on 
UNCTAD’s COMTRADE database. (The COMTRADE database contains detailed import and 
export statistics for more than 100 countries dating back to 1962.) Where bilateral trade flows are 
not reported at all (or are erroneous) the GTAP database compilation process makes use of part-
ner country reportings (see Dimaranan and McDougall 2001). Unfortunately, there are rather 
large differences between the aggregate trade values by country reported by the two sources. The 
FAOSTAT database provides aggregate trade data for rice in both quantities and values, but only 
in quantities for bilateral data (with substantial shares of unidentified bilateral flows). The GTAP 
database provides only value-based data, but does so for all bilateral flows using a specific rec-
onciliation method.  
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This observation seems to hold when observing export value and volume shares over 
the past decade. Table 3.1 shows the development in the shares of these six countries’ 
exports in total rice exports over the period 1990-99. The upper half of the table 
shows the percentage shares in volume terms, while the lower half of the table shows 
the shares in value terms. Measured in terms of value generated from world trade in 
rice, Vietnam accounted for just 5-7% of world trade in the years 1996-98, compared 
with 13-17% in quantity terms during the same period. With a few exceptions, lower 
value shares are also generally observed for China throughout this period. The United 
States, however, seems to be serving high-quality markets with its share of world ex-
ports in value terms clearly exceeding its share in volume terms. Pakistan and to a 
lesser extent Thailand also seem to be fairly successful in capturing at least some 
high-value market shares. The story for India seems to be more complex with very 
large variations from year to year. 
 
Figure 3.2. Shares of world rice exports in 1997 measured in volumes and values 
  
Volume share Value shares 
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Note: Total volume: 21 million metric tons. Total value: USD 5,831 million. 
Source: Trade quantities from FAOSTAT (2001). Trade values from GTAP version 5, Dimanaran and 
McDougall (2001). 
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Table 3.1. Exporters: Percentage shares of world rice exports, 1990-99 
           
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Quantity shares 
China 3.3 6.2 6.4 8.9 9.1 1.0 1.8 4.8 13.2 10.8 
India 4.0 5.2 3.6 4.6 5.0 21.8 12.3 11.4 17.2 9.9 
Pakistan 6.0 9.2 9.4 6.1 5.5 8.2 7.9 8.4 6.8 6.9 
Thailand 32.2 32.9 32.0 29.6 27.0 27.5 26.8 26.5 22.7 26.3 
USA 19.8 17.1 13.4 15.9 15.7 13.7 13.0 10.9 10.8 10.3 
Vietnam 13.0 7.9 12.1 10.2 11.0 8.8 17.2 17.0 12.8 17.7 
Others 21.7 21.6 23.0 24.6 26.8 18.8 21.1 21.1 16.4 18.1 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Mill. MT 12.5 13.2 16.1 16.8 18.0 22.5 20.4 21.0 28.8 26.0 
           
Value shares 
           
China 2.3 1.3 4.2 8.9 2.7 4.4 2.3 4.6 11.3 na 
India 4.7 7.6 9.3 9.2 11.6 19.8 8.6 17.9 19.1 na 
Pakistan* 5.5 9.5 8.1 6.5 4.7 6.4 9.3 6.6 2.0 na 
Thailand 29.4 25.8 30.6 28.9 27.6 27.1 23.2 19.5 25.1 na 
USA 24.3 19.5 15.1 16.5 17.9 14.8 20.4 15.7 14.7 na 
Vietnam 3.7 3.4 3.6 3.0 5.4 3.8 5.8 5.2 7.0 na 
Others 30.0 32.8 29.1 27.1 30.2 23.8 30.4 30.5 20.7 na 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 na 
Mill. $ 4,483 3,320 4,457 4,606 5,346 6,996 5,388 5,831 8,172 na 
           
* Pakistan is part of an aggregate in the GTAP database that includes Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal. The 
values of Pakistan’s exports have been extracted by using FAOSTAT value shares for this group of coun-
tries. 
Source: Trade quantities from FAOSTAT (2001). Trade values from GTAP version 5 (2001).            
 
 
The explanation behind the observation that the United States, Pakistan and Thailand 
seem able to capture large shares of the value of world rice trade is a reflection of 
several issues. These countries have a much longer experience in international rice 
trade than e.g. Vietnam, and have therefore built up a reputation of stable and good 
quality supplies. Recurring issues in the description of the challenges facing Vietnam-
ese rice exports are precisely unreliable supplies and (a reputation of) low quality. 
Clearly these are issues of which Vietnamese officials are well aware and efforts are 
being made to improve the quality of rice destined for exports. Given that around 
20% of Vietnamese rice production is now sold in foreign markets (Table 3.2.) and 
that rice exports in recent years have been the second or third largest generator of for-
eign exchange to the country, increasing the value of rice exports must definitely be a 
clear priority. 
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Table 3.2. Exports as a percent of domestic production, 1980-1999 
            
 1980 - 85 1986 - 90 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
            
China 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.8 2.8 2.1 
India 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.1 6.4 3.1 2.9 5.8 2.9 
Pakistan 31.4 32.7 37.0 48.3 25.7 28.4 46.5 37.0 40.6 42.0 34.6 
Thailand 29.8 39.1 32.9 40.1 41.9 35.6 43.2 37.5 36.2 43.9 44.9 
USA 54.0 53.7 46.1 40.1 54.2 46.1 59.0 52.7 43.6 58.5 44.8 
Vietnam 0.4 5.8 7.7 13.3 11.1 12.4 11.7 19.5 19.7 19.2 22.2 
            
Note: Measured in quantities 
Source: FAOSTAT (2001) 
            
 
 
A few large and many small importers 
Rice trade is much more dispersed on the import side than on the export side. In 1999 
thirty-five countries made up 80% of total imports, whereas just six countries made 
up 80% of the export side. In 1999 the largest single importers were by far Indonesia 
and Bangladesh. For both countries, import demand in a given year depends on the 
outcome of the domestic rice crop as is clear by the large variation over the years 
(Table 3.3). For Indonesia imports in the latter half of the 1990s have been particu-
larly volatile, demanding less than 2% of global rice imports in 1997 to almost 20% in 
1999. Indonesia is expected to continue to be a major importer of rice due to rising 
national consumption and limited scope for increasing yields in combination with less 
area being devoted to rice production. The population pressure in Bangladesh will 
render this country a major rice importer in the foreseeable future too.  
 
Two other significant importers in Asia are the Philippines and Malaysia. The Philip-
pines lack resources to expand rice growing areas and to develop or even maintain 
infrastructure. Moreover, yields are growing only very slowly and doing so from a 
low level by Asian developing country standards, and the population is growing rap-
idly. Hence the Philippines will be a regular rice importer in the foreseeable future as 
well. Malaysia is an exceptionally stable importer purchasing about 2-3% of world 
rice trade each year. 
 
Apart from the emergency hike in imports in 1994 (see e.g. Hayami and Godo 1997) 
Japan has only imported moderate amounts of rice as a direct consequence of the self-
sufficiency route followed in its rice policy. The same applies to the Republic of Ko-
rea. As will be discussed below, both countries have committed themselves to open-
ing their markets to a minimum quantity of rice imports through the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture as of 1 January 1995. Judging by these data alone it does 
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seem that the commitments have had an impact in the sense that both countries have 
increased their shares of world imports after 1995. Yet Japan and South Korea both 
have extremely strong preferences for japonica varieties, and so the opening of these 
markets will, ceteris paribus, only have an impact on countries able to supply these 
particular varieties (see Box 3.1). The US competes with Australia and China, and to 
a lesser extent Italy and Egypt, for access to these medium grain japonica markets. 
Japan and South Korea do, however, also use long grain rice for various food process-
ing purposes and a portion of this supply is open to other potential suppliers, mainly 
Thailand.  
 
The Middle East region is traditionally the world’s strongest market for high-quality 
rice, primarily parboiled, premium long grain, and basmati varieties. Main importers 
in the Middle East count Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which together imported 7% of 
world imports in 1999. Turkey is another Middle East importer of rice. After Japan it 
is the second largest importer of japonica rice being supplied by the US, Egypt, Aus-
tralia and the EU.  
 
The Sub-Saharan African region is a major importer of rice, accounting for 16% of 
total imports in 1999. Declining world market prices have enabled this region to in-
crease it imports of rice (both on market terms and in terms of food aid). The main 
importers are Nigeria, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire with relatively stable shares of 
world imports. Most of this demand is for low-quality rice. South Africa does not 
produce its own rice and imports primarily parboiled rice from India, Thailand and 
the US. 
 
The Latin American and Caribbean nations accounted for more than 10% of total im-
ports in 1999, with the bulk of it going to Brazil. Latin America is a primarily an in-
dica market. Except for the Caribbean, this region is primarily a rough rice market for 
the US. In South America most rice trade takes place within the region, with Argen-
tina and Uruguay as the main suppliers of milled rice. Regional trade preferences and 
locational advantages foster this intra-regional trade pattern. 
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Box 3.1. International rice trade is segmented by type, quality, degree of milling 
 
The international market for rice is segmented by type and quality. Soil and climate conditions determine 
which types are economically viable in a given region. According to Siamwalla and Haykin (1983) there are 
(albeit perhaps limited) possibilities of substitution in production. In terms of consumption, Childs and Bur-
dett (2000) argue that there is only very little substitution due to strong preferences for specific types and 
qualities, and so world rice prices tend to be more volatile than other grain prices.   
 
There are four types of rice that are traded internationally: indica, japonica, aromatic, and glutinous rice. 
Indica rice accounts for 80% of world rice trade. These grains are long and slender, and remain separated 
when cooked. Indica rice is grown in tropical and sub-tropical climates. Japonica rice accounts for 10% of 
world trade and is grown in temperate climates. These grains are short and round, and tend to become 
slightly sticky when cooked. Aromatic, or fragrant, rices account for just under 10% of the world market and 
are primarily jasmine rice from Thailand and basmati rice from India and Pakistan. The remainder is gluti-
nous rice (also known as sweet rice) grown mainly in Southeast Asia. Both the aromatic and the glutinous 
rices sell at a premium to indica and japonica. 
 
The main exporters of indica rice are Thailand, Vietnam, China, the United States and Pakistan. Other ex-
porters include Argentina, Uruguay, Guyana, Burma and Surinam. The primary exporters of japonica rice 
are Australia, Egypt, China, the European Union and the United States. As mentioned above Thailand, India 
and Pakistan export the aromatic rices. The US also has a small amount of aromatic rice exports. Thailand 
is the main exporter of glutinous rice. A very small amount of Californian glutinous rice is exported to Japan. 
 
Rice is traded in three primary forms: fully milled, brown and paddy (See Box 2.1). A higher price is usually 
obtained the higher degree of milling and the lower percent of broken kernels.    
 
Milled rice accounts for almost all internationally traded rice. There are moderate amounts of trade in brown 
rice and only very little trade in paddy (rough) rice. In fact, the United States is the only major exporter of 
rice in its rough form. According to Childs and Burdett (2000) Argentina and Uruguay supply some rough 
rice within the Latin American region, and Australia has begun exporting small amounts of rough rice to Tur-
key. 
 
Rice may also be parboiled, a process by which the rough rice is subjected to steam pressure making it 
hard and therefore less likely to break during milling. Parboiled rice typically sells at a premium to non-
parboiled rice. The main exporters of parboiled rice are Thailand, the United States and India. The main im-
porters are Western Europe, the Middle East and South Africa.                                                                     
 
 
 
The importance of the European Union as a rice importer has declined rather substan-
tially over the period 1980-99. From averaging 12.8% of total rice imports in 1980-85 
(not shown in table), the EU has only purchased 3.9% of world rice supplies during 
the period 1995-99. This increased self-sufficiency is in part explained by the EU rice 
policy, for which a proposal for reform has been set forth (See Chapter 4.4.4). The 
EU mainly imports indica rice from Thailand and the US, and premium basmati rice 
from India and Pakistan. The main importers among the transition countries (the for-
mer Soviet Union) are Russia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
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Table 3.3. Importers: Percentage shares of world rice imports, 1990-1999 
           
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
           
Indonesia 0.4 1.3 3.9 0.2 3.6 14.6 10.0 1.8 8.0 18.2 
Bangladesh 3.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 4.6 4.8 1.0 4.8 8.5 
Philippines 4.8 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.2 4.0 3.8 10.2 3.2 
Malaysia 2.7 3.1 2.8 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.7 3.3 2.8 2.3 
Japan 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 14.3 0.1 2.1 3.0 2.1 2.5 
Sth. Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.6 
Rst. of Asia 8.5 9.2 10.2 8.8 8.2 14.3 10.6 9.3 7.2 6.0 
Nigeria 1.8 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.4 1.6 3.7 2.5 2.6 
Senegal 3.2 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.1 2.4 2.4 
Ct. d'Ivoire 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.4 1.4 1.9 1.5 2.5 1.9 2.2 
Rst. of SSA 14.3 15.8 15.2 14.2 13.8 10.0 8.3 10.4 10.0 8.4 
Brazil 3.4 7.4 3.7 4.4 5.6 4.0 3.7 4.3 5.5 3.8 
Rst. LAm.Car. 8.7 9.0 10.1 11.1 10.8 8.2 9.8 10.3 9.1 6.8 
Iran 5.1 4.9 6.0 7.2 2.7 7.5 5.3 3.4 2.7 3.3 
Iraq 3.1 2.3 2.9 4.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 3.6 2.7 3.0 
Sau. Arabia 2.3 2.0 3.1 3.6 2.4 2.4 3.3 3.7 3.3 1.1 
EU* 6.6 5.8 5.0 5.0 6.3 3.7 4.3 4.8 3.6 3.3 
Trans.mrkts 4.6 4.7 6.5 5.1 2.6 2.6 4.6 5.0 3.6 4.5 
Rest of world 24.7 26.5 23.4 25.0 20.9 18.4 19.4 23.8 17.4 17.3 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
           
Note: Imports are measured in quantities. 
* For all years presented here this includes the fifteen countries that since 1/1/95 have constituted the Euro-
pean Union, i.e. including Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Sweden.  
Source: FAOSTAT (2001) 
           
 
 
International rice prices 
As mentioned earlier the international rice market is known for its volatility. With on-
ly about 5% of production entering world markets, production shortfalls in just a few 
major exporting or importing countries will have substantial effects on world rice pri-
ces.  
 
As is evident from Figure 3.3, world rice prices – using Thai 100 percent Grade B and 
US long grain #2, 4 percent as indicators – are very volatile with month-to-month 
swings of between +/- 25% for both Thai and US rice prices (not counting the US pri-
ce hikes in October 1987 and November 1993). Furthermore, the figure reveals that 
world rice prices have been declining steadily since 1997. 
 
Over the period depicted in the figure (1985/86-2000/01) the average Thai price was 
$276/ton, whilst the US price was $376/ton, i.e. an average difference of $100/ton. 
Yet as the figure makes evident, this average difference conceals very large fluctua-
tions over the years.  
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Figure 3.3. World rice prices 1985/86-2000/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Monthly averages of weekly f.o.b. quotes. Thai prices are obtained from the US Embassy in Bangkok. 
US prices are observations at milling centers in Houston, Texas and obtained from the Agricultural 
Marketing Service, ERS. 
Source: ERS (2001a). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 compares prices for 5 percent broken rice in the other major exporting 
countries. These data also reveal a downward trend in prices towards the end of the 
1990s for Vietnam, Thailand and Pakistan (albeit data availability is scanty for the 
latter). The price of Indian rice remains well above the other prices and does not show 
evidence of following the general trend. The Vietnamese price is somewhat lower 
than the comparable Thai price: an average difference of $20/ton over the depicted 
period. In other words, Vietnamese rice was sold at an 8% discount to Thai rice over 
this period. The Indian price, on the other hand, averaged $18/ton higher than the 
Thai price. Although there are only observations for ten of the months for Pakistan, it 
may be noted that the average price is $24/ton lower than the Thai price and $3/ton 
lower than the Vietnamese price. Hence there seems to be evidence that Thailand 
competes with the US on high-quality markets, where it accepts a price discount, 
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while it competes with Vietnam in lower-quality markets, where it captures a price 
premium. 
 
Figure 3.4. Comparing prices of 5 % broken rice in selected countries, 1997/98-
2000/01 
  
Note: Monthly averages of weekly f.o.b. quotes. Thai prices are obtained from the US Embassy in Bangkok. 
Other prices are weekly f.o.b. prices quoted in the Creed Rice Market Report, Creed Rice Co., Inc., 
Houston, Texas. 
Source: ERS (2001a). 
 
 
 
Bilateral trade flows 
The year-to-year variation in participants in international rice trade on the import side 
shown in Table 3.3 is of course evident at the bilateral level as well. Table 3.4 shows 
how the importance of individual export markets shifts just over a five-year period 
(1995-99) for Vietnam. The export structure of the other five exporters are shown in 
Table 3.7 for 1999 with the individual country table for the period 1995-99 contained 
in the Appendix Tables A.1 – A.5. The export structures shown in these tables are on 
a volume basis. 
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Vietnam 
Within the region Vietnam’s major export markets are Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. Sales to Iraq, Iran and Cuba are also important to Vietnamese rice ex-
ports. Iraq is a demander of high-quality long grain rice and Vietnam is the main sup-
plier to this country. Prior to the US-imposed sanctions in 1990, Iraq was a major 
market for US long grain milled rice. Cuba is a demander of low-quality long grain 
rice, and here Vietnam and China are the main suppliers. The US imposed restrictions 
on trade with Cuba in 1962, before which Cuba was a major market for US milled 
rice. Former political ties to Eastern Europe are also evident in the structure of Viet-
namese exports (Table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4. Vietnam’s top ten export markets, 1995-1999 
           
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Rank Country 
% 
share Country 
% 
share Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share Country 
% 
share 
           
  1 Indonesia  39.4 Iran  18.9 Philippines 16.3 Indonesia  55.3 Iraq  30.1 
  2 Cuba  15.4 Philippines  18.5  Iraq  15.5 Philippines 18.3 Cuba  12.9 
  3 Malaysia  11.4 Cuba  12.8  Indonesia  11.8 Iraq  11.1 Malaysia  9.5 
  4 Philippines 8.1 Iraq  9.8 Cuba  7.5 Malaysia  4.2 Tanzania  8.6 
  5 Iraq  7.0 Peru  6.5  Malaysia  6.8 Iran  2.5 Iran  7.4 
  6 Peru  3.1 Indonesia  5.9 Kenya  6.2 Poland  1.6 Singapore 5.6 
  7 Algeria  2.0 Senegal  5.9 Togo  5.9 Kenya  1.5 Yemen  4.1 
  8 Togo  1.9 Côte d’Ivoire  5.2 Iran  5.7 Sth Korea   1.1 Poland  3.6 
  9 Tanzania  1.9 Malaysia  4.8 Sth Korea  3.0 Algeria  0.8 Latvia  2.6 
10 Gabon  1.5 Guinea  2.3 Tanzania  2.7 Cuba  0.8 Algeria  2.3 
  Others 8.2 Others 9.5 Others 18.6 Others 3.0 Others 13.3 
           
  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%            
Thou. tons 1,587  2,898  3,267  3,421  4,521 
           
Note: Exports are measured on a quantity basis. Not all bilateral export flows in the FAOSTAT database are 
identified to specific destinations. The total amounts of rice exports (measure in metric tons) reported 
here include unspecified exports, whereas the percentage shares are calculated out of total specified 
trade. Note that China is one of the unidentified partners in this data set. 
Source: FAOSTAT (2001) 
           
 
 
Vietnam exports primarily indica rice, mainly of intermediate and low quality. As do-
cumented above Vietnam typically sells its intermediate and low-quality indica rice at 
a significant price discount relative to Thai counterparts. Part of the explanation 
behind this observation is that Vietnam entered the international rice market at a time 
of low world prices. Hence part of its emergence has been contingent on keeping 
prices competitively low, particularly in low-income markets. Even when beginning 
to export to higher-income markets, Vietnam has had to temper price premiums. Fi-
nally, there is the issue of low quality, which despite improved milling facilities, has 
 
 Vietnam in the International Rice Market, FØI  25 
been compounded by the lack of standardization systems, limited rice seed control, 
and insufficient drying and storage facilities.  
 
The quality of Vietnamese rice exports has increased markedly since it reentered the 
world market in 1989. As shown in Table 3.5 88% of Vietnam’s rice exports in 1989 
consisted of 35% or more brokens. This share has been brought down to 12% in 1997. 
 
Table 3.5. Vietnamese rice export quality, 1989, 1992 and 1996 
 
Quality grade 
% broken 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 Percent of total  
< 5 %    0.3   3.3   7.5 19.0 25.6 44.8   30.5 28.9 
10 %    1.5 13.0 27.6 21.3 26.0 24.4 24.6 16.7 43.6 
15 %    3.0   5.9   4.9 11.0 13.2   4.1 12.0   6.4 
20 %    2.3   2.0   5.6   4.3   8.2   9.2 10.7   6.1 
25 %    4.9  20.2 25.9 13.3 11.1   7.4 18.1 33.4 
 
44.4 
35 %  82.8 46.5 21.5 25.4 12.3   6.8   3.6   5.2 
> 45 %    5.2   9.0   7.0   5.4   3.4   1.9   0.5   3.3 12.0 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 100 
          
Source: Goletti and Rich (1998) for 1989-96 data. MARD (2000) for 1997 data. 
          
 
 
Table 3.6 shows the composition of Vietnams’ rice exports for the first six months of 
2001 by destination and quality. These data reveal, for example, that Indonesia and 
Malaysia import all the different qualities supplied by Vietnam, whereas Iraq, Japan 
and the EU countries are exclusively high-quality markets. The Philippines is exclu-
sively a purchaser of low-quality Vietnamese rice. 
 
Thailand 
The most important export markets for Thai rice within the region are Indonesia and 
Malaysia. In Africa Thai rice is sold mainly to Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. In 
the Middle East Iran is a major purchaser of Thai rice (Table 3.7). Thailand competes 
with the United States in certain high-quality markets such as the European Union, 
the Middle East and South Africa. In intermediate and low-quality markets Thailand 
competes with Vietnam, India, Pakistan and Myanmar. Most of Thailand’s exports 
are of the indica variety but there is also a smaller amount of aromatic jasmine rice, 
where the United States is a main market. Thailand has strongly increased exports to 
South Africa over the past ten years. This has had the effect of pushing the United 
States out of this specific market. From having supplied 80-90% of South Africa’s 
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Table 3.6. Vietnam’s rice exports, first half of 2001, by destinations and quality*, 
‘000 tons 
      
 Percentage  
brokens 
Gluti-
nous 
Par-
boiled 
Un-
known 
 
Total 
Destinations 5% 10% 15% 25% 100%     
          
Asia 111.3 168.7 115.5 434.5 1.5 5.4 0 2.0 838.9 
Indonesia 29.0 34.0 70.5 53.2 1.5 5.4 0 2.0 196.6 
Iraq 18.1 118.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 136.7 
Philippines 1.6 0 15.0 344.2 0 0 0 0 360.9 
Malaysia 42.4 9.6 13.9 19.3 0 0 0 0 85.2 
Japan 5.9 5.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.9 
East Timor 0 0 0 2.0 0 0 0 0 2.0 
Palau 2.2 0 3.0 2.8 0 0 0 0 8.0 
Singapore 6.9 1.5 13.0 13.0 0 0 0 0 34.5 
Middle East 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.4 
          
Africa 149.0 59.2 122.2 140.1 87.4 0 4.7 0 562.6 
Africa 146.4 51.0 112.2 140.1 87.4 0 0 0 537.0 
Tanzania 0 8.2 7.5 0 0 0 0 0 15.6 
Yemen 2.6 0 2.6 0 0 0 0 0 10.0 
          
Europe 30.5 73.6 20.0 1.0 0.3 0 0 0.0 125.5 
EU 10.3 29.8 7.0 0 0.3 0 0 0 47.4 
Russia 15.4 14.5 3.0 1.0 0 0 0 0.0 33.9 
Poland 4.8 29.3 10.0 0 0 0 0 0 44.1 
          
AUSTRALIA 5.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 7.4 
          
LATIN AMERICA 0 25.0 0 72.6 0 0 0 0 97.6 
Cuba 0 25.0 0 72.6 0 0 0 0 97.6 
Unknown 5.7 0 0 30.5 0 0 0 167.5 203.7 
          
Total 302.5 326.6 257.7 678.7 89.2 5.4 4.7 171.0 1.835.8 
 
*  Quality is often measured in terms of the percentage of broken kernels. Gultinous rice sells at a price 
premium due to its specialty characteristic, while parboiled rice sells at a price premium due to better mill-
ing characteristics. See Box 3.1. 
Source: FAS (2001a). 
 
 
 
rice imports in the 1960s and 1970s, the US market share has dropped to 14% in 
1999. South Africa transships small amounts of rice to neighboring countries (Childs 
and Burdett 2000). Iran is a consistent purchaser of high-quality long grain rice and 
Thailand is a major supplier. The US exporters have been prevented from supplying 
this market due to US-imposed sanctions in 1995. 
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Table 3.7. Top 10 export markets for the main rice exporters, excl. Vietnam, 1999 
          
 THAILAND  CHINA  USA  INDIA  PAKISTAN 
 
Rank 
 
Country 
% 
 share 
  
Country 
% 
 share 
  
Country 
% 
 share 
   
Country 
% 
 share 
  
Country 
% 
 share 
              
  1 Indonesia  18.0  Indonesia 28.9   Mexico  14.1   Bangladesh 37.9   U. Arab Em 15.4 
  2 Nigeria  11.0  Cot. d'Ivoire 16.6   EU  12.6   Saudi Arabia  20.5   Bangladsh 11.9 
  3 Iran  10.4  Cuba 8.9   Japan  11.6   Russ. Fed  7.3   Indonesia  11.5 
  4 Senegal  5.9  Philippines 7.1   Haiti  7.4   Sth Africa  6.5   Sri Lanka  7.1 
  5 Sth Africa  5.2  Russia 6.3   Canada  6.2   Nigeria  4.9   Afghanstn 7.0 
  6 Malaysia  5.1  Malaysia 4.9   Indonesia  5.9   EU 3.0   Sau. Arabia  5.6 
  7 Singapore 4.6  Iraq 4.0   Turkey  5.1   U. Arab Em 2.8   EU 4.8 
  8 USA  3.9  Guinea 3.9   Saudi Arab 4.1   Sri Lanka  2.6   Oman  4.6 
  9 Iraq  3.5  S. Korea 3.4   Russia  3.5   Kuwait  2.1   Sth Africa  3.9 
10 Togo  3.4  Libya 3.3   Nicaragua  2.9   Yemen  1.5   Malaysia  2.7 
  Others 29.1  Others 12.7   Others 26.5   Others 11.1   Others 25.5 
              
   100 %  100 %    100 %    100 %    100 % 
                             
Thou. tons 6,249  2,544     2,936     2,571   1,914 
 
Note: Not all bilateral export flows in the FAOSTAT database are identified to specific destinations. The total 
amounts of rice exports (measure in metric tons) reported here include unspecified exports, whereas 
the percentage shares are calculated out of total specified trade. Note that China is one of the uniden-
tified partners in this data set. 
Source: FAOSTAT (2001). 
 
 
 
China 
Several years with bumper rice crops coupled with declining per capita consumption 
of rice (partly being substituted by wheat) have enabled China to expand exports, par-
ticularly in the late-1990s. Currently China has abundant supplies of rice enabling in-
creased exports and leading to large stock accumulation. By evaluating the trade 
structure over the past few years China seems to be a major competitor of Vietnam. 
Within the region China exports mainly to Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia 
just like Vietnam (Table 3.7.). China also exports to politically sensitive countries 
such as Cuba and Iraq. The country’s communist history is also evident in the rice ex-
port pattern. In contrast with Vietnam, however, China has managed to gain access to 
the Japanese market after the URAA minimum access requirements were enforced in 
1995. Although a clear net exporter, China does import some rice. This is particularly 
fragrant rice from Thailand bought by high-income urban consumers. 
 
USA 
Virtually all rice produced in the United States is grown in six states: Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri and Texas. The United States was the leading 
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exporter of rice in most years from the late 1960s through 1980.  The US then took 
the position of the world’s second largest exporter after Thailand until 1997 where 
after Vietnam has made its presence clear. 
 
The United States is an exporter of high-quality rice to numerous markets around the 
world. Compared to the major Asian exporters US rice is, however, uncompetitive in 
some markets due to higher production costs. US milled rice exports have declined 
since the mid-1990s as a result of strong competition from Asian exporters. The US 
faces strongest competition from low-cost Asian exporters in the Middle East region 
and in South African. These countries are large importers of high-quality (long grain) 
milled rice. Eighty percent of US rice exports are southern long grain indica varieties 
where Latin America, the EU, Saudi Arabia, Canada and South Africa are the largest 
purchasers. Smaller quantities of japonica rice (grown mainly in California) are also 
exported, mainly to Japan, Turkey and Jordan. 
 
The US exports rice in all three forms: paddy, brown and milled. In fact, from consti-
tuting less than 10% of exports up until 1993/94, paddy rice exports have made up 
almost 30% of US rice exports since 1997/98 (ERS 2001a). Facing increasing compe-
tition on brown and milled rice markets, the paddy segment is the only one that has 
exhibited sustained growth over the past years. Indeed, as mentioned earlier the US is 
the only major exporter of paddy rice and sells mainly to Mexico and Central Amer-
ica (e.g. Costa Rice, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala).5 When har-
vests are poor, such as during the 1997/98 El Nino crop damage, or when supplies 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Mexico and the Central American countries have since the 1980s liberalized their rice markets and 
reduced government support of rice production. A long-term reduction in rice production in these 
countries is taking place, so there is a substantial excess milling capacity. The US has been quick 
to expand paddy rice exports to these markets in response to lower tariffs for rough than brown or 
milled rice in combination with increasing demand for rice. Around 90% of US rice exports to 
Mexico is paddy rice. Furthermore, as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) concluded in 1994, tariffs on all rice imports into Mexico from the US will be removed 
over a ten-year period. Both Mexico and the Central American countries impose very strict phyto-
sanitary restrictions on Asian rice. Since the early 1990s this has in practice meant a complete halt 
of Asian rice exports to Mexico. 
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from Argentina and Uruguay are weak, the US also supplies paddy rice to the Brazil-
ian market. Brazil mainly imports rice from Argentina and Uruguay.6  
 
The European Union is the largest market for US brown rice (purchasing nearly 60% 
in 1999/2000, Childs and Burdett 2000). This rice is shipped to northern Europe (pri-
marily the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) where it is fully milled. Most of this 
rice is then re-exported primarily to other EU countries but also outside the EU. The 
main reason that the bulk of US rice exports to the EU is brown rice is that import du-
ties for brown rice are substantially lower than for fully milled rice. Over the past 
years the US has been facing increased competition on the EU market from Asian ex-
porters, especially Thailand and India. These two countries primarily ship aromatic 
rice to the EU. Moreover, increased production of indica rice in Spain and Italy has 
limited import demand for this variety in the EU. 
 
As a direct consequence of Japan’s commitment to open its rice market to foreign 
supplies, the US has increased its exports to this market substantially since 1995. Ja-
pan is the largest market for US medium and short grain milled rice. The US has typi-
cally supplied half of Japan’s total minimum access purchases, although it has re-
cently lost shares to Australia and China (see Chapter 4). The markets of Iran and Iraq 
– and to a lesser extent Cuba, which is currently a low-quality importer – are potential 
markets for US rice although it is uncertain for political reasons whether this potential 
can be realized.7 Iran and Iraq are high-quality markets, but potential US exports 
would face stiff price competition from Thailand and Vietnam, which have much lo-
wer prices for comparable grades of rice. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay are all members of the regional trading block MERCO-
SUR where rice trade takes place free of duty. The El Nino was also the reason why the US could 
export to Ecuador and Colombia (Andean countries) in 1998. Usually, regional trade agreements 
provide Venezuela with import preferences within the Andean region. 
7 US rice exporters have been restricted by politically determined restrictions that have not allowed 
them to export to Iran (since 1995), Iraq (since 1990) and Cuba (since 1962). In October 2000 
President Clinton signed legislation eliminating unilateral embargoes on food and medicine ex-
ports to Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan and North Korea, becoming effective 120 days after signing. 
This legislation permits private or government supported sales to these countries (although there 
are additional restrictions on sales to Cuba, e.g. no US financing) if it is for humanitarian needs or 
in the interest of the US. In the case of Iraq, the United National Security Council established a 
program in 1995 to allow the Government of Iraq to sell a limited amount of oil for food and 
medicine. Up till now the US has only once (in July 2000) used this Oil-for-Food program to sell 
rice to Iraq (Childs and Burdett 2000). 
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India 
India has emerged as a major exporter of rice in the mid-1990s typically ranking 
fourth in world exports. India exports both low-quality milled rice to developing 
countries such as Bangladesh and premium-priced high-quality basmati rice to higher-
income countries. Basmati rice markets for India are the Middle East, the EU and the 
United States. The major markets for non-basmati rice are Russia, South Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Middle East. India has competed fiercely with the US suppli-
ers in Saudi Arabia, a country that does not produce any rice. From having supplied 
nearly 2/3 of Saudi Arabia’s rice imports in 1982, the US share was reduced to 16% 
in 1999 (Childs and Burdett 2000). Most of Indian exports to Saudi Arabia are bas-
mati and some parboiled rice. Due to internal pricing policies, India’s rice is currently 
uncompetitive on most indica markets. Moreover, India has problems relating to qual-
ity and reliability much like Vietnam does. 
 
Pakistan 
Rice from Pakistan is mainly sold to the United Arab Emirates, Iran and 
Bangladesh although exports to Indonesia are also substantial in some 
years. Like India, Pakistan exports both high-quality basmati rice to high-
income markets as well as low-quality rice to developing countries, mainly 
in Africa, where it competes with Thailand, Vietnam and China.  Accord-
ing to the ERS (2001a) about one-third of Pakistan’s rice production is 
basmati.  
 
Other exporters 
Australia produces and exports mainly high-quality japonica rice and has gained ac-
cess to about 16% of the Japanese market through the URAA requirements. Papua 
New Guinea and countries in the Middle East are other major export markets. Egypt 
has been able to increase its exports (almost entirely japonica) due to large production 
expansions. In South America Argentina and Uruguay are the largest exporters selling 
mainly to the Brazilian market through MERCOSUR arrangements.  
 
Myanmar was the largest rice exporter before World War II and ranked first or second 
until the mid-1960s. Exports are beginning to pick up, but remain of very low quality, 
mainly 25% brokens, due in part to antiquated marketing and milling facilities. Dis-
rupted by war and political unrest since the 1970s, Cambodia also began to export 
rice again in the mid-1990s, when the political situation stabilized. 
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Although the EU is a net importer of rice, the Union does export some rice outside the 
region. This is japonica rice sold to countries in the eastern Mediterranean. Small 
amounts of rice are also exported as food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, North Korea and 
the former Soviet Union. Japan is also a net importer of rice, but has in fact exported 
rice each year since 1998, mainly as food aid to Asian countries (North Korea and In-
donesia), as a result of declining domestic consumption and large excess supplies. As 
shall be discussed below, extremely high producer prices are a major reason for these 
large supplies and consequently large stocks.  
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4. Review of rice policies 
Despite the general move towards freer trade, the rice policy regimes around the 
world remain some of the most protective. More often than not the sector is controlled 
by direct government intervention in domestic marketing and foreign trade, and pro-
tected by high tariffs and numerous non-tariff barriers. 
 
Rice is the staple food in many Asian countries and the importance of this crop to 
food security and economic performance is evident. Throughout history the availabil-
ity of sufficient rice supplies has enabled economic development whereas the failure 
of a rice crop has led to famine and political instability. As a consequence virtually all 
rice-producing developing countries pursue policies aimed at promoting self-
sufficiency as an ultimate security against the thin and unstable international markets. 
The objectives of rice policies around the world vary across countries, of course, de-
pending in part on their net trade status, but generally they include at least some of the 
following:  
 
• Adequate supplies at low and stable prices for consumers 
• Promotion of producer incentives to increase domestic supplies 
• Reduced dependency on foreign supplies by increasing self-sufficiency 
• Generation or saving of foreign exchange 
• Generation or saving of government revenue 
• Adequate farm income 
• Interregional equity 
• Adequate nutrition  
 
Some of these objectives conflict with one another and the emphasis placed on each 
of the individual goals will change over time depending on the prevailing production 
and overall economic conditions. The most obvious and classic policy conflict is that 
of securing farmers adequate incomes whilst ensuring low prices to consumers.8     
 
The primary goals of self-sufficiency and stable domestic prices are most often sought 
achieved through direct market intervention and wide-scale public distribution sys-
tems. In Asia there is a tradition of state trading enterprises having strong controls 
over domestic marketing of rice as well as being given exclusive rights to import and 
                                                 
8 Naturally, farmer incentives need not be boosted through higher support prices, but can be 
strengthened through lower input costs, technology innovations, and expansions and improve-
ments of infrastructure. Such initiatives, of course, use rather than generate government revenue. 
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export rice. Foreign trade is typically controlled directly through quotas.9 By using 
quantitative restrictions rather than tariffs, a separation of domestic prices from world 
market prices is achieved.10 Seen from the individual country perspective, the strategy 
of independence from the world market could be argued as being rational given its 
current thinness, instability and unpredictability. Therefore, it cannot be expected that 
governments will change their policies – by making import and export volumes more 
responsive to world prices – as long as the international rice market retains these 
characteristics. The consequence is, however, that these isolationist policies simply 
add to the (price) instability of world rice markets.      
 
The unreliability of the international market has furthermore induced many govern-
ments to rely on their own stockpiling as a supplement to import and export controls. 
According to Siamwalla and Haykin (1983) there has been a tendency for govern-
ments to overstock in years of excess production rather than export the surplus. Gov-
ernments have generally found this to be an easier and less risky option compared 
with reliance on the world market. To the extent that world rice markets did function 
efficiently this would not be a rational decision. 
 
The recent developments in rice policies have been affected by above-average har-
vests (record world production in 1999), faltering import demand (except for 1998), 
and declining world prices. Particularly in the developed countries focus has shifted 
toward supporting farmers’ incomes. Governments have intervened by expanding rice 
procurement, lowering support prices, controlling production (e.g. moving land out of 
rice production), increasing direct income transfers, restricting imports, and/or en-
couraging exports. Despite these lower world market prices, the self-sufficiency pol-
icy focus in the developing countries, however, has not changed. Expansionary pro-
duction policies are generally being maintained in both traditional rice importing and 
rice exporting developing countries (FAO 2001a). Hence the change in world rice 
policies over the past few years has only been partly consistent with the price devel-
opments in domestic and world markets. 
                                                 
9  See e.g. Latham (1998) for a history of export and import controls, which date back to the 1930s. 
10 This tendency of market isolation has been exacerbated by the country-specific pattern of tech-
nology adoption. The environmental and structural conditions in the traditional importing coun-
tries have been more receptive to the high-yielding varieties that were introduced in the late 1960s 
and 1970s and which require timely irrigation and chemical fertilizers. This has helped them in 
their drive for self-sufficiency and has lowered their need to import from world markets. Tradi-
tional exporters such as Thailand and China have typically relied on traditional methods that have 
made use of their naturally flooded river deltas that simplify planting, but where it is not easy to 
neither control water supply nor regulate fertilizer use. (Latham 1998). 
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4.1. Comparative overview 
Before embarking on a description of the policies of Vietnam and the other major rice 
exporting and importing countries, this section aims at providing a preliminary com-
parative overview of the degrees of protection and support provided to the rice sectors 
of these countries. The methodological backdrop is the classification scheme for agri-
cultural support and protection policies that underlies the well-known OECD Pro-
ducer Support Estimate (PSE). The PSE is an indicator of the monetary value of im-
plicit and explicit transfers from consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural pro-
ducers arising from policy measures that support agriculture. The outset of the OECD 
classification is that the impact of a particular policy instrument on production, con-
sumption and trade depends on the extent to which it is linked to a specific commod-
ity or to an input used to produce that commodity (OECD 2001a). This leads to a 
ranking of policy measures according to their relative potential economic impact. In 
general, the more specific to a commodity a measure is, the greater the potential im-
pact. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the different types of agricultural policies in 
descending order according to the degree of their potential distorting effects of pro-
duction and trade.11 
 
The PSE quantifies the implicit and explicit transfers from consumers and taxpayers 
to producers of the agricultural policies. There are a number of indicators based on 
the PSE measure and its subcomponents, which enable comparisons of degrees of 
protection and market orientation across countries. Table 4.2 contains a selection of 
such indicators of which the ones that are based directly on the PSE are only available 
for the OECD countries.  
 
The %PSE shows the share of transfers to producers in the total value of gross farm 
receipts, i.e. the share of farm receipts that is due to policy. For rice producers in Ja-
pan and Korea, for example, 70-90% of farm receipts are directly due to policy meas-
ures. The share is between 10 and 30% for rice farmers in the US and in the EU.  
 
As indicated in Table 4.1 direct Market Price Support (MPS) has the most distortive 
effects on production and trade. This component of the PSE includes a wide range of 
 
 
                                                 
11 The PSE does not include the costs of general agricultural policies that are not received directly 
by individual farmers. Examples are research and development, investments aimed at improving 
infrastructure, government financed quality control of inputs, etc. These are included in the 
OECD’s General Services Support Estimate (GSSE). 
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Table 4.1.  Relative impacts of policy measures on production and trade  
      
 
 
 
Effect on 
production 
and trade 
Effect on 
consump- 
tion 
 
Budget 
financed 
 
 
Description 
 
Examples of 
instruments 
      
Market Price 
Support (MPS) 
√* √ - Support provided 
through policies that 
create a gap be-
tween domestic and 
border prices 
Border measures on im-
ports and exports, Public 
and on-farm stockhold-
ing, Food aid, Consump-
tion subsidies, Export 
subsidies 
Payments based 
on output 
√ - √ Increases producer 
price  
Deficiency payments 
Payments based 
on use of inputs 
√ - √ Reduces costs of 
inputs, subsidies on 
variable inputs have 
greater impact than 
subsidies on fixed 
inputs 
Subsidies on fertilizer, 
feed, seeds, energy, wa-
ter, transportation, and 
insurance; Interest con-
cessions; Tax rebates 
Payments based 
on area planted/ 
animal numbers 
√ - √ Requirements to 
produce specific 
crops / own animals 
Hectare premiums; 
Headage payments 
Payments based 
on historical enti-
tlements 
√ - √ No requirements to 
producer specific 
crops / own animals 
Payments based on past 
support, area, animal 
numbers, production or 
income 
Payments based 
on input con-
straints 
√ - √ Constraints on in-
puts and/or farming 
practice 
Reduction, replacement 
or withdrawal of inputs; 
Environmentally friendly 
production 
Payments based  
on overall farm-
ing 
income 
√ - √ Triggered by pre- 
determined farm  
income level 
Income-dependent  
payments 
 
* In the 2nd and 3rd columns a tick (√) indicates that there is an effect, while a dash (-) indicates that there is 
no direct effect. In the 4th column a tick indicates that the measure requires budgetary outlays, while a dash 
indicates that the measure does not operate through explicit budgetary outlays. The declining size of the 
ticks down the 2nd column indicates that the relative potential impact of the policy measures described on 
production and trade declines as the instruments become less commodity specific and less coupled to pro-
duction.  
 
 
 
policies and it can of course be difficult to single out the contribution of each instru-
ment. The share of MPS in PSE nevertheless provides an indication of how prevalent 
this type of support is in a given country compared with other less distortionary forms 
of support. Table 4.2 reveals that Japan and Korea rely heavily on price support poli-
cies. The EU also relies to a large extent on market price support to its rice producers, 
but the share of MPS in PSE has declined over the most recent years. According to 
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the OECD estimates the US does not rely on market price support at all.12 In other 
words, US domestic prices seem to be in line with world market prices.  
 
Finally, the table contains estimates of the Nominal Protection Coefficient. For the 
OECD countries these estimates are taken directly from OECD sources and shown in 
Tables A.6-A-9 of the Appendix to this report. For non-OECD countries proxies have 
been calculated. The documentation hereof is also contained in the Appendix. 
 
The first observation to be made is that the degree of protection provided to Japanese 
and Korean rice producers is far greater than the protection provided to producers in 
the US and the EU. Furthermore, the degree of protection has consistently increased 
in Japan, Korea and the United States over the period 1997-99. For the EU support 
has declined over the past years (see Chapter 4.4.4 below). 
 
For the non-OECD countries the estimated coefficients indicate that rice producers 
are generally implicitly taxed rather than protected. The prices received by rice farm-
ers in Vietnam, for example, are 14%-22% below the prices obtainable for exports. 
Chinese rice producers are taxed even more heavily. Another observation is that for 
several countries, particularly Indonesia, whether rice producers are taxed or subsi-
dized varies other the years. As shall be seen below, these year-by-year changes in 
policy are typically responses to the domestic harvest situation and are a clear reflec-
tion of the rice self-sufficiency objective followed by most governments of Asian rice 
producing countries. 
 
In the following chapters the rice policies of Vietnam (Chapter 4.2) and the other ma-
jor rice exporting (4.3) and importing (4.4) countries will be described. In each case 
the overall objectives of the policy regime will be stated and the policy instruments 
will be described. The descriptions of the policy instruments follow the structure pro-
vided by the OECD PSE policy measure classification scheme as shown in Table 4.1 
above. 
 
 
                                                 
12 The estimates for the US rice sector should be interpreted with caution, however, because the ref-
erence price used is an implicit price derived by subtracting the average unit value of export sub-
sidy (total value of export subsidies for the crop year divided by total exports) from the producer 
price. Hence implicit export subsidies through e.g. the provision of export credits and food aid are 
not taken into account. This can only be measured by comparing the “true” export price with the 
producer price. 
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Table 4.2. Selected indicators of market protection, market orientation and assis-
tance to the rice sectors in OECD and non-OECD countries 
     
 1997 1998 1999 2000e 
     
%PSEa     
United States 10 15 26 - 
Japan 78 84 88 - 
Korea 79 71 80 - 
European Union 20 18 29 - 
     
Share of MPS in PSEb     
United States 0 0 0 - 
Japan 87 89 89 - 
Korea 96 96 97 - 
European Union 98 68 59 - 
     
Nominal Protection Coefficientc    
United States - 1.01 1.28 1.43 
Japan - 5.81 7.19 8.17 
Korea - 3.40 4.15 6.25 
European Union - 1.18 0.99 0.89 
     
Vietnam 0.78 0.78 0.86 - 
Thailand 1.05 0.95 1.08 - 
China - 0.60 0.74 0.75 
India - 0.71 0.78 0.79 
Pakistan - 0.89 1.00 1.25 
Indonesia 1.18 0.52 1.18 - 
 
a The percentage PSE is calculated as follows: %PSE = PSE/(Q*Pp + PP)*100, where Q*Pp = Value of pro-
duction at producer prices and PP = Payments to producers = PSE – Market Price Support. 
b MPS = Market Price Support  
c The Nominal Protection Coefficient is calculated as follows: NPCp = (Pp + PO/ton)/Pb, where Pp is the av-
erage price received by producers (at farm gate), PO/ton is payments based on output, and Pb is the bor-
der price (at farm gate). The data for the OECD countries are obtained directly from OECD (2001). The 
calculations behind the estimates for the non-OECD countries are described in the Appendix. 
e Preliminary 
Source: OECD PSE database 1999 Edition, OECD (2001) and own calculations. See Appendix for calcula-
tions of NPCp for non-OECD countries. 
 
4.2. Rice policy in Vietnam 
Policy objectives 
Like many other developing countries, Vietnam faces the policy dilemma of seeking 
to achieve food security for its population whilst also raising foreign exchange earn-
ings by encouraging the export of food and agricultural products. Rice is at the crux 
of this dilemma for Vietnam since it is both the dominant staple food (accounting for 
¾ of the caloric intake of the average Vietnamese household) and the second or third 
largest foreign exchange earning sector of the country (accounting for more than 10% 
of the total value of exports and almost 40% of the value of agricultural exports in 
1997, Que and Que 2000).  
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Policy instruments 
Table 4.2 above showed that the nominal protection coefficient for Vietnam’s rice 
sector has consistently been below unity over the past few years – a reflection of do-
mestic prices being lower than world market prices. As shall be seen below many dif-
ferent border measures contribute to this negative market price support. Being a de-
veloping country there is not much budgetary scope for directly supporting rice pro-
ducers in Vietnam, but there are other ways in which the Government seeks to influ-
ence rice production and trade (encouragement of production of specific types of rice, 
regulation of fertilizer imports, etc.).  
 
Market Price Support: An export quota  
The food security argument has weighed heavily in the balance of policy objectives 
mentioned above and therefore the Government of Vietnam has kept a tight control 
on the volume of rice exports ever since it re-entered the international rice market as 
an exporter in 1989. Yet the success of Vietnamese rice exports has given impetus to 
the foreign exchange earning objective and so as of May 1, 2001 the export quota, 
which has been the most direct instrument used to regulate rice exports, has been re-
moved. Nevertheless, as shall be discussed below, the government still retains a sub-
stantial degree of control over rice exports. 
 
Turning back time to the policy regime before May 1, 2001, the Government of Viet-
nam has controlled the volume of rice exports by setting an annual export quota. An 
export quota amounts to negative Market Price Support by implicitly taxing exports. 
The quota has been set each year by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment, the State Planning Committee, and the Ministry of Trade based on estimates of 
domestic supply and utilization. The rice export quota has typically been allocated in 
two steps: an initial allocation valid up to September, followed by a second allocation 
after an evaluation of the domestic crop situation.  
 
The rights to export rice under the national quota have been allocated to the two re-
gional state-owned trading enterprises – VINAFOOD I (also known as the Northern 
Food Company) in Hanoi and VINAFOOD II (Southern Food Company) in Ho Chi 
Minh City – and to a number of provincial state-owned trading enterprises. VINA-
FOOD II has handled the majority of the Corporation’s rice exports because the bulk 
of export rice is produced in this region (FAOSTAT 1995). Following reforms of the 
quota allocation process in 1996, however, the provincial SOEs have been given a 
substantially larger share of the national quota (Latham 1998). 
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The initial steps to liberalize the rice export regime in the sense of allowing private 
trading companies to participate in rice exports were taken in the years 1997 and 
1998. Export quotas were offered to private traders on the basis of four criteria: pre-
vious experience in rice trade, ownership of milling facilities, capacity to export at 
least 5,000 tons per shipment, and proof of financial security (Goletti 1998). Although 
several private companies have since obtained access to export quotas, they accounted 
for just 4% of total rice exports in 1999 (Minot and Goletti 2000). Hence there still 
seem to be barriers to entry for private firms.13 In terms of the allocation of quota 
rents, however, it is worth noting that although private firms have not until recently 
formally held export quotas, they have been and continue to do most of the actual 
trading by working as subcontractors to the quota holders, i.e. the state owned enter-
prises (CIE 1998). According to Goletti (1998) private traders purchase 96% of total 
market surplus from farmers. 
 
Foreign rice firms have increasingly established their presence in the country, and 
their marketing expertise has according to Latham (1998) been crucial for re-
establishing Vietnam’s position as a major exporter. Vietnam’s revised Trade Law of 
January 1, 1998 allows foreign traders to set up branches and engage in direct transac-
tions, carry out trade deals and offer trade services. They have not yet been allowed to 
export rice themselves, but they act as agents for the provincial food companies.  
 
By using a two-step allocation procedure for the annual rice export quota, the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam has secured itself a significant degree of “flexibility” to respond 
to the prevailing domestic crop situation. In 1997, for example, the initial quota was 
2.0 million tons out of a total estimated quota for the whole year of 2.5 million tons. 
Above-average harvests enabled the quota to be raised with a final volume of 3.6 mil-
lion tons being exported that year. The flexible quota has not always been used to in-
crease exports, but also to restrict them. In 1998 the annual quota was set at 4.0 mil-
lion tons, of which 3.6 was the initial allocation. Facing a drought situation, the Min-
istry of Trade and the provincial rice export steering committees were instructed to 
restrict exports thereby failing on contracts of delivery. The Government simply cho-
se not to authorize the prices negotiated by exporters and buyers (CIE 1998). And a 
final example to muddy the picture: The allocation of an export quota of 4 million 
                                                 
13 Increasing the participation of the private trading firms in rice exports is important because their 
costs are considerably lower than those of SOEs. According to Minot and Goletti (2000) the unit 
costs of SOEs in the two main rice-producing areas – the Mekong River Delta in the south and the 
Red River Delta in the north – are four to sixteen times the corresponding costs of private firms. 
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metric tons in the year 2000 assigned directly to rice exporters could not be fulfilled. 
Only 3.4 million tons ended up being exported (Oryza 2001). 
 
A natural question is then whether this flexible setting of the export quota in reality 
has meant that the “quota” has been more a target than a binding quota? There are se-
veral indications, however, that the rice export quota has been binding. First of all, 
according to Minot and Goletti (2000) there has been intense political lobbying activ-
ity among SOEs (and private firms when they were permitted to request quotas) to 
receive export quota allocations. Second, there are strong indications that 0.5 million 
tons of rice were exported illegally to China in 1995 (official exports were registered 
at 2.0 million tons that year). Third, an investigation of the foreign-domestic price dif-
ferential shows that the domestic price has been substantially below the border price 
during the period 1990-1995. As shown in Table 4.3, this amounts to an export tax 
equivalent of between 20% and 25% as a percentage of the border price.  
 
Table 4.3. Export tax equivalent of Vietnam’s export quota, 1990-95 
      
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Exports 
Domestic price 
(wholesale 
price, Mekong 
Delta) 
 
Border price 
(f.o.b. export 
price)a 
Export tax 
equivalent as a 
percentage of 
domestic price 
Export tax  
equivalent as a 
percentage of 
border price 
    
 Million metric tons                        USD/metric ton                 Percent 
1990  1.6 135 170 26.3 20.8 
1991  1.0 164 226 38.2 27.6 
1992  1.9 155 207 33.1 24.9 
1993  1.7 159 203 28.1 21.9 
1994  2.0 162 218 34.2 25.5 
1995   2.0b 202 269 33.2 24.9 
1996    3.0c - - - - 
1997             3.6 - - - - 
1998 3.7 - - - - 
1999 4.6 - - - - 
 
a Although not explicitly stated in Minot and Goletti (2000), a previous study Goletti and Minot (1997) indi-
cates that the border price given here is the export unit value. 
b It is widely believed that 0.5 million tons were exported illegally to China this year. 
c FAOSTAT reports 3.5 million tons for 1996. 
Source: Price data for 1990-1995: Minot and Goletti (2000). Export data: GSO (1999).  
 
 
 
The next question is whether the quota has become less binding after 1995 – a period 
characterized by frequent adjustments as described above. For the more recent years, 
1995-1999, Minot and Goletti (2000) compare retail prices with the f.o.b. 25% broken 
price in lack of more appropriate data (Table 4.4). When comparing the data for 1995 
in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, however, it is evident that there is a large margin between the 
wholesale price and the retail price, and that the average export quality is higher than 
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25% brokens. Hence this price comparison does not seem appropriate. Therefore, Ta-
ble 4.4 presents calculations of an implicit wholesale price and an implicit unit export 
value based on an assumption that the relationship between wholesale and retail 
prices and the relationship between the price of 25% brokens and the average unit va-
lue of exports are constant in the period 1995-99. These calculations show that the 
quota has in fact amounted to an export tax equivalent of 23%-25% in the period 
1995-98 followed by a dip to 15% in 1999 (Table 4.4). Hence, the available informa-
tion provides no basis to conclude that the export quota has become less binding up 
until its removal. 
 
Table 4.4. Comparison of domestic and export prices, 1995-1999 
       
 
 
 
Year 
 
Implicit 
wholesale 
price*  
 
Retail price 
Mekong 
Delta 
 
 
Unit export 
value* 
 
Vietnam fob 
price 25%  
broken rice 
Export tax 
equivalent 
as a % of 
border price* 
 
Thailand fob 
price 25% 
broken rice 
       
  ---------------- USD/metric ton ----------------   
1995 202 250 269 252 24.9 300 
1996 204 253 267 250 23.6 280 
1997 183 227 235 229 22.1 254 
1998 204 253 265 250 23.0 250 
1999 183 226 215 205 14.9 215 
 
* The implicit wholesale prices are calculated on the basis of the relationship between the 1995 wholesale 
price in Table 4.3 and the 1995 retail price in Table 4.4. Minot and Goletti (2000) provide evidence that the 
margin between retail and wholesale prices is 8-9% and regression analysis shows no detectable trend in 
this margin over the period 1986-95. Wholesale paddy prices are 4-5% above farm gate rice prices, and 
once again there is no trend in this price wedge. The paddy-rice margins reflect the costs and profits in the 
milling sector and are 73-75% over the period 1986-95 with no statistically significant trend. Finally, it may 
be noted that rice prices are 30% higher in the north than in the south regions of the country with no trend. 
The unit export value for 1995 is taken directly from Table 4.3. The value for 1996 is calculated based on 
the relationship between the 1995 border price in Table 4.3 and the 1995 price for 25% broken rice in Ta-
ble 4.4. The average export prices are calculated for 1997-99 by using the rice export quality structure 
given in Table 3.5 and the price quotes provided by the USDA (2001). Hence they are “quality-adjusted”. 
The export tax equivalent is calculated on this basis. 
Source: Minot and Goletti (2000), and own calculations 
 
 
 
The impact of a binding export quota depends on whether the country imposing the 
quota is “large” or “small” (see Box 4.1). Vietnam has ranked number two in world 
rice exports in volume terms in recent years, and some analysts such as Minot and 
Goletti (2000) have taken this to imply that the  “large country” assumption is appro-
priate. With a market share of 17-18% in recent years it is clear that Vietnam is a sig-
nificant player on the world rice market. Yet there are also indications that Vietnam’s 
influence on the global price setting process may be somewhat less pronounced. It 
was seen earlier that Vietnam’s share of world trade measured in value terms is 
somewhat lower than the share measured in volume terms. Furthermore, Vietnam has 
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entered the market as an exporter at a time when rice prices have been falling and has 
therefore found itself necessitated to sell its rice at a discount. Hence there does not 
seem to be evidence that the Vietnamese export quota has had a price raising effect on 
world markets.  
 
Market Price Support: Export tax  
Until 1998 the Vietnamese rice regime has also consisted of an export tax (IMF 
1999). Just like the quota, the rice export tax has also been managed flexibly in the 
sense that it has not always been levied, particularly in times of low world market pri-
ces (FAOSTAT 1995). In 1997 export duties were 0% on rice with more than 25% 
brokens, and 1% on other rice qualities (CIE 1998). An export tax in addition to an 
export quota has the effect of shifting some of the rents from the quota holders to the 
government in the form of tax revenue.  
 
Market Price Support: “Guidance” export prices 
The export quota and tax instruments have been accompanied by the setting of “guid-
ance” export prices. According to the latest Oryza (2001) reports, the Vietnam Food 
Association still sets floor prices for exports despite its efforts to liberalize the regime. 
According to the latest plan submitted for approval to the Ministry of Trade, Viet-
namese rice exporters were told not to accept export contracts with prices less than 
160, 155, 150, 140 USD/MT (f.o.b. HCMC) for 5%, 10%, 15% and 25% broken rice, 
respectively. The actual export price depends of course on a wide range of factors in-
cluding world market conditions, quality, reputation of the exporter, efficiency of port 
facilities, bargaining skills, etc. In response to this reality the minimum export price 
has indeed had to be lowered in response to weak international prices, thereby render-
ing it less restrictive on export contracting.  
 
Market Price Support: Import tariffs 
As shall be discussed below, the Vietnamese Government encourages the production 
of high quality and specialty rice varieties. Vietnam currently imports limited 
amounts of high-quality rice varieties, mainly from Thailand, and by increasing im-
port tariffs it hopes to reduce this inflow and to encourage farmers to expand produc-
tion of such varieties. Just like the “flexible” management of export restrictions, im-
port restrictions are also changed frequently. In April 2000 Vietnam raised its import 
levies from 10% to 20% for all types of rice except paddy, which remained duty free. 
Another rise to 30% was implemented in July 2000 and yet another to 40% as of No-
vember 1, 2001 (FAS 2001a). 
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Box 4.1. Quantitative export restraints 
 
Some countries restrict exports of staple foods such as rice, maize and wheat for food security reasons. Ir-
respective of price developments on the world markets, exporters are restrained from supplying more than a 
fixed quantity. A binding export quota will change the demand curve seen from the perspective of domestic 
exporters. In the figure below the demand curve is Dq. The domestic price falls to the benefit of the consum-
ers, but at a cost to producers. The net effect is a deadweight loss equal to b+d. The curves depicted are 
excess supply and demand curves of the foreign and domestic economies, respectively, and so the areas a, 
b, c, and d represent the combined consumer and producer surpluses in the market for the good (see e.g. 
Deardorff 1999). Agents with the right to export under the quotas gain what corresponds to the area c. If the 
country imposing the quota is “large” in the sense that it can affect world market prices by its policy, the 
world price will tend to rise. The area a shows the potential terms of trade gain. The net effect is uncertain, 
but a very large country could actually gain from imposing an export quota if demand for its exports is highly 
inelastic or if the implicit tax of the quota is rather small. The latter would be more likely if exports of the par-
ticular good in question constituted only a small share of domestic production and if domestic supply and 
demand are very elastic. In the small country case, there is no impact on the world market price, hence no 
terms of trade gain, and therefore the country stands only to lose. Just like a variable levy, the difference be-
tween an export quota and an export tax is evident as market conditions change. An export tax has a con-
stant degree of negative protection while allowing the volume of exports to change. An export quota main-
tains a fixed export volume, but allows the degree of protection to vary according to domestic market condi-
tions and the world price. Furthermore, an export tax generates explicit revenue to the government, whereas 
a quota generates rents that may be distributed in many different ways depending on who has access to the 
quota. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a member of ASEAN Vietnam is committed to reducing tariffs on imports from 
other ASEAN countries to 0-5% by 2006 for a list of agricultural and industrial prod-
ucts included in the so-called Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT). 
Non-tariff barriers relating to these goods are also to be eliminated, and customs, in-
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vestment and standard regulations and procedures are to be harmonized (CIE 1998). 
To meet AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Agreement) requirements, the Government of 
Vietnam has adopted a detailed annual road map for tariff reductions and the phasing 
out of quantitative restrictions vis-à-vis ASEAN countries between 2001 and 2006. 
 
For 2001 only seed paddy is included in the CEPT commitments and it is included at 
a rate of 0%. The other kinds of paddy, husked, semi-milled and milled, and broken 
rice are excluded from the CEPT reduction schedule, included in either the sensitive 
list or the temporary exclusion list. Hence the increase of the rice tariff rate to 40% 
mentioned above is also valid on rice imports from other ASEAN members. 
 
Table 4.5. Rice tariff rates applied by Vietnam as of November 1, 2001* 
     
 
HS code 
 
HS description 
Special pref-
erential rate 
Preferential 
rate 
 
Normal rate 
     
1006 Rice    
1006.10 - Paddy    
1006.10.10 -- For sowing   0   0   0 
1006.10.90 -- Other 40 40 60 
1006.20.00 - Husked (brown rice) 40 40 60 
1006.30.00 - Semi-milled or wholly milled rice, 
whether or not polished or glazed 
40 40 60 
1006.40.00 - Broken rice 40 40 60 
 
-  In 1999 Vietnam implemented a change in its import tariff structure. There is a three-tier tariff structure: a 
special preferential rate (applicable at this time to ASEAN countries through the CEPT scheme under the 
AFTA), a preferential rate (applicable to imports from countries with which Vietnam applies the MFN 
status, i.e. the EU, the US, Japan and most non-ASEAN Asian countries), and the normal rate (which is 
50% higher than the preferential rate for other countries) Apoteker (2000).  
Source: FAS (2001a, 2001b). 
 
 
 
Market Price Support measures: Public stockholding 
Apart from quantitative restrictions on exports and tariffs on imports, national food 
security is also sought achieved through procurement and storage programs. Stock-
holding programs enable the Government to regulate domestic prices. The VINA-
FOOD corporations are required to hold stocks, known as a circulation reserve, as a 
basis for market intervention and to cover food requirements due to seasonal varia-
tions. The financial means to purchase rice for the reserve are drawn from the operat-
ing capital of the SOEs, which in turn is part of the state budget. The corporations are 
permitted to manage the reserves as they see fit, but must also bear all costs and fi-
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nancial responsibilities.14 Due to poor storage facilities a substantial deterioration of 
quality occurs, and when these stocks are wound down through sales to domestic and 
foreign markets, lower prices are obtained.  
 
Measures based on use of inputs 
In a developed country a government may assist its farmers with direct support based 
on e.g. output or input use. In a developing country like Vietnam there is very little 
budgetary scope for direct support of producers. Furthermore, in the case of a staple 
food like rice, the overriding concern with domestic food security can in fact result in 
direct or indirect taxation of producers rather than support. This is because govern-
ments try to keep tight control of domestic supplies at the regional level and to limit 
exports of staple foods.  
 
In Vietnam there are restrictions on internal rice trade, which in effect act like a tax 
on the use of transportation services in the rice sector. These restrictions are in place 
to ensure inter-regional equity in terms of security of rice supplies and to control ille-
gal exports. The rice surplus region of the country is in the southern Mekong Delta 
whereas the rice deficit regions are in the north. Furthermore, the destination of most 
smuggled rice is China, which borders Vietnam to the north.  
 
The restrictions are mainly bureaucratic rigidities in the form of fees, taxes, police 
checkpoints, permit requirements, but sometimes also explicit bans. These measures 
all act as a tax on internal rice trade because they increase costs of inter-regional tra-
de. As late as in 1996 purchases by the northern rice-deficit regions from the south 
required the following: (1) a license from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural De-
velopment, (2) registration with the Market Control Department, (3) purchase at a 
place determined by VINAFOOD II, (4) registration with local market control chap-
ters in the south, (5) registration at ports of departure and arrival, and (6) registration 
with local market controls in the north (Minot and Goletti 2000).15 Moreover, SOEs 
have been granted monopoly control over north-south rice trade in part because the 
                                                 
14 Rice is also held in the national reserve fund - a strategic security entity - along with other ‘essen-
tial’ goods such as medicines, chemicals, metals, motor vehicles, and defence and communication 
equipment (CIE 1998). 
15 An analysis by Minot and Goletti (2000) shows that the restrictions on north-south internal trade 
are so great that if these are lifted, the implicit export tax associated with the export quota is re-
duced because internal south-north trade provides an unused sales potential. This is most probably 
a specific feature of the unique geographical segregation of the Vietnamese rice market rather 
than a general observation about complementarity of domestic and foreign policy liberalization. 
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profits earned by the SOEs are an important source of revenue for the central gov-
ernment. 
 
Restrictions on domestic trade in rice were removed in 1997. Decision no. 140 on the 
“Management of Rice Export and Fertilizer Import in 1997” declared that “any or-
ganization or individual who is registered for food business activities is allowed to 
buy, process, transport, and carry out food business activities for the domestic con-
sumption”. Furthermore, “licenses and controls on domestic food transport are abol-
ished, as are food taxes for wholesale activities among different regions, in order to 
create a unified and free flow of food dictated by the demand and supply of the mar-
ket” (cited in Goletti 1998). Yet the requirements for obtaining a business certificate 
for private traders operating in the internal market are strict. They must have a mini-
mum capital of USD 4.5 million and must have been trading for at least three years. 
Few companies can fulfill these criteria and so it is doubtful how real the liberaliza-
tion of south-north trade has been (Latham 1998). 
 
Measures based on use of inputs: restrictions on fertilizer trade 
In addition to the explicit and implicit taxation of rice trade, the rice sector has also 
been taxed implicitly through the restrictions on fertilizer imports. Compared with 
other Southeast Asian countries, Vietnamese rice production is an intense user of in-
organic fertilizers and domestic production supplies only 13% of total use, thereby 
making imported fertilizer critical (Goletti 1998).16 The MARD and the Ministry of 
Trade, who have determined the quantity and types of fertilizer to be imported each 
year, have controlled fertilizer imports. In 1997 the quota was 2.527 million tons 
(GSO 1999). Quotas are allocated to the provinces based on expected provincial pro-
duction. The provincial authorities then allocate the quotas to the enterprises under 
their management. Non-state enterprises have also been allowed to receive quota allo-
cations subject to fulfillment of certain criteria. Just like the rice export quota, the fer-
tilizer import quota has been adjusted following mid-year reviews of the local supply 
and demand conditions.   
  
The Government operates a Price Stabilization Fund to monitor prices on fertilizer. 
This acts as a variable levy because an import surcharge is invoked when interna-
tional prices fall significantly below regulated maximum selling prices. When interna-
tional prices rise, funds are disbursed to stabilize domestic prices (European Commis-
                                                 
16 According to the IMF (1999) joint-venture fertilizer plants are being opened to start domestic 
production of more advanced fertilizer types, but the import substitution idea is still lurking as im-
port bans have been imposed for precisely  these products. 
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sion 2001). Fertilizer price volatility in Vietnam has indeed been lower than in world 
markets – clearly the reason why this system has been established – but this stability 
has been achieved at the cost of domestic fertilizer prices being well above world 
market prices thereby representing a real tax on farmers (Table 4.6). Since quota hol-
ders earn rents, an active illegal market for fertilizer quotas has been established, and 
informal interviews reveal that the value of these quotas has been around USD 3-4 per 
ton (Goletti 1998).  
 
Table 4.6. Comparison of fertilizer prices 1998* 
    
 
Fertilizer type 
Domestic price 
USD/kg 
Import price 
USD/kg 
Premium over import 
price, percent 
    
Urea 2,100 1,566 34 
DAP** 3,850 2,990 29 
Kalium 2,150 1,723 25 
 
*Although not entirely clear in the source it seems that the price data are for 1998. 
**Diabasic Ammonium Phosphate 
Source: CIE (1999). 
 
 
Measures based on use of inputs: promotion of specialty rice 
Vietnam’s rice export profile consists mainly of low and medium quality rice, al-
though the share of high-quality rice has been increasing rapidly. The Vietnamese 
government is keenly aware of the general need to improve the quality of its export 
rice as well as the prospects of obtaining price premiums on specialty rice varieties. 
Special zones have therefore been assigned to production for exports in an effort to 
enhance the quality of Vietnam’s rice exports and to minimize transportation costs. 
These efforts act as an implicit subsidy on transportation. Other implicit subsidies in-
clude supporting the expansion of the rice drying, husking and storage capacity. 
Farmers are furthermore being encouraged to use pure high-quality seed from se-
lected varieties including specialty rice such as Jasmine rice. Processors are encour-
aged to pay a higher price for paddy from these varieties and to ensure that the high 
quality is retained through the processing process. In principle, the high-quality rice 
will be identity preserved from the normal rice in expectation of capturing a higher 
export price.  
 
Although it may be tempting to follow a strategy that focuses specifically on promot-
ing the production of specialty rice for exports, competition from other countries such 
as Thailand, India and Pakistan, which have long-held traditions and experience in 
producing and exporting specialty rice, will be intense. Furthermore, as the Govern-
ment of Vietnam is keenly aware, there is still a lot to be gained from a general qual-
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ity lift in the rice sector (including better post harvest management) in order to sustain 
and develop market shares in countries that demand “regular” rice. 
 
Measures based on input constraints: withdrawal of paddy land 
As mentioned above, many governments are adjusting their rice policies in response 
to the current world market situation characterized by declining prices. In Vietnam 
the government is converting paddy fields into alternative uses (FAO 2001a). 17 The 
area of land under irrigated paddy has been targeted at 4.2 million hectares in 1999, a 
level which was cut further to 4.0 million hectares in 2000. Furthermore, a number of 
steps have been taken to provide paddy producers with preferential credit conditions, 
and credit subsidies are being provided to traders for purchasing and storing rice.  
 
Recent policy developments  
In principle at least, one of the most substantial changes in Vietnamese rice policy in 
recent years is the elimination of the export quota. To be effective as of May 1, 2001 
the Prime Minister signed Decree No. 46/2001/QD-TTg on Vietnam’s Export-Import 
Management Mechanism for 2001-2005. This decision declares the abolishment of 
both the rice export quota and the fertilizer import quota. Furthermore, the practice of 
directly nominating exporters and importers of these products has been removed. 
Hence all economic agents (state owned and non-state owned) holding a license to 
trade food or agricultural commodities can participate in rice exports. According to 
Oryza (2001) some SOEs are already beginning to express concerns that “too many 
rice exports will cause market disturbances”. To this end the Deputy Trade minister 
has been quoted for saying that the SOEs will not face any serious challenges since 
many private trading companies will not be capable of exporting rice anyway. More-
over, the Government will still assign the Ministry of Trade to coordinate with Viet-
nam’s Food Association in nominating state owned food companies to deal with the 
country’s main rice markets such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Iraq. 
The signed contracts will then be allocated to the provinces based on their available 
rice supply (Oryza 2001). So although the quantity limitations have been lifted, this 
                                                 
17 The land law passed in 1993 extended long-term land use rights to farming households. This in-
cluded the rights to exchange, transfer, lease, inherit, and mortgage land thereby increasing 
farmer incentives to invest in land reclamation and land improvement. Yet Goletti (1998) men-
tions that there have been restrictions on the conversion of rice land to other activities, constrain-
ing the possibilities of developing a more diversified agriculture and the development of rural in-
dustries. Whether these restrictions have been relaxed since is not clear.  
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decision will not have a significant impact on increasing the participation of private 
trading companies in rice exports. 
 
Along with the removal of the export quota, the Government of Vietnam simultane-
ously introduced an export subsidy, i.e. an explicit Market Price Support measure. 
Rice exporters will receive a subsidy of VND 180 (about USD 0.012) per export dol-
lar (Oryza 2001).18 Export subsidies are generally prohibited in the WTO context and 
those that were in place under the URAA negotiations were required to be reduced in 
both quantity and value terms. Developing countries were, nevertheless, given per-
mission under certain conditions to use export subsidies to reduce the costs of market-
ing and transporting their exports. It is unclear whether these conditions are met by 
the new rice export subsidies in Vietnam, but a closer scrutiny in connection with its 
negotiations with the WTO on accession terms will determine whether or not they are 
compatible with WTO rules.  
 
Another recent policy initiative that may well meet opposition by WTO members is 
an agreement that Vietnam has signed with Thailand. Under the deal each of the two 
countries is to contribute 100,000 tons of 25% broken rice to an international rice 
pool for sale at USD 152/ton. The intention is to keep the two partner countries from 
undercutting one another’s prices on world markets. The judgment of the FAO 
(2001a), however, is that the amount and the number of countries involved are too 
small for it to have any impact. Nevertheless, China and India have expressed interest 
in the agreement although it is far from clear that such an agreement will be WTO 
compatible. At the domestic level this initiative will continue to contribute to domes-
tic rice prices being below border prices. 
 
Preliminary evaluation 
The above description of the Vietnamese rice policy regime makes it clear that both 
export and import instruments are changed frequently. These adjustments have not 
been a reflection of a focused attempt to dismantle and simplify trade regimes, but 
rather an effort to ‘fine-tune’ instruments to balance demand and supply conditions 
and macro indicators such as the trade balance. Yet this type of ‘fine-tuning’ often 
adds implicit, but very real, costs to trade because of the resulting uncertainty. Unpre-
dictability is a barrier in itself both to those trading with Vietnam as well as to domes-
tic producers/exporters. Trade regimes that are managed as strongly as the rice regime 
                                                 
18 Other products to benefit from this program are pork and suckling pigs (VND 900 and 280 per 
USD), canned fruit and vegetables (VND 500 and 400 per dollar) and coffee (VND 220) (Oryza 
2001). 
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in Vietnam will inevitably also be subject to direct policy-induced price instability, 
because policies are based on judgments made about supply and demand. Shortages 
of fertilizer supply at various times witness these mistakes. The consequences are of-
ten dear in the form of sending confusing price signals and thereby making it difficult 
for agents in the economy to plan and invest.  
 
The removal of the export quota and the introduction of the export subsidy is a clear 
indication that the Government of Vietnam is relying on sustaining rice exports as a 
means of earning foreign exchange. Sustainability of Vietnam’s rice exports will of 
course depend on both demand and supply side factors. Vietnam has the advantages 
of favorable climate conditions and low costs of labor. On the disadvantage side Viet-
nam is still in the process of building up a reputation of a stable and reliable supplier 
and part of these problems is related to domestic structural constraints (e.g. port inef-
ficiencies) but also to policy constraints (including the tendency to frequently ‘fine-
tune’ the policy instruments). Vietnam also stands to gain from improving the overall 
quality of its export rice. Based on international experience and the experience of 
other food processing sectors in Vietnam, allowing the private sector to participate in 
rice exports should result in a better seeking out and exploitation of market niches for 
high-quality and specialty rices although this may not necessarily – on its own at least 
– be the “right” strategy for Vietnam, c.f. the discussion above. In any case and on 
efficiency grounds, the Government of Vietnam should nevertheless further liberalize 
– in real terms – the participation of private enterprises in rice trade. 
4.3. Policies of other rice exporting countries 
4.3.1. Thailand 
Policy objectives 
The overriding goals of Thai rice policy are to maintain stable paddy prices at rea-
sonably high levels and at the same time to ensure the international competitiveness 
of Thai rice exports.    
 
Policy instruments 
Comparing the rice policy of Thailand with that of Vietnam clearly reflects the fact 
that Thailand is a country with a substantially longer and more well established ex-
perience in international rice trade.  Moreover, the policy instruments used in Thai 
rice policy also reflect this county’s higher level of income.  
  
The rice policy program for 2000/01 consists of five elements (FAS 2000a):  
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(i) Rice procurement program: Funds are allocated to government agencies 
authorizing them to intervene in the marketing and procurement of both 
paddy and milled rice 
(ii) Rice exports under Government-to-Government arrangements: This 
component includes exports under the Vietnam-Thailand “rice pool” 
agreement, and the encouragement of exporters to export good quality ri-
ce using the Thai logo.  
(iii) Paddy mortgage scheme: A 1.5 million ton paddy mortgage scheme 
through which farmers can obtain a loan by mortgaging their crop plus a 
rice intervention program of up to 1 million tons. 
(iv) A paddy mortgage scheme of 1 million tons for upcountry areas. 
(v) Credit assistance: The Bank of Thailand provides packing credit to rice 
exporters and millers. 
 
The value of the paddy mortgage scheme declined from USD 168.1 million in 1995 to 
USD 65.6 million in 1997, but has rebound to USD 118.7 million in 2001 in an effort 
to assist farmers as prices decline (FAO 2001a). 
 
Market Price Support measures 
As mentioned above, price stabilization is a key element of Thai rice policy and is 
sought achieved through the rice procurement program. The target paddy price sup-
porting the farm-level price has been lifted over the past years and depends on the ty-
pe and grade as shown in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7. Official target paddy prices in Thailand for 2000/01 
         
 
Paddy type 
 
Jasmine 
 
100 % 
 
5% 
 
10% 
 
15% 
 
25% 
 
Glut. long 
Glut. 
short 
         
Target price 
(Bht/ton) 
 
6,840 
 
5,560 
 
5,460 
 
5,260 
 
5,160 
 
4,960 
 
6,200 
 
5,900 
 
Source: FAS (2000a) 
 
 
 
In terms of border measures, the Government of Thailand has in the past used export 
quotas to control its rice exports and imposed an export surcharge known as the ‘rice 
premium’. Taxing rice exports had the effect of an implicit consumer subsidy by 
keeping domestic prices low whilst at the same time generating revenue to the gov-
ernment. The quota system was abolished in 1986 and the export premium on low 
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quality rice was removed in acknowledgement that low prices were part of the game 
when competing with US rice exports. 
 
Today Thai rice exporters are assisted through the provision of export credits on pref-
erential terms, i.e. implicit export subsidies. In the year 2000 Baht 20,000 million 
(USD 487 million) were earmarked for this purpose through an Export Support Fund. 
Furthermore, due to the currently low world market prices, exporters have been re-
quested to purchase and store 1 million tons of domestic rice at the prevailing market 
prices. In return, the Government has offered interest-free credit to back up the pur-
chases and to cover storage costs – yet another implicit export subsidy (FAO 2001a).  
In terms of import measures, the URAA required Thailand to lift its long-held ban 
against rice imports and to open its markets to an annual tariff rate quota, the com-
mitments of which are shown in Table 4.8. Thailand manages its import quota as a 
global tariff quota and does not pre-selected which suppliers have access to it. Actual 
imports fall well below these levels (which are opportunities to import not require-
ments). Thailand’s reports to the WTO show that imports were just 147 metric tons in 
1998 and 907 metric tons in 1999. Most of these imports came from the US with 
small amounts also coming from Japan and China. Thailand imposes a specific tariff 
of Bhat 2.75/kg on imports. In addition hereto quota license holders are subject to a 
30% tariff whilst non-quota importers are subject to a 54.4% tariff. The total amount 
of customs duty collected shall not exceed the amount of the customs duty that would 
be collected if the ad valorem rate alone had been applied (UNCTAD TRAINS data-
base).  
 
Table 4.8. Thailand’s rice import quota commitments of the URAA* 
        
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
        
Metric 
tons 
 
237,863 
 
239,185 
 
240,506 
 
241,828 
 
243,149 
 
244,471 
 
245,792 
 
* All rice types: paddy, cargo, milled and broken 
Source: FAS (2001c). 
 
 
 
Payments based on use of inputs 
The Government of Thailand also supports it farmers through payments based on the 
use of inputs. In September 2000 the Government adopted a commodity insurance 
scheme allocating USD 24.3 million ready to compensate rice (and maize) producers 
for costs incurred in the case of natural disasters such as floods and drought. This acts 
as an indirect subsidy on insurance costs. 
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Other payments to farmers based on the use of inputs are the mortgage schemes men-
tioned above as components (iii) and (iv) of the rice policy program for 2000/01, and 
the credit assistance scheme noted as the final component (v). 
 
General agricultural policies 
At the more general level the Thai government adopted an Agricultural Development 
Plan in 1998 with the following objectives (FAO 1998): 
 
• Establish integrated agricultural export zones to induce cost savings on ac-
tivities related to processing, packaging, marketing and export services 
• Enhance research and development to boost production and cut costs by us-
ing new technology, including biotechnology 
• Secure higher product and processing quality  
• Reduce the use of chemical fertilizers and promote alternative natural and or-
ganic methods of production 
• Improve the management of land use and ownership 
 
Payments related to these measures would not be counted in a PSE for the Thai rice 
sector since they are not paid out directly to rice farmers and hence do not introduce 
distortions relative to other agricultural sectors. 
 
 
4.3.2. The United States  
Policy objectives 
The main objectives of the US rice policy are to support farmer income, and to sustain 
and promote US exports. 
 
Policy instruments 
Support to American rice farmers consists of direct income support and export pro-
motion measures. Under the 1996 Farm Act, which expires in 2002, rice producers 
are supported by production flexibility contract payments, the marketing loan pro-
gram, and subsidized crop and revenue insurance (Childs 2001). Furthermore, rice 
exporters benefit from trade promotion programs, food aid programs, export credit 
guarantees, and market loss assistance.  
 
Market Price Support measures 
Starting with the instruments that make up the Market Price Support component, there 
are a number of specific programs that directly and indirectly create a wedge between 
domestic and border prices. Food aid and export credit guarantees are two such pro-
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grams that account for the lion’s share of government assistance to rice exporters. To-
tal exports under these programs in the fiscal year 2000 amounted to 626,000 tons, 
with credit guarantees accounting for 225,000 tons and food aid shipments accounting 
for 401,000 tons (Table 4.9). Put together these programs accounted for 19% of total 
rice exports in fiscal year 2000 and 25% in fiscal year 1999. In 1999 total program 
exports reached almost 777,000 tons consisting of 192,000 tons in credit guarantees 
and 584,000 tons in the Food for Peace program. These are the largest volumes of 
program exports since 1993 (ERS 2001a).  
 
Commodities sold or donated through the food aid programs are supplied from the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) inventory (which is acquired under price sup-
port programs) or purchased from private stocks. Surplus commodities of the CCC 
may be disposed of through this program if they cannot be sold or otherwise disposed 
of without disruption of price support programs or at competitive world prices. Re-
cipients of rice shipments under the food aid programs include countries such as the 
Philippines, Indonesia, North Korea, and Russia. The CCC also administers the ex-
port credit guarantee programs, which are used to finance US rice exports to buyers in 
countries where financing would not otherwise by available without CCC guarantees. 
 
Table 4.9. US rice exports under food aid and export credit programs, 1996-2000 
     
 
Year 
 
Food aid shipments 
CCC export credit 
guarantee programs 
 
Total US rice exports 
Program exports as a 
share of total exports 
   
                              --- 1,000 metric tons --- Percent 
1996 212 141 2,826 12.5 
1997 218 80 2,560 11.6 
1998 195 499 3,310 21.0 
1999 584 192 3,076 25.2 
2000* 401 225 3,299 19.0 
 
* Based on program announcements as of October 2000 
Source: ERS (2001a) 
 
 
 
Finally, there are two foreign market assistance programs: the Market Access Pro-
gram (MAP) and the Foreign Market Development Program (FMD) assist the main-
tenance and expansion of foreign markets for US agricultural products. Funds are 
drawn from the CCC to help cover costs of overseas marketing and promotion activi-
ties.  
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As was seen in Table 4.2 above the OECD PSE measure reports that the share of 
MPS in the PSE for the US rice sector is zero. It was also noted, however, that these 
estimates should be interpreted with caution because the reference price used is an 
implicit price derived by subtracting the average unit value of export subsidy (total 
value of export subsidies for the crop year divided by total exports) from the producer 
price. Hence implicit export subsidies through e.g. the provision of export credits and 
food aid are not taken into account. This can only be measured by comparing the 
“true” export price with the producer price. Furthermore, even if these implicit subsi-
dies were included in the PSE measure, it must be kept in mind that it is not clear that 
they are compatible with the current WTO rules. Export subsidies are generally pro-
hibited, and explicit subsidies that are in place are to be reduced according to specific 
schedules.   
 
In the URAA domestic support to agriculture as measured by the aggregated meas-
ures of support (AMS) was to be reduced. The measures that were required reduced 
were the amber box measures larger than a given de minimis level. In the US case the 
reduction requirements were met without reducing support to the rice sector at all.19 
Moreover, since the URAA only dealt with explicit export subsidies, the US rice sec-
tor was not affected by the disciplining of the use of these instruments. The URAA 
also required a reduction of tariff rates. Tariffs on rice imports into the US were al-
ready quite low and were reduced by 36% in six equal annual steps. The reductions 
are as shown in Table 4.10, which also shows that both ad valorem and specific tariffs 
are applied. Imports from countries with GSP status are duty-free as are imports from 
Canada. As of October 1, 2001 Mexico still faces tariffs on its rice exports to the US 
although they are being phased out as part of the NAFTA agreement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Although rice support only makes up a very small part of the total US AMS, there is scope for 
discussing the classification of the various policy instruments in the “boxes” of the WTO. The 
commodity-specific crop and revenue insurance programs and the crop market loss assistance 
payments are classified as production-distorting amber box policies. The Conservation Reserve 
Program, on the other hand, is appropriately classified as green box. But perhaps more controver-
sial are the Production Flexibility Contract payments that are also classified as green box measures 
since they are considered to be decoupled from current market prices and  production, and because 
their total levels were predetermined by the 1996 Farm Act. 
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Table 4.10. U.S. tariff reduction commitments in the URAA, MFN rates 
       
 1995 2000/01   1995 2000/01 
       
Rice in husk 2.8 
cents/kg 
1.8 cents/kg 
(Mexico 0.5) 
 Rice, par-
boiled 
17.5% 11.2% 
(Mexico 0) 
Bismuth rice, 
husked  
1.3 
cents/kg 
0.83 cents/kg 
(Mexico 0.2) 
 Rice, milled/ 
semi-milled 
2.2 cents/kg 1.4 cents/kg 
(Mexico 0.4) 
Husked  
(brown) rice 
3.3 
cents/kg 
2.1 cents/kg 
(Mexico 0.6) 
 Broken rice 0.69 
cents/kg 
0.44 cents/kg 
(Mexico 0.1) 
 
Source: FAS (1994) 
 
 
 
Payments based on output 
US rice producers also receive assistance that directly affects production incentives. 
The Marketing Loan Program provides marketing loan gains (MLGs) and loan defi-
ciency payments (LDPs) to farmers when the world prices fall below the loan rates 
pre-specified for the different types of rice. During the period 1995/96 through 
1997/98 no payments were made under this program since world market prices were 
above the set loan rates. This changed in early 1999, however, and LDP rates have 
gone from about USD 1 per cwt (hundred weight) in August 1999 to USD 3.50 per 
cwt in May 2001. In 1997/98 the only direct payments made to rice farmers were the 
USD 448 million in Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments (see below). In 
1999/2000 direct payments surpassed USD 1.3 billion consisting of USD 466 million 
in PFC payments, USD 465 in market loss assistance (MLA), and USD 393 million in 
MLGs and LDPs. This development of domestic support payments has been a direct 
consequence of the lower world market prices (Childs 2001).   
 
Payments based on input constraints 
Payments received by participants in the Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) pro-
gram are not linked to current production or prices, but they are based on historical 
acreage. Farmers receiving these payments are required, however, to keep their land 
within agriculture (planting to any crop they desire except for fruits and vegetables) 
and they must follow conservation compliance obligations. The former requirement 
means that the payments are not entirely decoupled from production decisions. In 
1999 PFC payments to rice farmers amounted to USD 483 million yielding a payment 
rate of USD 2.82 per cwt. Low world market prices triggered the provision of sup-
plemental payments in the form of market loss assistance (MLA) payments. In both 
1999 and 2000 MLA payments were of the same order of magnitude as the 1999 PFC 
payment rate. 
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Future policy profile 
As mentioned above, the 1996 Farm Act expires in 2002 and hence its future profile 
is currently being debated. The discussions must be seen in relation to the fact that the 
world trading environment is one of low prices, increasing production costs (particu-
larly fertilizer and fuel), and intense international competition. Hence many have ad-
vocated a continuation of the traditional support programs including an increase in the 
PFC payments. According to Wailes (2001) the US rice industry suggests that the 
loan rate is maintained at USD 6.50 per cwt (or at least aligned with other program 
crops) and that a crop-specific counter-cyclical income support payment be provided. 
Such payments would be triggered in response to the developments of some indicator 
variable such as farm income, aggregate price, gross revenue,  gross revenue per acre, 
or production costs, relative to a base period or fixed target level of this variable 
(Wailes 2001). Implementing these suggestions would link payments to crop-specific 
market outcomes thereby classifying them as amber box policies in WTO notation, 
which would then have to be reduced according to a specific schedule. A small 
minority has suggested the adoption of voluntary supply control programs in return 
for higher marketing loan rates to manage surpluses. Others propose to increase 
humanitarian food aid donations and the establishment of a farm storage program for 
government-owned surplus stocks earmarked for food aid and renewable fuels (Childs 
2001). All these suggestions, however, point in the direction of a reversal of the mar-
ket-orientation of policies that was the key attribute of the 1996 Farm Act.   
 
 
4.3.3. China 
Policy objectives 
The main goals of Chinese rice policy are to sustain high levels of self-sufficiency, to 
secure higher farmer incomes, to ensure price stability, and to increase quality. Fol-
lowing five decades of a policy focused on increasing rice production (through mod-
ern seed technologies, expansion of irrigated areas, increased use of chemicals and 
other modern inputs), China is now coping with a new problem: too much rice. And 
so price stability is of major concern to the Chinese government. Furthermore, as of 
the mid-1990s China’s rice policy has focused on raising farmers’ incomes whilst sus-
taining a high level of rice self-sufficiency. 
 
Policy instruments 
In China almost all the instruments used to achieve these goals may be classified as 
Market Price Support measures because they create a wedge between the domestic 
and border price. As was seen in Table 4.2 the net effect is a negative nominal protec-
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tion coefficient, i.e. domestic rice prices received by rice farmers are lower than the 
price obtainable on world markets – a seemingly clear reflection of the self-
sufficiency policy. Nonetheless, this gap seems to be narrowing. 
 
Market Price Support measures 
To achieve the goal of stable domestic food and feed grain markets the State Admini-
stration of Grain Reserve (SAGR) has been established to purchase and sell grains. 
The so-called Governors Grain Bag Responsibility System involves the provision of 
high procurement prices, and requirements of minimum levels of rice production and 
reserves to be met by provincial governments. This system represents a traditional 
approach to ensuring sufficient food supplies through quotas, targets, and input allo-
cation (ERS 2001). The system has been reformed in 1998 as a result of the increas-
ingly heavy financial burden of the accumulated stocks, the increasingly poor quality 
of the procured rice, and the declining market prices of rice. The so-called “Four Se-
paration, One Perfection” reform was introduced, which relaxed the expansionary 
stance of the previous policy.  
 
Since 1999 further changes have taken place. Procurement prices have been lowered 
and the practice of providing minimum price support to low quality rice has been 
abolished. Wholesale prices dropped by 20% during 1999 as a result of the reduced 
government procurement prices, the large national rice stocks and an above-average 
harvest (FAS 2001e).20 Chinese rice policy is still focused on self-sufficiency, but it is 
also moving in the direction of increasing efficiency and improving quality (FAO 
2001a). In the new schedule of procurement prices higher quality is rewarded by 
higher prices. 
 
Private sector participation in domestic rice trade in China has been severely re-
stricted. As late as in 1998 private traders were forbidden to purchase rice directly 
from farmers and were instructed to purchase from the state grain agencies. In fact, 
this policy change in 1998 reflected a strengthening of government intervention com-
pared with previous efforts to give markets a greater role. This strong state control of 
domestic rice trade has since been relaxed in some provinces, partly in response to the 
aforementioned increase in public stocks and the associated financial burden hereof 
(FAO 2001a). The Central Government has selected six provinces in South China, 
which have rice production as their main grain production, to prepare for a complete 
opening of their grain markets. The central government has decided not to instruct the 
                                                 
20 See FAS (2001d) for average wholesale market rice prices for 1998-2000. 
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state-owned grain companies to do any specific procurement task nor will it provide 
“protected prices” for any grain varieties. Farmers in these regions are already ex-
pressing interest in growing other more profitable crops and total rice area and pro-
duction is expected to continue to decline (FAS 2001e). 
 
Another means of providing Market Price Support is through border measures. The 
Chinese government has monopoly control over exports and imports of rice. The 
State Planning and Development Commission and the State Council decide the vol-
umes to be imported and exported. The trade is administered by the Ministry of For-
eign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC) whilst the actual transactions are 
carried out by the state-owned enterprise China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs 
Import and Export Company (known as COFCO or CEROILS) (FAO 2001a).  
 
China’s state trading enterprises are involved throughout the entire chain of marketing 
organizations at the central and provincial levels in both domestic and international 
marketing. The central and provincial governments determine the quantities of rice 
that must be purchased, and they set the purchase price for these procurement quotas. 
Grain bureaus may purchase above-quota grains at market or support prices. Grain 
bureaus are also responsible for distributing grains to the wholesale markets, feed 
mills, grain storage facilities, grain and food processors, as well as for partly supply-
ing urban residents (ERS 1999). On the import side, MOFTEC orders COFCO to pur-
chase pre-specified quantities and transfer them to the grain bureaus at Government 
Fixed Import Grain Transfer Prices (GFIGTPs). The Ministry of Finance subsidizes 
COFCO for any losses caused by a difference between import and transfer prices and 
pockets any gains from the differential. On the export side MOFTEC is responsible 
for selling the quantity of rice prescribed in the annual plan. The volumes to be ex-
ported are acquired by the provincial grain bureaus at the Government Fixed Export 
Grain Transfer Prices (GFEGTPs). The latter are the fixed procurement prices of the 
province in question plus a price premium to reflect quality and additional grain proc-
essing costs for meeting export standards and contract requirements. As with imports 
it is the SAGR that determines how the quotas are allocated to the provincial grain 
bureaus (ERS 1999).   
 
Currently China imposes a quota on rice imports with out-of-quota duties of 114% 
(Table 4.11) but has committed itself to expanding this quota and to lowering the as-
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sociated tariff rates when it joins the WTO.21 China furthermore levies a value added 
tax on both imports and domestic products. However, trade contracts have indicated 
that the VAT is sometimes used to affect trade flows. Imports of certain products are 
exempted from the VAT in some years to secure lower costs to protected domestic 
producers. In other years it is increased – again to protect domestic producers. More 
importantly, grain-trading SOEs are not subject to VAT, whereas private traders han-
dling domestic and imported grain are. All Chinese agricultural exports enjoy a VAT 
rebate of at least 5%. The rebate is higher for a few selected commodities such as cot-
ton. 
 
Table 4.11. China’s rice tariffs as of January 1, 2000 
    
HS code HS description In-quota duty (%)                      Out-of-quota duty (%) 
   MFN VAT* 
     
1006.10.10 Paddy for seed 0 114 13 
1006.10.90 Other paddy 1 114 13 
1006.20.00 Husked (brown) rice 1 114 13 
1006.30.00 Milled, semi-milled rice 1 114 13 
1006.40.00 Broken rice 1 40 13 
 
* The VAT is imposed on both imports and sales of domestically produced goods, i.e. in addition to the tariff. 
 Source: FAS (2000c). 
 
 
 
Measures based on input constraints 
As mentioned above the Governors Grain Bag Responsibility System was reformed in 
1998 entailing the relaxation of the expansionary nature of the policy. One such step 
has involved the conversion of rice land into other uses: oilseeds, corn, vegetables, 
and other cash crops. 
 
Future policy directions 
The government’s holding of large rice stocks, its strong controls over domestic mar-
keting, and its tools for managing imports and exports means that the Chinese gov-
ernment is in a strong position to determine the size and direction of its foreign rice 
trade. China’s concerns about maintaining a reputation of an international buyer and  
 
 
                                                 
21 China is not a member of any preferential trade agreements, but does extend preferential tariff 
treatment to developing countries (FAS 2001d). 
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seller of rice suggests that this central role will not diminish quite yet and this is a 
source of potential concern to WTO members (Latham 1998).22 
 
In connection with negotiations concerning its accession to the WTO China has 
agreed to establish a tariff rate quota of 2.6 million tons of rice in the first year of its 
membership, expanding to 5.3 million tons over a five-year implementation period  
(Table 4.12) (FAO 2000a). In percent of domestic consumption these commitments 
on rice imports are lower than for wheat (FAS 2001d). Imports within the quota 
would be levied a 1% ad valorem tariff. Imports above the quota would be levied an 
80% tariff in the first year, gradually being lowered to 65% by the end of the imple-
mentation period. Half of the import quota would be reserved for short and medium 
grain rice, and the other half for long grain rice. In an effort to increase the participa-
tion of the private sector it has been agreed that private traders should be involved in 
50% of the TRQ imports of the first type and 10% in the second type. In an effort to 
ensure maximum possible fill rates for TRQs once it enters the WTO, China has 
agreed to allow TRQs to be reallocated to other end-users, including non-state trading 
entities, if the enterprises that have originally received quotas are not able to fill them. 
The committed share of private entities in the rice import quota is meant to increase 
competition, although the precise licensing procedure and quota allocation process are 
basically unknown to traders (ERS 2001b). 
 
Table 4.12. China’s rice TRQ commitments, million metric tons 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Initial TRQ 
End of 5-year im-
plementation period 
TRQ 
 
 
Private share 
 
In-quota 
tariff 
 
Out-of-
quota tariff 
      
Total 2.66 5.32  1% 80% 
- Short & medium grain 1.33 2.66 50%   
- Long grain 1.33 2.66 10%   
 
Source: FAS (2001d) for quota commitments and ERS (2001b) for tariff commitments. 
 
 
 
In addition to market access commitments, China has also agreed not to use export 
subsidies for agricultural products after it joins the WTO. This is a serious commit-
                                                 
22 In 1996 China surprised the international rice trading community by winning the tender for the 
South Korean minimum access obligation under the URAA. It also achieved more than 50% of 
the initial minimum access allowance for Japan that year well ahead of the US, which had the ma-
jority share of access to the Japanese market in 1995. And so there may be scope for China be-
coming a large-scale exporter as the past years have witnessed (Latham 1998). 
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ment since China has subsidized rice exports in the past, although recently prices have 
been so low that subsidies have not been necessary (FAS 2000c).  
 
 
4.3.4. India 
Policy objectives 
Self-sufficiency and food price stability are of key importance to the Government of 
India. Food policy in India focuses on self-sufficiency in grains as a whole, with no 
particular emphasis placed on rice rather than wheat.  
 
Policy instruments 
The food policy goals are sought achieved through measures and mechanisms that 
may be classified as Market Price Support because they create a wedge between the 
domestic and border price. As was seen in Table 4.2 the net effect is a negative nomi-
nal protection coefficient, i.e. domestic rice prices received by rice farmers are lower 
than the price obtainable on world markets – a reflection of the self-sufficiency pol-
icy. As in the case of China, this gap also seems to be narrowing in India. 
 
Market Price Support measures 
The price of rice is controlled through the administration of the Indian Public Distri-
bution System (PDS). The Food Cooperation of India (FCI) acts for the Government 
by procuring domestic rice, which may in times of shortage be supplemented by im-
ports. The Food Cooperation also stores and distributes rice domestically. Rice pro-
curement purchases under the PDS takes the form of both paddy rice purchases di-
rectly from farmers at a given paddy procurement price and as milled rice purchases 
from millers and traders. The procurement price of the latter is the paddy procurement 
price plus a fee to cover milling, handling and transportation costs plus a small profit 
margin (Latham 1998). 
 
A buffer stock is also part of the PDS, where buyers from this stock pay a fixed coun-
trywide price depending on the current market price and an evaluation of the ability of 
the poor to pay. The government covers any losses incurred with these sales. Up to 
one third of marketed rice in India goes to various poverty alleviation programs man-
aged by the PDS.  
 
In spite of large rice inventories due to many years of bumper crops and falling ex-
ports, the Government of India has continued to raise paddy support prices (Table 
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4.13) and has had to intensify procurement purchases by the FCI and other govern-
ment procurement agencies (FAO 2001a).  
 
Table 4.13. Paddy support prices in India, per ton 
    
 
 
 
Nominal prices (rupees) 
Real prices 
(CPI-deflated 1995/96=100) 
 
Prices in USD 
 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 
          
Common 4400 4900 5100 3454 3590 3552 104 113 110 
Grade A 4700 5200 5400 3690 3810 3769 111 120 116 
 
Source: FAO (2001a) 
 
 
The 1955 Essential Commodities Act gives the government the right to restrict the 
holding of cereals by the private sector and to restrict the movement of cereals across 
provinces in its efforts to ensure food security. So in years of food shortages zones are 
established between which food may not be freely traded. This is a typical food secu-
rity policy instrument of Asian rice-producers, as has been seen in the case of e.g. 
Vietnam, enabling the government to purchase rice at low prices in surplus regions 
and then redistribute it to deficit regions. Attempts to limit the role of the FCI have 
been attempted in 1997 and again in 2001 with a view to increasing the participation 
of the private sector in the storage and handling of cereals (FAO 2001a). 
 
As regards trade-related measures, private traders are permitted to engage in interna-
tional trade subject to license (FAO 1998). The private sector is permitted to import 
low quality rice (more than 50% brokens) free of duty. Yet Indian rice is relatively 
highly priced compared with e.g. Pakistani rice and this has resulted in an accelera-
tion of rice imports by private traders. According to FAS (2000d) the Government of 
India has indicated that it will not hesitate to impose restrictions if private rice imports 
surge as in the case of wheat. 
 
India’s previous quantitative restrictions on rice imports, sheltered under the GATT 
Balance-of-Payment provision, were removed during the URAA process of tariffica-
tion. As of April 1 2000 India actually increased its tariff from 0% to 80% for husked 
and broken rice and to 70% for milled and semi-milled rice after having succeeded in 
a renegotiation of its bound tariff with major trading partners (FAO 2001a). 
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Payments based on input use and general services to agriculture 
Government policies in the 1990s have also included investments in irrigation and 
drainage improvement as well as the subsidization of fertilizer supplies. 
 
Recent policy developments 
India is currently facing the worst storage crisis ever (for both wheat and rice) and is 
desperately trying to alleviate the situation by subsidizing exports onto an already 
low-priced world market – a clear Market Price Support measure. 23 The Government 
of India has authorized the subsidization of exports of 3 million tons of rice, a figure 
that may increase as the situation later in the year is assessed. Both private traders and 
government parastatals are permitted to export. As yet another instrument used to 
regulate prices, a minimum export price has also been set, which is equal to the sales 
price applicable to the Below Poverty Line (BPL) clientele24 (Rp. 5,650 = USD 121 
per ton). Taking transportation and grain cleaning costs into account the FAS (2001e) 
estimates that the export price will be no lower than USD 135/mt f.o.b. for 25% bro-
kens making exports very difficult. The FAS (2001e) asserts that the export price 
must be as low as USD 110 before exports are a realistic possibility. Hence this ex-
port support scheme seems to be a very expensive policy instrument that will only add 
to the budgetary burden the government is experiencing in relation to its large stocks. 
 
 
4.3.5. Pakistan 
Policy objectives 
In contrast to most other countries in South and Southeast Asia, Pakistan grows rice 
as an export crop. Wheat is the staple grain in Pakistan, not rice. This means that rice 
self-sufficiency is not a major issue as it so clearly is in the other countries (Hang 
1999). The Government of Pakistan does encourage rice production, however, and 
focuses on promoting exports of high-quality rice. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 The increasing costs of physical storage is the topic of a study by Jha and Srinivasan (1999) in 
which cost-effective alternatives to the current policy for ensuring food security are sought. They 
find that the option of variable levies on private external trade turns out to be the most inexpen-
sive instrument, whereas the option of domestic buffer stocks the most costly.  
24 Rice is sold though the Public Distribution System (PDS) at different prices to three categories of 
consumers: the “above-poverty line” group, the “below-poverty line” group and the “poorest 
among the poor” (FAO 2001a). 
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Policy instruments 
Comparing with the other major exporters the rice policy instruments chosen by the 
Government of Pakistan clearly reflect the difference in objectives. There is much 
less Market Price Support and much more general services support to agriculture.  
 
Market Price Support measures 
Minimum producer prices are announced each year, but according to FAO (2001a) 
they are more indicative prices than binding floor prices. Market prices well below 
target levels did end up forcing the government to purchase paddy through the Paki-
stan Agriculture and Storage Supply Corporation in 2000 – for the first time since 
1995. The procurement was marginal (25,000 tons) since the government is reluctant 
to intervene directly in the market. 
 
Rice is Pakistan’s second leading source of export earnings and there is neither a sub-
sidy nor a tax on rice exports, and exporters compete in the market for exportable 
supplies (FAS 2000f).25 As was seen in Table 4.2 the domestic price of rice in Paki-
stan fluctuates around the world market price and in 1999 it was on a par with the 
prevailing world market price.  
 
Pakistan imports only minor quantities of rice. The applied import tariff is 25%, the 
bound rate is 100% (AMAD database), and an additional sales tax of 15% applies to 
all rice (FAS 2000f). 
 
Payments based on use of inputs 
The Government encourages rice production through the provision of inputs such as 
fertilizers, seeds, irrigation, and technical assistance. The government is also very ac-
tive when it comes to subsidizing credit, encouraging hybrid rice cultivation and pro-
moting more efficient input use. Input subsidies have declined or been eliminated 
over the past few years as part of reforms initiated in consultation with the IMF. In 
fact most forms of government intervention in rice production and marketing were 
eliminated in Pakistan in the mid 1990s.  
 
 
 
                                                 
25 This stands in sharp contrast with the Government’s involvement in the wheat market. Bread is 
the staple food in Pakistan and therefore wheat is the strategic commodity. The government re-
stricts inter-provincial wheat trade and uses local procurement and imports to secure sufficient 
wheat supplies to urban areas (FAS 2000f). 
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General services to agriculture 
As mentioned above most of the support to rice producers in Pakistan takes a more 
indirect form. The government is e.g. very active when it comes to financing research 
and extension activities. 
 
In terms of exports, the Government of Pakistan also adopts a more indirect approach 
to promoting sales on foreign markets. All Pakistani rice trade is performed by the 
private sector. The state-owned Rice Export Corporation was abolished several years 
ago and today’s (state owned) Trading Corporation of Pakistan plays only a limited 
role in rice exports, primarily by promoting Government-to-Government export 
agreements through the private sector (FAS 2001g).  
 
Exports have also been sought promoted through the establishment in 2000 of a qual-
ity review committee under the Trading Corporation of Pakistan to provide foreign 
buyers with quality guarantees for rice (particularly basmati) delivered from Pakistan. 
This was done in consultation with the Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan 
(REAP). 
 
4.4. Policies of rice importing countries  
4.4.1. Indonesia 
Policy objectives 
In the 1980s Indonesia pursued a self-sufficiency focused rice policy. This enabled 
the country to almost completely avoid importing rice and it even entered the world 
market as an exporter during this period. High costs of production rendered Indone-
sian rice uncompetitive in international markets, however, and so Indonesia once 
again engaged in large imports in 1989. Furthermore, rising national consumption, 
continuous area losses, and already-high yields have put an end to the period of rice 
self-sufficiency (Latham 1998). Indonesia’s current food policy in general aims at 
achieving food security by increasing domestic food production, raising farmer in-
comes, and ensuring the availability of food at affordable prices.  
 
Policy instruments 
Food self-sufficiency in Indonesia is sought achieved by means of price support poli-
cies, price stabilization policies, and public investment policies. The four main in-
struments of Indonesian rice policy are: (1) a floor price to encourage rice production, 
(2) a ceiling price to ensure reasonable prices to consumers, (3) a sufficient wedge be-
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tween these two prices to ensure traders and millers a reasonable profit margin, and 
(4) and border protection (Robinson et al. 1997). Hence the instruments of the Indo-
nesian rice policy primarily fall in the category Market Price Support measures as 
they relate to domestic price controls and border measures on exports and imports to 
create and control the wedge between domestic and border prices. 
 
Market Price Support measures 
The National Logistics Agency, Badan Urusan Logistik (Bulog), has been authorized 
to implement the rice pricing policy to ensure price stability and food security through 
the maintenance of food stocks.26 27 The floor and ceiling prices are determined by 
Bulog, the Coordinating Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Trade, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The margin between the floor and ceiling prices varies, but 
the average margin in the 1990’s has been about 21% (Robinson et al. 1997). Bulog 
maintains this price band by procuring rice to keep the market price near the floor 
producer price and by releasing stocks to keep the retail market price at or below the 
ceiling consumer price.28 According to Robinson et al. (1997) Bulog’s domestic pro-
curement of rice has never exceeded 10% of total rice production. Bulog’s storage ca-
pacity is around 3.5 million tons and in recent years Bulog has maintained an annual 
average of 2 million tons of rice as operational, buffer and surplus stocks. The agen-
cy’s releases in the 1990’s have averaged around 8% of total available rice.   
 
The years 1996-98 were characterized by heavy reliance on rice imports to meet do-
mestic demands, and so Indonesia intensified its efforts to achieve self-sufficiency. 
This meant increased support prices and procurement of paddy rice by Bulog in 1998, 
                                                 
26 In its notification to the WTO, Indonesia argues that the provision of exclusive rights to Bulog is 
the thinness of the international rice market and the need to maintain domestic stability in the con-
text of international market instability (FAO 1998). 
27 Bulog’s market interventions have not been limited to rice, but have also included maize, sugar-
cane, soybean, soybean meal, wheat, wheat flour, chicken, eggs, mungbean, garlic, and crude pal-
moil (Robinson et al. 1997). 
28 Robinson et al. (1997) model the Bulog intervention mechanism in a national computable general 
equilibrium model by specifying different regimes defined by inequalities in prices and buffer 
stocks. Bulog is assumed to support producer and consumer prices within a price band that is set 
exogenously. When the consumer price of rice reaches the exogenously set ceiling of the price 
band, Bulog intervenes by selling enough quantities of rice in the domestic market to satisfy the 
excess demand. The modeling is such that Bulog first sells rice from its stocks. When these hit a 
lower bound, Bulog starts importing rice from the world market. When the producer price reaches 
the floor price Bulog purchases rice from the domestic market to maintain the market price at this 
level. When stocks reach a maximum, exogenously given, level Bulog starts exporting rice. There 
is a complementary slackness relation between the producer price and consumer price inequalities 
and the Bulog stocking and de-stocking variables in the model. 
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1999 and 2000 (Table 4.14). In 1998 Indonesia initiated a market liberalization proc-
ess under a structural adjustment agreement with the IMF. The intention was to re-
duce the role of Bulog in domestic food crop marketing29 and in imports (c.f. below). 
As of 1999 the agency’s authority to procure rice has been restricted to paddy, which 
is purchased through local logistic agencies known as Dolog. It does not procure 
milled rice from millers. Bulog still has the responsibility of stabilizing the domestic 
rice market through releases from its stocks. It also runs a Government subsidized rice 
distribution scheme to low-income households and the agency sells rise to the military 
and to civil servants as part of their salaries. In 1999 and 2000 releases from stocks 
have been estimated to be about 4.8 million tons – half as regular market operations 
and the other half under special distribution programs (FAO 2001a). 
 
Table 4.14. Paddy support prices in Indonesia, per ton 
   
 
Nominal prices (rupiah) 
Real prices 
(CPI-deflated 1995/96=100) 
 
Prices in USD 
1998/99 1999/00 2000/01    1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 
         
1000 1400 1400 701 629 633 103 158 187 
 
Source: FAO (2001a) 
 
  
 
In terms of border measures that constitute Market Price Support, it may be men-
tioned that Bulog has had monopoly control over the country’s external trade in rice. 
In principle, Bulog was disbanded in September 1999 in an effort to pave the way for 
a complete liberalization of the entire cereal sector – a process that had been initial-
ized in 1998 by the liberalization of wheat trade. Bulog’s rice import monopoly was 
relaxed and private traders were permitted to import rice in 1999. At first they were 
restricted to high quality rice of no more than 5% brokens and were charged a 25% 
import duty. The quality restriction was drawn back in January 2000 and a specific 
tariff of Rp. 430/kg (USD 58 per ton, amounting to an ad valorem tariff equivalent of 
about 30%) was levied on all imports – by both private traders and Bulog (FAO 
2001a).  
 
As part of its URAA commitments Indonesia agreed to allow a TRQ of 70,000 tons 
annually – actual imports have far exceeded this quota. Bulog has allocated import 
                                                 
29 Just like in India, inter-provincial trade in rice has sometimes been restricted in Indonesia to en-
sure food security at the regional level. 
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quota rights on a global basis. Indonesia has agreed to bind the in-quota rate at 90% 
and the out-of-quota rate at 160% (AMAD database).  
 
Despite these commitments of tariffication to the WTO, Indonesia also relies on im-
port and export bans to control its rice trade flows. In July 1998, for example, it im-
posed a ban on the export of unhusked and milled rice to secure domestic supplies 
(FAO 1998).  In the spring of 1999, a time with an unexpectedly large domestic rice 
harvest, the Government imposed a ban on all rice imports between March and May 
that year (FAO 1999). 
 
Measures based on use of inputs 
As in Vietnam, fertilizer policy is closely linked to rice policy in Indonesia. Although 
gradually being phased out, a fertilizer subsidy program sets the wholesale prices of 
urea, triple super phosphate (TSP) and ammonia. As of 1994 only urea is being subsi-
dized in this manner.  
 
Another input-based measure that has been removed is the provision of credits to Bu-
log on preferential terms. As part of the reforms in 1998-99 Bulog is now required to 
rely on banking credits at market rates. 
 
General services to agriculture 
Closely related to the rice policy, the Indonesian Government supports the develop-
ment of irrigation infrastructure and maintenance, transportation facilities, research 
and development, and the dissemination of seeds and technologies for high-yielding 
varieties (Robinson et al. 1997).  
 
Recent policy reforms 
In November 2000 the Government of Indonesia announced plans for reforming the 
rice policy. The reform proposal under consideration is known as the “Controlled 
Free Market Mechanism” and consists of three parts: (a) a seasonal import ban: rice 
imports are to be banned apart from during the lean season (October to January each 
year), (b) during the import season the rice tariff is to change from the current fixed 
specific tariff of Rp. 430/kg ((USD 0.06/kg) to a variable levy based on world prices, 
the USD/Rp exchange rate and domestic supply, and (c) the domestic floor price is to 
be raised from Rp. 1400/kg to Rp. 1500/kg (FAS 2000j).  
 
If implemented this policy reform proposal will entail a further distortion of the do-
mestic rice market away from the international market signals and a strengthening of 
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the Market Price Support component of its rice policy regime. The expected outcome 
is a reduction of official imports but a continuation of illegal smuggling of imported 
rice.30 Given that Bulog’s role was strongly reduced as part of Indonesia’s agreement 
with the IMF, this policy change may cause the Government difficulties. 
 
4.4.2. Japan 
Policy objectives 
The Government of Japan is preoccupied with ensuring food security for its citizens 
and this is manifested in its formulation of a specific target for food self-sufficiency 
on a caloric basis. As stated in official documents, there is a desire in Japan - both po-
litically and culturally - to protect and sustain agricultural production in general and 
rice cultivation in particular. The Government is also seeking to reverse the trends of 
a static to declining agriculture and an aging farm population. Although the most re-
cent policy developments stress the promotion of the responsiveness of agricultural 
production to consumer demands, it is also stated that the government must take 
measures necessary to mitigate adverse effects of price changes (Bull and Roberts 
2001).  
 
Policy instruments 
Assistance to the rice sector in Japan is provided primarily through price support 
backed up by supply controls, import restrictions and the use of administratively de-
termined internal support prices. As is evident from the indicators in Table 4.2 Market 
Price Support accounts for up to 90% of the value of producer support provided to ri-
ce farmers in Japan.31  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 It is estimated that as much as 80,000 tons/month are smuggled in the outer islands (FAS 2000j). 
31 The PSE initially declined after 1994, but increased again so that in 1999 the level was the same 
as the base in 1986-88 (Appendix Table A.7). This has happened despite the obligation to reduce 
total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) by 20% as part of the URAA. Japan did meet these 
obligations, and did so by shifting some of its support toward measures that were exempt from 
AMS reduction requirements, e.g. provision of government services (Bull and Roberts 2001). For 
this reason Bull and Roberts (2001) assert that the AMS measure used in the WTO negotiations is 
not representative of actual domestic support. In Japan the main component of the AMS is price 
support. In the AMS this is calculated as the difference between the internal administered support 
prices and a constant external reference price. The actual level of market distorting level of price 
support is more correctly given as the difference between actual internal prices and actual import 
prices at world market levels 
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Market Price Support measures 
The Government of Japan intervenes strongly in the pricing and marketing of rice re-
sulting in extremely high internal prices and substantial protection against foreign 
competition. Japanese consumers currently pay four to six times the world price for 
its rice, only part of which can be explained by higher quality.  
 
The Japanese Food Agency controls the sales of rice in the Japanese market. The dis-
tribution system is split into three major categories: government-owned/government-
marketed rice, voluntarily marketed rice, and rice outside the government channel 
(i.e. rice for farmers’ own consumption and rice sold directly to wholesalers, retailers 
and consumers) (FAS 2000n). Voluntarily marketed rice accounts for about half of 
Japan’s total demand for rice and the successful rice price at tenders held by the Vol-
untarily-Marketed Rice Distribution Corporations becomes a key indicator for both 
the wholesale and retail price of rice (Oryza 2001).  
 
The official production purchase price is determined annually by the Ministry of Ag-
riculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), the central Government, and the Rice Price 
Advisory Council – although the decision is often affected by the strong farming 
lobby. Table 4.15 shows the official price for domestically produced rice. In the 
1990s, high support prices have strongly encouraged rice production while consump-
tion has been declining because dietary patterns are changing. The price-induced ex-
cess production has been supplemented further by bumper harvests in the mid-1990s 
and the imports required under Japan’s URAA commitments (c.f. below).  
 
Table 4.15. Japanese Government resale price of domestically produced rice, 
yen/ton 
       
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
       
306,450 302,050 305,050 301,683 297,183 294,100 289,383 
 
Source: FAO (2001) 
 
 
 
At the border too the Food Agency controls rice trade to achieve its rice policy objec-
tives and hence it has the status of a state trading enterprise. Prior to the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture Japan banned rice imports on the basis of two ar-
guments. First, dating back to Japan’s accession to the GATT in 1955, the ban was 
justified under the Balance of Payments clause. Second, when the trade balance 
switched to a surplus in the 1960s it remained in place on food security and environ-
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mental grounds.32 During the URAA Japan made use of the Special Treatment Provi-
sion33 to postpone the tariffication of its rice import policy regime.34 Under the 
minimum market access commitment, Japan agreed to allow duty-free imports in 
1995 of up to 4% of its average annual consumption in the base period 1986-88. This 
was then to be following by equal annual increments of 0.8% of base period con-
sumption until reaching 8% in the final year 2000. The minimum market access re-
quirements amounted to 379,000 tons in 1995, doubling to 758,000 in 2000. Even 
though the minimum access imports faced a zero tariff, the URAA permitted Japan to 
impose a mark-up of 292 yen/kg (USD 2.56/kg). Japan has had to control the size of 
its stocks in order to be able to fulfill the minimum market access requirement. 
 
In the URAA Japan retained the right of opting for tariffication before the end of the 
implementation period – the agreement being that the annual increases in imports for 
years beyond the tariffication would be half the originally agreed (Bull and Roberts 
2001). Japan took this opportunity on April 1, 1999, and so Japan’s rice import re-
gime now consists of a tariff rate quota.  
 
In 1999 above-quota imports faced a specific tariff of 351.17 yen per kilo (USD 3,334 
per ton) and 341 yen per kilo (USD 2,973 per ton) was levied in 2000. As mentioned 
above the tariffication deal entailed a reduction in the imported volumes. These are 
shown in Table 4.16. To date there have been virtually no over-quota rice imports into 
Japan and given the high tariff not much is expected. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Rice cultivation is considered to be a defense against flooding as well as a water filtration system 
with cultural and aesthetic dimensions, i.e. multifunctionality considerations (FAO 1999). How-
ever, as mentioned in Bull and Roberts (2001) forests play a similar role, and 60% of Japan is in 
fact covered in forest. See Bull and Roberts (2001) for a discussion of the misperception of sup-
porting paddy rice production in an effort to attain multifunctionality objectives, including envi-
ronmental benefits, rural employment spillovers, and food security concerns.  
33 Special Treatment was allowed for commodities meeting the following conditions: (i) they are 
major staples in the diet, (ii) imports are less than 3% of domestic consumption in the base period, 
and (iii) no export subsidies have been provided. Three countries were allowed to apply the Spe-
cial Treatment clause for rice under the URAA: Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines 
(FAO 1995).  
34 See Hayami and Godo (1995) for a discussion of the political-economy background of this result. 
They argue that the tariffication option at the time threatened the vested interests that were pro-
tected by the monopoly control of rice marketing enjoyed by the Food Agency and agricultural 
cooperatives.  
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Table 4.16. Japan’s Market Access Obligations for Rice 
   
 Without tariffication With tariffication 
 
 
 
Volume (tons) 
% of domestic 
consumption 
 
Volume (tons) 
% of domestic  
consumption 
     
1999 682,000 7.2 644,000 6.8 
2000 758,000 8.0 682,000 7.2 
 
Source: FAS (2000n) 
 
 
 
Controversy has furthermore surrounded the tariffication of the Japanese rice import 
regime. It seems to be yet another case of dirty tariffication. According to Bull and 
Roberts (2001) the tariff equivalent was calculated on the basis of the price gap be-
tween different qualities of domestic and imported rice, namely the Japanese internal 
price and prices for Thai broken rice. If the Japanese prices had been judged relative 
to a comparable quality of rice, such as US rice, the tariff equivalent would have been 
far lower.35 Several countries, including Australia, the European Union, Uruguay and 
Argentina have criticized the tariffication method applied.36  
 
In addition to the tariff rate quota system, special safeguards have been introduced 
into the Japanese rice import regime. Under the URAA special safeguards (price-
triggered and quantity-triggered safeguards) allow an importer to increase the tariff 
rate corresponding to the decline in border price or the increase in the imported quan-
tity.37 
 
To manage Japan’s import purchases under its URAA commitments, the MAFF holds 
Ordinary Minimum Access (OMA) tenders and Simultaneous Buy and Sell (SBS) 
tenders.38 Four countries have gained access to the Japanese rice market: the United 
States, Thailand, Australia, and China   (Table 4.17). Their shares have remained rela-
                                                 
35 See Hayami and Godo (1997) for a discussion on the difference between domestic and border 
prices in Japan. 
36 See Hayami and Godo (1997) for a partial equilibrium analysis of the consequences of tarrifica-
tion and a strengthening of acreage control in the Japanese rice regime. These results are based on 
the assumption of ‘clean’ tariffication in which the initial tariff rate is set precisely equal to the 
domestic-border price difference. 
37 See Hayami and Godo (1997) for an illustration of the protective effect of the safeguard measures 
using an ad valorem tariff and a specific duty.  
38 Importers and wholesalers offer tenders simultaneously for the selling and buying prices for each 
variety of rice in the SBS system. The price offered by the wholesalers reflects market demand 
and the differences between the two offers reflect the market evaluation of the price differentials 
on imported rice (Bull and Roberts 2001). 
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tively stable over the period in the aggregate – the USA: 47.8%, Thailand: 23.4%, 
Australia: 17.0%, China: 10.0% - although the split between OMA and SBS pur-
chases has varied. To expand the participation of other countries in Japan’s rice im-
port market, the MAFF announced in November 2000 that it would introduce an Ex-
perimental Trial Quota (ETQ) for imports as of January 2001. The ETQ will be 
treated as part of the OMA rice imports and will total 10,000 medium and long grain 
rice for processing use (FAS 2000r). 
 
Table 4.17. Japan’s Minimum Access Rice Tenders, 1995-2000 
        
 U.S. Thailand Australia China Others Total Metric  tons 
 Percent of total  
 
1995 
Total 47.4 23.3 21.3   7.9 0.1 100% 408,794 
of which SBS 53.4   2.3 18.1 22.3 3.8 100% 10,694 
of which OMA 47.2 23.9 21.4   7.5 0.0 100% 398,100 
1996 
 Total 46.2 27.5 17.4   8.6 0.3 100% 465,650 
of which SBS 64.2   1.6   5.3 23.2 5.5 100% 22,000 
of which OMA 45.3 28.8 18.0   7.9 0.0 100% 443,650 
1997 
  Total 50.1 24.8 15.7   8.1 1.4 100% 544,341 
of which SBS 62.9   1.7   5.7 25.2 4.6 100% 55,141 
of which OMA 48.6 27.4 16.8   6.1 1.0 100% 489,200 
1998 
  Total 47.7 21.4 16.1 11.4 3.4 100% 632,400 
of which SBS 30.4   4.4 12.1 51.6 1.4 100% 120,000 
of which OMA 51.8 25.4 17.0   2.0 3.9 100% 512,400 
1999 
  Total 47.9 21.7 16.0 11.7 2.6 100% 653,100 
of which SBS 30.7   3.1 12.2 52.2 1.9 100% 120,000 
of which OMA 51.8 25.9 16.9   2.6 2.8 100% 533,100 
2000 
  Total 47.7 21.5 15.6 12.7 2.4 100% 693,039 
of which SBS 38.6   4.1 11.9 44.4 1.0 100% 120,000 
of which OMA 49.6 25.2 16.4   6.1 2.7 100% 573,039 
 
Note: SBS stands for Simultaneous Buy and Sell tenders. OMA stands for Ordinary Minimum Access ten-
ders. 
Source: FAS (2001m) 
 
 
 
In spite of the partial opening of the market to foreign suppliers through the URAA 
commitments, Japanese consumers still make retail purchases of domestic rather than 
foreign rice. There are several reasons for this. First, foreign rice is expensive relative 
to domestic rice and prices come close to the price of domestic premium rice. Second, 
the availability of foreign, SBS-purchased rice is still very limited (Oryza 2001). One 
of the apparent reasons for limiting the SBS system is that the government may no 
longer be able to ensure that rice imports meet the agreed quota levels if domestic 
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demand is weak. Hence there may be cast doubt on the effect that the market opening 
is having on lowering domestic prices and reducing market distortions in Japan. 
 
There are also other indications that imported rice is not competing to the full extent 
with domestic rice on the Japanese market. Most imported rice is stored for twelve 
months before it is released for other purposes such as for animal feed and for food 
aid (c.f. below) (Bull and Roberts 2001). Just like the United States, Japan’s rice pol-
icy regime has a rather large food aid component. The government covers the cost 
difference between the Japanese domestic rice price and the international market price 
for rice. In October 2000, for example, the Government of Japan decided to donate 
500,000 tons to North Korea through the United Nations World Food Program (Oryza 
2001). The rice to be given here is all government-owned domestic rice (FAS 
2001m), but Japan has at other times used minimum access rice and rice purchased 
from international markets for its food aid program. In 1994, one year after agreeing 
to open its rice market through a minimum market access amount, Japan saw a record 
post-war harvest and so much of the imported rice, which was rather unsuited for the 
Japanese market, was kept in storage. Disposal of this stock was in terms of animal 
feed, input to food processing, and finally as food aid to Laos and Nepal. In the Japa-
nese fiscal year 1998 1,000,000 tons were provided as food aid to Indonesia, consist-
ing of 420,000 tons domestic rice, 280,000 tons minimum access rice, and 300,000 
tons purchased from the international market. In the fiscal years 1999 150,000 tons of 
rice was provided as foods aid to 21 countries in Asia, Africa and Central America, 
although the composition of domestic vs. minimum access purchased rice is unknown 
(FAS 2000p).  
 
Payments based on area planted and on input constraints 
Instead of reducing production incentives by e.g. substantially lowering producer 
support prices (see Table 4.14), the Japanese government has tackled the problem by 
embarking on a land diversion program where land-based payments encourage farm-
ers to divert rice land to other crops and activities (Bull and Roberts 2001). Farmer 
and government contributions fund the land diversion program jointly. It includes 
many alternatives: planting to other crops, diversion to multifunctional purposes (e.g. 
landscape conservation, conservation of paddy fields without cropping) and land im-
provements. Both set-aside areas and payments per hectare have been increasing since 
1994 (Bull and Roberts 2001).  
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The land diversion program has expanded in recent years to reduce the large stocks 
held by the MAFF. For both the 1998/99 and the 1999/2000 seasons the program tar-
get to divert 960,000 hectares from rice to other crops (FAO 1999). According to the 
FAO (2001) the paddy area subject to diversification was increased in September 
2000 to 1,063,000 hectares. Japan’s total potential rice paddy land is estimated at 
2,682,000 hectares, and so total production area will occupy only about 60% of total 
potential paddy land. Results of a study by Fujiki (2000) show that the rice acreage 
controls have a significant impact in terms of boosting domestic prices.   
 
4.4.3. Republic of Korea 
Policy objectives 
The main objectives of the Korean rice policy are to support producer prices whilst at 
the same time to ensure that consumers face affordable prices for their staple food.  
 
Policy instruments 
The Korean rice policy regime is in many ways very similar to that of Japan. As 
shown in Table 4.2 the Market Price Support component is even stronger in Korea 
than in Japan, but the Nominal Protection Coefficient is somewhat lower, although 
still very high. 
 
Market Price Support measures 
Procurement at an administered price and import restrictions are the two main instru-
ments used to support the domestic price.39 The Korean government operates a dual 
price system for rice: a purchase price at which the government procures rice from 
producers, and a release or resale price at which it sells government stocks to the 
market. The purchase price is determined by factors such as production costs, urban-
rural income disparities, the agricultural terms of trade, the expected supply and de-
mand situation, expected inflation, and the government budget situation. The resulting 
price has consistently been far above the world prices, usually by a multiple of more 
than five (OECD 1999). To ensure low prices to consumers the release price has gen-
erally been lower than the purchase price. Both the purchase price and the procure-
ment volume are determined in advance (Table 4.17). In 1994-95 the share of gov-
ernment procured rice was about 30%, after which it has declined rather steadily to 
23% in 1996-97 and 17-18% in 1998-2000 (FAS 2001j).  
 
                                                 
39 Government procurement has been used not only to influence the level of production (and thereby 
prices) but also the varieties. 
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Since the introduction of the New Agricultural Plan in 1993 most of the rice pur-
chased by the government is now resold through a competitive bidding system under 
the National Agricultural Co-operatives Federation (NACF). This practice has re-
sulted in a significant reduction of the price wedge between the government purchase 
price and the resale price. As Table 4.18 shows, the consumer has been paying for this 
change since the release price has increased substantially more than has the purchase 
price. 
 
In 1997 the rice purchase system was further reformed. The government now signs 
contracts with farmers at the time of sowing, paying them 40% of the pre-determined 
purchase price. At harvest time, the farmer is free to sell to either the private sector or 
to the government. If the farmer chooses the first option it must reimburse the ad-
vance payment at 7% interest (OECD 1999).  
 
Table 4.18. Government program for rice purchases 
     
Crop Year Production Purchase Purchase pricea Release pricea 
                       (1,000 metric tons)                         Korean Won/kg 
     
1996 5,323 1,267 1,725 1,562 
1997 5,449 1,224 1,725 1,650 
1998 5,097   928 1,818 1,850 
1999 5,263  876 1,911 1,963 
2000 5,262 906 2,016 na 
2001 b 5,400 828 2,076 na 
 
a For #1 grade rice, b Projection 
Source: FAS (2000k, 2001k) 
 
 
 
The domestic price support measures are complemented by restrictions on foreign 
trade. Prior to the URAA imports were only permitted during periods of domestic 
shortage. Under the URAA Korea made use of the Special Treatment provision, just 
like Japan and the Philippines, and avoided the tariffication of its rice import regime. 
Instead it opened its markets marginally through minimum access commitments. Ko-
rea committed itself to importing rice quantities equivalent to 1% of domestic rice 
consumption in the base period 1988-90, starting in 1995 and rising to 4% of this base 
quantity in 2004. South Korea’s minimum access amount is smaller than Japan’s due 
to its developing country status. An ad valorem tariff of 5% is levied on minimum ac-
cess rice imports (AMAD database). Just like Japan, the Government of Korea has the 
right to apply a mark-up on imports in addition to the in-quota tariff.  
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The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) acts as a state trading agency and 
administers the rice import quota (OECD 1999). Korea’s importing strategy seems to 
be to meet the minimum requirements and to tender only for lower quality rice to 
avoid creating real competition for domestic rice, which is consumed directly by the 
Korean consumer (FAS 2000k). In the year 2000 Korea purchased 114,016 metric 
tons of brown rice, equivalent to the 102,614 metric tons of milled rice as required by 
its minimum market access commitments. This was done through five separate ten-
ders. Two agencies purchased foreign rice. On behalf of the MAF, the Supply Ad-
ministration of the Republic of Korea (SAROK) purchased 71,000 and the Agricul-
tural and Fishery Marketing Cooperation purchased the remainder. The majority of 
this rice (four of the five tenders) was won by COFCO, the Chinese state trading en-
terprise, and was sold at very low prices. The fifth tender was won by Siam Rice of 
Thailand, and also sold at low prices. The interesting thing to note is that none of this 
imported rice is made directly available to Korean consumers, but rather the rice is 
resold by the MAF for industrial food processing purposes. In each of the five tenders 
in 2000 there were between three and five bidders with China’s COFCO clearly un-
derpricing the other bidders in all cases except one (FAS 2000k).  
 
Payments based on area planted 
Apart from encouraging increased rice production through increased support prices, 
the government has in recent years supported the conversion of idle land to paddy 
fields. The forecasts, however, envisage rice production giving way to more lucrative 
cash crops such as vegetables as the economy develops.  
 
General services to the rice sector  
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) supports the rice sector in more gen-
eral ways too. It supports e.g. the development of direct marketing channels for rice 
from farm to retail levels – the goal being to lower the cost to the consumer by reduc-
ing the commercial middleman component. The MAF development plans also include 
investing resources in the development of rice processing centers to provide drying, 
storage, milling, distributing and purchasing services for farmers (FAS 2000k). 
 
Future policy developments 
As a developing country signatory of the URAA Korea is committed to reducing its 
domestic support of agriculture. The Korean Aggregate Measure of Support must be 
reduced by 13.3% from the 1989-91 base level to 2004. Support to encourage agricul-
tural and rural development such as investment is exempt from the AMS reduction 
requirements. In Korea the AMS is heavily dominated by rice (accounting for 90% of 
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the country’s total AMS, OECD 1999). So although the AMS commitment does not 
apply to individual commodities, the Government of Korea has no choice but to ad-
just its rice support policies to meet commitments. The AMS for rice is calculated as 
the purchased quantity multiplied by the difference between the purchase price and a 
fixed world reference price (Table 4.19). 
 
Table 4.19. Korean Rice Aggregate Measurement of Support (billion Won) 
       
 
 
Year 
 
 
Base AMSa 
 
Current 
AMSb 
Applied pricec 
(1,000 won 
/MT) 
External refer-
ence priced 
(1,000 Won/MT) 
Eligible pro-
ductione 
(1,000 MT) 
 
Total market 
price supportf 
       
1993 2,109      
1995 2,034 2,016 1,650 183.9 1,375 2,075 
1996 1,959 1,910 1,723 183.9 1,241 1,967 
1997 1,885 1,884 1,723 183.9 1,224 1,937 
1998 1,810 1,510 1,811 183.9    928 1,563 
1999 1,735 1,503 1,900 183.9    876 1,552 
2000 1,660 1,660 2,016 183.9    906      na 
2001 1,585     na 2,097 183.9    828      na 
2002 1,510     na na 183.9      na      na 
2003 1,435     na na 183.9      na      na 
2004 1,360     na na 183.9      na      na 
 
a Country schedule. b Actual AMS. 2000 data is a FAS/Seoul estimate. c Government purchase price. 2000 
and 2001 are FAS/Seoul estimates. d The international market price in 1993 that the MAF uses for the 
AMS calculation. Note that the WTO URAA reference period for the AMS external reference price is 1986-
1988. e Government procurement quantities. Government did not reach target qualities in 1998 and 1999 
because farmers chose to retain stock for direct sales. 2001 is a FAS/Seoul projection. f Calculation of ac-
tual AMS for all agricultural commodities. 
Source: FAS (2001j) 
 
 
 
4.4.4. The European Union 
Policy objectives 
The EU rice policy is an integrated part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and hence the overall objectives hereof are coherent. The main objectives of the CAP 
are (European Commission (1999) as cited in Walter-Jørgensen and Jensen (2001)):  
- to ensure the competitiveness of the EU agricultural sector, both on internal 
market and on export markets 
- to contribute to sustaining the livelihood of farmers while promoting the eco-
nomic development of the wider rural economy 
- to promote ways of farming that contribute to the maintenance and enhance-
ment of the rural environment and landscape. 
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Policy instruments 
As was seen in Table 4.2 between 20% and 30% of the gross receipts earned by rice 
farmers in the EU are due to policy transfers – a level clearly below the corresponding 
indicators for Japan and Korea but of a similar magnitude as those for the US in the 
most recent years. The share of the most distorting policy instruments - the Market 
Price Support measures - is high, however, although it has been declining. 
 
The current EU rice regime consists of four components: (i) an intervention storage 
system guaranteeing purchases at a predetermined intervention price, (ii) export resti-
tutions enabling EU exporters to compete on world markets, (iii) import duties that 
are gradually being lowered in line with URAA commitments, and (iv) compensatory 
payments.  
 
Rice is of course a minor crop in the EU, with budgetary outlays for the fiscal year 
2000 estimated to have amounted to Euro 203 million. The main part consists of di-
rect payments worth Euro 122 million, with intervention storage accounting for Euro 
54 million, and export restitutions amounting to Euro 27 million (FAS 2000s).40  
 
Market Price Support measures 
One of the main Market Price Support mechanisms of the EU rice regime is the inter-
vention system that guarantees purchases at a predetermined intervention price. As a 
direct result of the CAP reforms of 1992 and the URAA of 1994/95 the European 
Community amended its rice policy regime in 1996/97 to be effective from 1997/98 
to 1999/2000. The changes entailed a 15% reduction of intervention prices imple-
mented through annual cuts of 5% during the aforementioned period. The rice inter-
vention price was thereby reduced from Euro 351.00 per ton in 1996/97 to Euro 
333.45 per ton in 1997/98, Euro 315.90 per ton in 1998/99, and Euro 298.35 per ton 
in 1999/2000 (European Council 2000). 
 
The EU also makes use of substantial border measures to provide Market Price Sup-
port to its rice farmers. During the Uruguay Round negotiations the EU tariffied all its 
rice import duties and a schedule for reducing them by 36% by 2000/01 was agreed 
upon (Table 4.20). These rates have not been applied, however, because rice became 
part of the US-EU Blair House Agreement. This agreement introduced a variable levy 
                                                 
40 For the fiscal year 1998 (16/10/97-15/10/98) rice policy expenditures were ECU 166,052 million. 
Of this total 40.5 were hectare premiums given to Italy (22.8), Spain (11.7), Portugal (2.9), France 
(2.6) and Greece (0.6). Export restitutions amounted to ECU 49.6 million and storage costs 
amounted to ECU 62.2 million (European Commission 1998). 
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on husked and milled rice, which account for the bulk of rice imports into the EU. A 
specific formula was given for calculating the import levy, which relates directly to 
the difference between the intervention price and an external reference price. 41 If the 
calculations result in higher duties than the bound URAA duties, the latter apply. The 
variable levies prevent the duty-paid import price from exceeding the effective buy-
ing-in price by more than 80% for husked Indica rice, 88% for husked Japonica rice, 
163% for milled Indica rice, and 167% for milled Japonica rice. Over the past three 
years the variable levies have declined since they have followed the reduction of the 
intervention price. Paddy rice and broken rice have been subject to fixed specific du-
ties within bound rates. The actual duties have been well below the bound rates (FAS 
2000s).  
 
Table 4.20. Bound rice import tariff rates into the EU under URAA (Euro/ton) 
        
 
 
 
Base  
period 
(1986-88) 
 
 
1995/96 
 
 
1996/97 
 
 
1997/98 
 
 
1998/99 
 
 
1999/2000 
 
 
2000/01 
        
Paddy 330 311 291 271 251 231 211 
Husked 413 388 363 339 314 289 264 
Milled 650 611 572 533 494 455 416 
Broken 200 188 176 164 152 140 128 
 
Source: FAS (2000s) 
 
 
 
As the above indicates, the EU rice import regime has been constructed to protect EU 
rice millers. In 1996 the EU struck deals with the United States and Thailand on an-
nual tariff rate quotas for 63,000 tons of milled rice, 20,000 tons of brown rice, and 
1,000 tons of broken rice. The quotas are split by country of origin and applications 
for import licenses take place in quarterly tranches (Table 4.21). The EU notifications 
to the WTO show that the quotas are completely filled (or at least very close to being 
filled) each year except for broken rice.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 To determine the import prices of the different types of rice the following factors shall be used: 
the cif price at Rotterdam (in lack hereof the representative price on the Thai, US or other markets 
in that order of priority), the average cost of sea freight between the port of origin and one of the 
main ports in Holland. In absence of estimates of the latter, freight costs for cereals shall be used. 
If the price available is C&F (cost and freight), it should be increased by 0.75% (European Com-
mission 1996).  
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Table 4.21. Allocation of EU rice import quotas by country of origin (tons) 
    
 Semi/wholly milled rice Husked rice Broken rice 
    
Quota 63,000 20,000 80,000* 
 - USA 38,721 7,642 7,281 
 - Thailand 21,455 1,812 41,600 
 - Australia 1,019 10,429 12,913 
 - Guyana 0 0 8,503 
 - Others 1,805 117 9,703 
    
In-quota duty  0 ECU 88/ton ECU 28/ton 
 
* Note that subsequent notifications to the WTO report quotas of 1,000 tons of broken rice. 
Source: European Commission (1998b) 
 
 
 
The EU also has an inward processing scheme (IPR) through which products are im-
ported duty-free, undergo processing in the EU, and are thereafter exported to third 
countries without export subsidies. In 1998/99 120,000 tons were imported and re-
exported under this system (FAS 2000s). 
 
The European Union provides preferential conditions and preferential access quotas 
to agricultural and food products from several developing countries, particularly the 
ACP countries. Around 40% of rice imports into the EU enter on preferential terms. A 
quota of 160,000 tons of husked rice is allocated to imports from the ACP and OCT 
countries, currently allocated as 125,000 tons from ACP countries and 35,000 from 
OCT countries (FAS 2000s). Imports from the ACP countries are charged 35% of the 
normal duty whereas the OCT countries face zero duties (EUR-Lex 2001). This ma-
kes imports from these origins particularly attractive to EU rice millers. The EU also 
provides concessional import terms for other countries. Lower import duties apply for 
a quota of up to 32,000 tons of rice from Egypt and a quota of up to 4,000 tons from 
Bangladesh. India and Pakistan, the main suppliers of basmati rice to the EU, enjoy a 
rebate of Euro 250/ton to the normal import duty, which at present levels amounts to 
an effective zero duty.42  
                                                 
42 As mentioned earlier rice production in the European Union consists of japonica rice, which is 
consumed in the producing member states, Italy, Spain, Greece, France and Portugal.  Consump-
tion in the northern member states consists mainly of indica rice imported from the US, ACP/OCT 
(Overseas Countries and Territories) countries, Thailand, India and Pakistan. Fragrant rice varieties 
- jasmine rice imported from Thailand, and basmati rice from India and Pakistan - have also gained 
in popularity. Due to a surplus of japonica rice in the Union (in 1999/2000 accounting for two-
thirds of total EU rice production), from 1988 to 1993 producers were encouraged to convert to in-
dica varieties to satisfy the demand that consists of 55% indica. This has resulted in an increase 
from 27,000 ha indica production in 1988/89 to 120,000 ha in 1999/2000 (EUR-Lex 2001). 
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Rice exports are supported by export restitutions that are subject to annual reductions 
in both volume and value terms up to 2000/01. Most of EU rice exports are subsi-
dized, with the subsidy closing the gap between EU domestic prices and the lower 
prevailing world market prices. Exports under food aid programs also benefit from 
subsidies set beforehand by the European Commission. Both subsidized exports and 
food aid shipments are to be notified to the WTO. The unsubsidized exports are those 
that are exported through IPR arrangements. Table 4.22 shows the status of the budg-
etary outlays to rice export restitutions in the EU and how they compare with the 
commitments (FAS 2000s). EU export data cover exports with and without subsidies 
as well as exports under special food aid programs. As the table reveals the quantity 
restrictions are binding – an indication of the necessity that the URAA included re-
strictions not only on the value of export subsidies but also the quantity of subsidized 
exports. 
 
Table 4.22. EU rice export support: budget outlays and quantities: actual vs. 
commitments 
    
    Budgetary outlays (million Euro)    Volume (thou. tons, milled rice 
     equivalent) 
MY Sep/Aug Commitments Actual outlays Commitments Actual volumes 
Food aid  
(thou. tons, 
wheat equiv.) 
      
1995/96 54.6 30,3 163,0 88,6 91.8 
1996/97 51.1 72,2 157,1 226,5 42.5 
1997/98 47,5 32,6 151,2 155.1 110.2 
1998/99 43,9 26.6 145.3 143.9 125.5 
1999/2000 40,4 26.4 140,4 139.3 63.5 
2000/01 36,8 not yet notified 133,4 not yet notified not yet notified 
 
Source: Export data for 1995/96, 1996/97, and 200/01: FAS (2000s). Food aid and export data for 1997/98, 
1998/99, and 1999/2000: EU notifications to the WTO: G/AG/N/EEC/5 Rev.1, G/AG/N/EEC/11, 
G/AG/N/EEC/20 Rev.1, G/AG/N/EEC/23, and G/AG/N/EEC/32.   
 
 
Payments based on area planted 
Rice farmers have been compensated for the above-mentioned reduction of the inter-
vention price (and the reduction of the import duties following the URAA commit-
ments, c.f. above) since 1997/98 through so-called compensatory payments. Compen-
satory payments are paid out to rice farmers up to a national base area limit – the total 
base area in the EU is 433,123 hectares. The national base areas are as shown in Table 
4.23. If these base areas are exceeded the compensatory payments are reduced propor-
tionally for all producers as a penalty (European Council 1995). 
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Table 4.23. Compensatory payments (Euro/hectare) 
     
 
 
Base area 
(hectares) 
 
997/98 
 
1998/99 
 
1999/2000 and after 
     
Spain  104,973 111.44 222.89 334.33 
France 
- Metropolitan 
- French Guyana 
 
  24,500 
    5,500 
 
96.35 
131.80 
 
192.70 
263.60 
 
289.05 
395.40 
Greece    24,891 131.27 262.55 393.82 
Italy 239,259 106.00 212.00 318.01 
Portugal   34,000 106.18 212.36 318.53 
 
Source: European Council (1995) 
 
 
 
Recent policy reform proposal 
The intervention mechanism of the EU rice regime that supports the internal market 
price has lead to rapidly increasing intervention purchases over the recent years due to 
falling world market prices and hence a continued build-up of intervention stocks. In 
an attempt to control the structural market surpluses – to which the increased opening 
of the market to imports and the curbing of subsidized exports have contributed – the 
EU released a rice policy reform proposal in June 2000. The main content of this pro-
posal is the removal of the intervention price and the mandatory intervention purchase 
system, and the inclusion of the rice sector into the arable crop system of the CAP 
(Table 4.24). The proposal has not been adopted yet because the major rice producing 
countries in the EU cannot agree to eliminate the intervention system (FAO 2001a, 
EUR-Lex 2001). 
 
If the Commission’s rice policy reform proposal is accepted, the mechanism of de-
termining the duties on husked and milled rice imports will have to be revised be-
cause the current formula relies on the intervention price. One possibility is to resort 
to the URAA bound rates as is the case for paddy and broken rice. Such a change 
would have to be negotiated with the affected partners under Article XXVIII of the 
GATT, i.e. Modification of Schedules (FAO 2001a). If the URAA bound tariffs are to 
be used it is expected that the currently applied rates would increase from around 200 
Euro/ton for husked rice to the bound rate of 264 Euro/ton. Furthermore, the Basmati 
duty abatements would no longer apply. In any case, such a change would remove an 
instrument that has served to discriminate between different types and qualities of rice 
thereby posing a strong distortionary effect on trade flows. Adopting fixed tariffs 
would greatly simplify the system. Including the rice sector into the arable crop pro-
gram would increase EU budgetary expenditures on area payments by about 27 mil-
lion Euro per year. On the other hand, the removal of the intervention price system 
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would entail cost savings of about 38 million Euro per year by abolishing public rice 
stocks (EUR-Lex 2001). 
 
Table 4.24. Proposed change in the EU Rice Policy Regime 
  
Current Rice Policy Regime Commission Reform Proposal 
PRODUCTION POLICY 
1999/2000 support intervention price: 298.35 
Euro/ton for paddy rice.  
 
Mandatory intervention purchases.  
 
 
Compensatory area payments: 52.65 Euro/ton 
multiplied by average regional yield (Spain, metro-
politan France, Guiana, Greece, Italy, Portugal). 
On average in 1999/2000: 328.98 Euro/hectare 
within the base area.  
 
 
 
No compulsory set-aside. 
Support intervention price to be abolished in 2001/02.  
 
 
Public intervention system to be abolished and re-
placed with aids to private storage. 
 
Area payments to be raised to same level as for 
crops under the arable crop policy regime (63 
Euro/ton for 2001/02). If rice is brought into arable 
crop system the national base areas would have to 
be increased to reflect same reference years as for 
arable crops, i.e. 1989,1990,1991. 
 
Rice is to be subject to compulsory set-aside. Using 
the 10% set-aside currently used for grains would 
lower production by approx. 150,000 tons of paddy, 
or 90,000 tons milled equivalent. 
IMPORT REGIME 
Since 1995 imports of paddy rice and brokens 
have been subject to URAA bound rates (211 
Euro/ton for paddy and 128 Euro/ton for brokens in 
2000/01) 
 
Rice was part of the US/EU Blair House accord. 
The duty-paid import price for husked Indica and 
husked Japonica must not exceed by more than 
80% and 88%. respectively, the effective buying-in 
price for intervention for those qualities. For milled 
counterparts the difference may not exceed 163% 
and 167%, respectively. 
 
Basmati rice imports are subject to a rebate of 
Euro 250/ton to the normal import duty, which at 
present levels amounts to an effective zero duty.  
No change. 
 
 
 
In absence of the intervention price system this 
method cannot be applied. If the URAA bound tariffs 
are used instead it is expected that the currently ap-
plied rates would increase from around 200 Euro/ton 
for husked rice to the bound rate of 264 Euro/ton and 
Basmati abatements would no longer apply. 
 
URAA bound tariff for husked rice was 289 Euro/ton 
in 1999/00, substantially higher than the applied rate. 
Changes will probably require re-negotiation with the 
affected parties, mainly India and Pakistan. 
EXPORT REGIME 
Subsidized exports subject to quantity and value 
ceilings. 
No change. 
 
Source: FAO (2001a, b) and EUR-Lex (2001) 
 
 
 
Recent preferential trade agreements 
In the meantime, the EU member states has taken a trade policy initiative that will ha-
ve a direct impact on several of the EU’s poorer rice trading partners. In February 
2001 the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative was endorsed. Through this initiative the 
EU will unilaterally remove all tariffs and quotas on all commodities, except weap-
ons, from 49 Least Developed Countries. There are three exceptions, however, to this 
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initiative: rice, sugar, and bananas. Implementation of free market access for these 
products will take place in three progressive stages. In the case of rice duties are to be 
reduced by 20% annually from January 1, 2002 to full elimination as of January 1, 
2006 (European Commission 2001).43 
 
To compensate for the delayed liberalization of rice imports, the EU is offering mar-
ket access through the creation of duty-free quotas for rice (and sugar), based initially 
on the ‘best figures’ for LDC exports during the 1990s plus 15%. These quotas will 
increase by 15% each year during the interim period. This solution is intended to im-
prove trading opportunities for LDCs immediately, while giving time for EU farmers 
to adapt to the changes required in the Common Agricultural Policy as well as taking 
into account the limitations imposed by the EU budget. The Commission will monitor 
the imports of rice (and bananas and sugar) carefully and has pledged to apply safe-
guard measures (e.g. an additional import duty) if necessary to prevent damaging 
surges. In order to implement the initiative there will have to be monitoring to verify 
the respect for rules of origin (European Commission 2001). The EU duty-free rice 
import quotas under the EBA preferential access scheme are shown in Table 4.25. 
 
Table 4.25. EU duty-free rice import quotas: EBA preferential access scheme 
(tons) 
        
2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 20051/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
        
2,517 2,895 3,329 3,829 4,403 5,063 5,823 6,696 
 
Source: FAO (2001a) 
 
 
 
In terms of other regional trade agreements it may be mentioned that cereal trade (in-
cluding rice) and other sensitive agricultural products were not part of the agreement 
to liberalize trade between the EU and South Africa signed in 2000 (Bjørnskov and 
Krivonos 2001). Moreover, in its deal with the Mercosur States, the European Union 
has agreed to postpone talks on tariffs until July 2001 (FAO 1999). 
 
 
                                                 
43 Duties on sugar and bananas are to be eliminated in three stages beginning with a 20% reduction 
on July 1, 2006, 50% on July 1, 2007 and 80% on July 1, 2008. Duties will be completely elimi-
nated as of July 1, 2009. 
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5. Evaluation of rice policies 
The most prominent characteristics of the rice policies of the major exporting and im-
porting countries are the extremely high degrees of protection provided to domestic 
producers and the wide array of complex policy instruments being used to achieve the 
stated policy objectives. This chapter evaluates the rice policies reviewed above in 
light of issues related to e.g. the adherence to URAA commitments, and points to re-
forms that will enable a better functioning of the international rice market. This 
evaluation intends to provide – particularly Vietnamese – stakeholders with an over-
view of which countries have the most distorting policies as they impact on interna-
tional trade, and hence where pressure should be mounted in the upcoming multilat-
eral agricultural trade negotiations to reform these policies. Yet the review also re-
veals that there are a number of domestic policies that ought to be reformed too so as 
to ensure efficient rice production and trade within these countries.     
 
State trading enterprises 
State trading enterprises (STEs) play a dominant role in most rice producing coun-
tries. Governments use STEs to achieve the goals of their rice policies by giving them 
the authority to intervene in the market and by having them administer the chosen 
policy instruments. As the policy review above reveals, the STEs involved in rice 
trade differ with respect to the extent to which they control foreign trade and their re-
sponsibilities for management of domestic production and distribution. The scope 
spans from monopoly control over imports and strong control over domestic market-
ing in Japan to the provision of export credit guarantees and management of food aid 
programs in the United States. Table 5.1 gives an impression of the range of functions 
of state trading enterprises. 
 
Concerns are expressed that – given their control over foreign trade, domestic market-
ing, distribution and pricing – STEs have the ability to effectively foreclose domestic 
markets from foreign competition and to distort export competition (see e.g. Ingco 
and Ng 1998). It is argued that STEs (mis-)use their position to limit the degree of 
competition in domestic markets by controlling market access, to protect domestic 
producers at levels higher than those provided for by the bound tariffs levels, and to 
provide exporters with unfair competitive advantages in international markets – some 
of which are not very transparent, e.g. preferential access to credit, possibilities of en-
gaging in long-term trade agreements with other governments, screening from bank-
ruptcy concerns, etc. This non-transparent behavior makes it difficult to assess 
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whether and to what degree market access is being restricted and whether domestic 
producers and exporters are being supported by the presence of an STE per se. 
 
Table 5.1. Range of STE activities based on notifications to the WTO 
  
Activities related to domestic trade Activities related to foreign trade 
• purchase of all, or a significant percent-
age of, domestic production 
• intervention purchases and sales (based 
on pre-determined floor and ceiling 
prices) 
• involvement in support schemes for 
domestic production 
• administration of marketing arrangements 
• domestic distribution of national 
production (possible monopoly) 
• domestic distribution of imports (possible 
monopoly) 
• credit guarantees (or other assistance) 
for producers and processors 
• marketing activities (promotion activities 
for national consumption) 
• maintenance of emergency stocks 
(national defense preparedness or 
implementation of food security 
programmes) 
• granting of production licenses  
• import operations (possible monopoly on 
imports) 
• export operations (possible monopoly on 
exports) 
• quality control of domestic production (for 
export) 
• storage, shipping, handling, processing, 
packaging, insuring (and other export-
related support       activities) 
• credit guarantees (or other assistance) for 
exporters 
• marketing activities (promotion activities for 
exports) 
• granting of import and export licenses  
• negotiation of long-term bilateral contracts 
for exports 
• implementation of quantitative restrictions 
(on imports/exports) 
• implementation of bilateral aid agreements 
 
Source: FAO (1998) and WTO (1995). 
 
 
 
Some argue that the benefits of “traditional” trade liberalization efforts such as tariff 
reductions, TRQ expansions and export subsidy restrictions may not fully materialize 
if the role of state trading enterprises is not curtailed (see e.g. Ingco and Ng 1998). 
Notwithstanding the distortionary effects of covert forms of support and protection 
provided to STEs, it is nevertheless important to distinguish between a given institu-
tional arrangement and the policy instruments being used within this setup.44 State 
trading enterprises are often merely administrators of government policies (OECD 
2001b, Young and Abbott 1998). In China, for example, it is the central government 
that determines the national rice import requirements while the state trading enterprise 
                                                 
44 Another point to keep in mind is that many agricultural markets are imperfectly competitive, and 
so the impact of an STE should be judged against this benchmark rather than against one of per-
fect competition. Karp and Perloff (1989) estimate the competitiveness of the rice export market 
and their results suggest that it is an oligopolistic market but that it is closer to being competitive 
than collusive. Furthermore, because state trading enterprises can be thought of as having a differ-
ent objective function than e.g. a private monopolist, a seemingly monopolistic STE may behave 
in a relatively more competitive manner because it takes account of effects on consumer and/or 
producer welfare (OECD 2001). 
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COFCO carries out the actual transactions. Similar examples of this ‘division of la-
bor’ exist in other rice trading countries. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that 
many trade distorting policy instruments would probably be in place irrespective of 
the presence or absence of a particular STE.  
 
Several countries do take the issue of state trading up in their proposals for the next 
phase of WTO negotiations, however. This suggests that there are perceived problems 
with the way STEs are currently being regulated in the WTO (see Box 5.1).45 A main 
concern is that the dominant roles played by STEs in agricultural trade, including rice  
 
Box 5.1. The status of State Trading Enterprises in the WTO 
 
The participation of state trading enterprises in agricultural trade is not a new phenomenon to the 
GATT/WTO system – it is well known in both developing and developed countries. The 1994 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (WTO 1994, p. 250) defines state trading enterprises as: “Governmental 
and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive or 
special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influ-
ence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports.”  
 
The GATT acknowledges state trading enterprises as legitimate participants in international trade as both a 
market regulator and an economic agent, but the Agreement also contains guidelines concerning their be-
havior (Article XVII). In particular, state trading enterprises are subject to the general GATT principles of 
non-discrimination and most-favored nation treatment (Article I). Furthermore, STEs are supposed to act 
solely on the basis of “commercial considerations”. Finally, STEs should not provide protection exceeding 
that provided by bound tariffs (Article II:4). In addition hereto, state trading enterprises are also explicitly 
mentioned in a number of other articles (see e.g. McCorriston and MacLaren 2001). State trading enter-
prises are of course subject to the disciplines contained in the Uruguay Round Agreement as they relate to 
market access, export subsidies and domestic support.  
 
WTO members must notify to the organization the existence, objectives, methods of operation, and the 
volumes of trade under the control of STEs. The majority of the notifications relate to state trading enter-
prises engaged in agriculture and related sectors (McCorriston and MacLaren 2001). Apart from the Euro-
pean Union, all the major exporters and importers notify the use STEs to administer some parts of their ag-
ricultural trade. Due to a somewhat unclear definition of state trading enterprises there are still controver-
sies as to whether or not the intervention agencies of the EU ought to be characterized as such since they 
manipulate markets but are not directly engaged in trade (Dixit and Josling, 1997). 
 
 
 
trade, are enabling WTO member countries to circumvent their URAA commitments 
to improve market access, discipline domestic support and reduce export subsidies. 
The review of rice policies above does indeed indicate that commitments have in 
some cases been circumvented and that rules are being used in ways that are in con-
                                                 
45 Furthermore, since China, who has just joined the WTO, and several of the countries that have 
applied for membership (e.g. Vietnam, Russia and Taiwan) all use state trading enterprises to im-
plement their agricultural policies and to manage agricultural exports and imports, there is a natural 
interest in this issue. State trading has indeed been a key issue in the negotiations leading to China’s 
accession to the WTO. 
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flict with their original intent. In some cases circumventions have taken place as ex-
ceptions to the general agreement such as the permission given to Japan and Korea to 
postpone the tariffication of their rice import regime. Another example is the Blair 
House Agreement that allowed the European Union to use a variable levy on milled 
rice imports. In other cases the circumventions have certainly not been intended, 
which the problems of dirty tariffication and de facto variable levies witness.  
 
Domestic support 
In order to compare policy instruments across countries, Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide 
an overview of domestic support and trade policy instruments, respectively, used in 
the rice policy regimes of the main importing and exporting countries reviewed 
above. The description of procurement programs with guaranteed prices and the like 
are described in the table with domestic support measures although they are of course 
closely linked to the trade policy measures in terms of providing producers with mar-
ket price support. 
 
Given the importance of the food security and price stability objectives, all govern-
ments (with the exception of Pakistan) intervene in the rice market to a greater or 
lesser extent to secure a price target of some sort – mainly to support producers but in 
some cases also to protect consumers (e.g. in Indonesia and Korea). To manage these 
procurement programs, governments typically hold stocks. In some countries these 
have become such a large budgetary burden that counter-measures are resorted to. In 
Japan, for example, land-based payments are used to encourage farmers to convert 
land to other uses. In the EU production exceeding the national base area limit trig-
gers a penalty in the form of lower compensatory payments. The effect of acreage 
controls is to limit the long-run output and export levels, and to raise the value of 
land.46  
 
Seen in relation to the total value of producer support provided to rice farmers, e.g. as 
measured by the Producer Support Estimate (PSE), the lion’s share of this support  
 
 
 
                                                 
46 In an applied general equilibrium model such controls must be modeled directly as a restriction on 
land use as an input. Acreage controls in combination with an output subsidy or price support will 
have the effect of increasing farmer income, but production increases will be limited by the ex-
plicit account-taking of restrictions on the use of land as an input. This combined effect amounts 
to both an upward shift as well as a movement along the supply curve.  
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Table 5.2. Rice: domestic support instruments 
      
 Minimum or 
guidance 
prices 
Production-
limiting meas-
ures (land use, 
output) 
Procurement 
and storage 
programs 
Direct support 
(compensatory 
payments, acre-
age support) 
STE control of 
domestic 
trade 
Exporters:      
Vietnam Only indirectly    
~ restrictions 
on exports and 
domestic trade 
Paddy land be-
ing converted to 
other uses 
SOEs must hold 
stocks for mar-
ket intervention  
No Monopoly con-
trol of north-
south trade 
→1997 
Thailand Target paddy 
price, depends 
on quality and 
type 
No Rice procure-
ment scheme 
No No 
United 
States 
Pre-specified 
loan rate which 
triggers defi-
ciency pay-
ments 
Farmers receiv-
ing PFC pay-
ments must 
keep land in ag-
riculture 
SOE accumu-
lates stocks ~ 
price support 
program and 
purchases from 
private stocks 
for food aid pro-
gram 
Payments based 
on historical acre-
age (PFC) and 
deficiency pay-
ments 
No 
China Pre-specified 
procurement 
prices 
Paddy land be-
ing converted to 
other uses 
Government 
holds stocks 
No State grain 
agencies re-
sponsible for 
domestic mar-
keting 
India Procurement 
prices for 
paddy and 
milled rice 
No Rice procure-
ment program, 
buffer stock for 
concessional 
sales to the 
poor 
No Efforts to limit 
role of SOE in 
‘97 and ‘01 
Pakistan No No No No No 
      
Importers:      
Indonesia Floor producer 
price, ceiling 
consumer price 
and “sufficient” 
wedge btwn 
them 
No Government 
stocks to man-
age procure-
ment program 
No Efforts to limit 
role of SOE in 
’98 under 
agreement with 
IMF 
Japan Official produc-
tion purchase 
price 
Land diversion 
program 
Government 
stocks as part of 
price support 
program 
Land-based pay-
ments to encour-
age land diver-
sion out of rice 
Strong control 
over domestic 
rice trade 
South Korea Dual price sys-
tem: purchase 
price and re-
sale price 
Conversion of 
idle land to 
paddy land 
Government 
stocks as part of 
price support 
program 
No Most govern-
ment pur-
chased rice is 
resold ~ 
comp’tive bid-
ding 
European 
Union 
Pre-determined 
intervention 
price 
Compensatory 
payments only 
up to national 
base area limit 
Intervention 
storage system 
Compensatory 
payments 
No 
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takes the form of market price support rather than direct payments. It is only the de-
veloped countries that can afford to provide producers with direct support payments. 
Developing country governments rely on procurement programs to support their 
farmers’ incomes (and trade policy instruments to protect them from foreign competi-
tion, c.f. below). 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture required WTO members to reduce 
their Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). This requirement was not product-
specific and so there has been given a potentially large degree of flexibility as to 
which sectors were to be affected. In the case of rice, for example, the AMS reduction 
requirement has been met by the United States without reducing support to the rice 
sector at all. In Japan, the requirements have been met by shifting support into catego-
ries that are exempt from the general AMS reduction requirement, i.e. into the green 
and blue boxes. Yet producer support in Japan, as captured by the PSE measure, has 
actually increased. Therefore, although direct support of rice production is minimal 
seen in the broader context of agricultural support, there does seem to be scope for 
reevaluating the appropriateness of the AMS measure and the formulation of the re-
duction requirements.47  
 
Trade policy instruments 
Tariffs 
Table 5.3 summarizes the trade policy instruments used in rice policy regimes around 
the world. Both tariffs and non-tariff barriers are used to protect domestic rice pro-
ducers from foreign competition. Many different types of tariff are applied: ad 
valorem tariffs, specific tariffs, and combinations of the two. Variable levies are also 
being used. An exception to the general rule of tariffication in the URAA has e.g. 
permitted the European Union to use variable levies on imports of husked and milled 
rice.  
 
The observation that rice imports are subject to a multitude of specific tariffs, combi-
nation tariffs, and variable levies (official and de facto) is important because these 
types of duty provide greater protection than simple ad valorem tariffs, as described in 
Box 5.2. Most importantly, they provide increasing protection when world market 
prices fall. Furthermore, because of this characteristic, the actual degree of protection 
                                                 
47 In particular there seems to be a need to strengthen the rules concerning non-product specific do-
mestic support. Furthermore, some support measures such as the so-called ‘disaster payments’ 
and the current counter-cyclical payments in the US are clearly production–linked, but not in-
cluded in the amber box (Agra Europe 2001). 
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provided by specific and combination tariffs at a given point in time is not very trans-
parent. 
 
Table 5.3. Rice: trade policy instruments 
      
 Tariffs Non-tariff 
measures 
Minimum or 
guidance 
prices 
Export taxes 
or subsidies 
STE control of 
external trade 
Exporters:      
Vietnam Ad valorem, 
frequently ad-
justed 
Export quota → 
May ‘01 
“Guidance” 
export price 
Taxes → ’98, 
subsidies in ‘01  
Monopoly → ‘97 
Private only 4% 
in ‘99 
Thailand Combination of 
ad valorem and 
specific tariffs 
TRQ No Subsidized ex-
port credits 
No 
United States Ad valorem and 
specific tariffs, 
preferential ac-
cess for some 
countries 
No No Export credit 
guarantees and 
food aid 
STE administers 
export credit and 
food aid program 
China Ad valorem tar-
iffs 
TRQ as part of 
WTO accession 
agreement, 
fixed shares for 
private/state 
participation 
Fixed export 
and import 
“transfer” prices 
Exports enjoy 
VAT rebate 
Monopoly control  
India Ad valorem tariff No Minimum ex-
port price 
Export subsi-
dies 
Restrictions on 
private sector 
imports  
Pakistan Ad valorem tariff No No No No 
      
Importers:      
Indonesia Applied: specific 
tariff, Bound: ad 
valorem 
TRQ, but relies 
on time-limited 
import and ex-
port bans 
No No Monopoly con-
trol, relaxed in 
‘99 
Japan Until ’99: mark-
up on imports > 
min. market ac-
cess 
 
After ’99: spe-
cific in- and out-
of-quota tariffs 
Until ’99: Mini-
mum market 
access 
 
After ’99: TRQ  
 
Allocation based 
on tenders 
Special safe-
guards in addi-
tion to TRQ 
introduced in 
‘99 
Food aid Monopoly control 
South Korea Ad valorem tariff 
on min. access 
imports, mark-
up on imports > 
min. market ac-
cess 
Minimum mar-
ket access  
No No Monopoly control 
European 
Union 
Variable levy on 
husked and 
milled rice, spe-
cific tariff on 
paddy rice 
TRQs split by 
country of ori-
gin, preferential 
access quotas 
No Export restitu-
tions, food aid 
No 
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Even where ad valorem tariffs are used, they are sometimes adjusted so frequently in 
response to changing domestic and world market conditions that they work like de 
facto variable levies. In Vietnam, for example, the tariff has recently been increased 
in several steps in an effort to encourage farmers to produce specialty rice as a reac-
tion to increasing imports hereof from e.g. Thailand. In Indonesia the government 
seems willing to raise tariffs at short notice to avoid import surges by the private sec-
tor. 
 
This latter point relates directly to the concept of bound rates within the URAA. One 
common complaint is that the bound rates have been set so high that the reduction re-
quirements have had no real impact. In the case of rice, however, it seems that a per-
haps more important consequence is that tariff rates are being permitted to fluctuate 
significantly below the bound rate, thereby providing protection with effects similar 
to those of variable levies. Furthermore, the frequent adjustments generate uncertainty 
about the prevailing import regime thereby adding real costs to trade. 
 
Box 5.2. Tariffs: Ad valorem tariffs, specific tariffs and variable levies 
 
The ad valorem tariff is the only form of import duty that yields a constant percentage wedge between the 
world and domestic price. Yet many agricultural commodities are subject to non-ad valorem tariffs such as 
specific duties, variable levies, and combinations of ad valorem and specific tariffs. Non-ad valorem tariffs 
provide varying degrees of protection depending on the prevailing world price. Moreover, they are often 
less transparent, thereby concealing actual level of protection. Gibson et al. (2001) find that the world aver-
age of bound ad valorem tariffs on agricultural goods is 58%, while the average ad valorem equivalent of 
non-ad valorem tariffs is 123%. 
 
Levying a specific duty of $Ti on import commodity i, the ad valorem tariff equivalent is  
[( *itp + iT )- *itp ] / *itp  = *iti pT , where the world price *itp varies over time. When the world price falls, the 
specific duty as a percent of the world price – the ad valorem equivalent – increases. This mechanism is 
captured by an ad valorem equivalent function (Lloyd 1991): if ( iT , *itp ) = *iti pT . 
A variable levy is used if the aim is to have the duty-inclusive price reach a pre-specified target:  
Ti = argtip - 
*
itp      if *itp  < argtip , 
Ti = 0    otherwise.  
The ad valorem equivalent function is:  
if ( argtip , 
*
itp ) = (
argt
ip  -
*
itp ) / *itp  = argtip /
*
itp  - 1     if *itp  < 
argt
ip ,  
if ( argtip , 
*
itp ) = 0    otherwise. 
Another mechanism to insulate domestic prices from world price fluctuations is by imposing an additional 
duty if the price falls below a certain minimum. This is known as a minimum price tariff. In a simple form, 
both tariffs could be levied as ad valorem rates: 
if ( it , minip , *itp ) = it    if *itp  ≥ minip ,  
if ( argtip , 
*
itp ) = it + iτ    if *itp  < minip . 
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Non-tariff measures 
International rice trade is also affected by non-tariff measures such as quantitative re-
strictions on imports and exports, seasonal bans, tariff rate quotas, and more or less 
explicit export support measures. With the aim of improving market access, the 
URAA introduced the tariff rate quota (TRQ) system as a half way solution between a 
preferred tariffs-only regime and the previous regimes characterized by import bans 
and quotas. In the case of rice, however, three exceptions to this rule were made: Ja-
pan, Korea and the Philippines were allowed to use a classic import quota (see Box 
5.3) to determine their minimum market access level with no commitments whatso-
ever to import above this level.  
 
The minimum market access commitments made by these three countries have gener-
ally been fulfilled, but it may be questioned which effect this has had on international 
rice trade. The number of countries winning the tenders for these imports has been 
limited. The United States accounts for half of Japan’s total imports, while the other 
large suppliers are Thailand and Australia, and to a lesser extent China. Vietnam, In-
dia and Pakistan have not succeeded in gaining noteworthy access to the Japanese 
market. There are many possible explanations for this outcome. Due to the consumer 
preference structure, opening the rice markets of Japan and South Korea increases the 
demand for japonica rice varieties. Most exporters of japonica rice are developed 
country producers such as the US and Australia, although China is also a potential 
supplier. Vietnam, India and Pakistan are indica rice producers. 
 
Notwithstanding this plausible explanation, concerns are being raised, however, about 
the way in which access to the Japanese and Korean markets is being regulated. Thai-
land’s Export Promotion department, for example, has requested that Japan permits 
the free market forces to determine the quota allocation and allows importers to freely 
conduct promotional campaigns (BizAsia 2000). It is argued that the Japanese ad-
ministration of the quota amounts to a protectionist measure against free market ex-
porters. Another problem relates to the fact that governments and/or their STEs are 
free to choose which grades and standards of a product may be imported under the 
minimum market access arrangement and can therefore discriminate against products 
from certain countries and/or limit competition on the domestic market. Korea, for 
example, tenders only for low quality rice thereby severely limiting actual competi-
tion on the domestic market where demand is for high quality. 
  
The extent to which these problems of quota administration relate to the fact that state 
trading enterprises are involved is not entirely clear. The URAA allowed significant 
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freedom of choice in this regard, which seen in retrospect may have generated unin-
tended effects. In some countries such as Japan, Korea and Indonesia, quotas are allo-
cated to STEs, which then determine the conditions of entry and sometimes also the 
marketing channels to be used. There are concerns that the allocation of import quotas 
takes place on political grounds rather than on a commercial basis.48  
 
Perhaps more importantly, it seems that the STEs in e.g. Japan and Korea have helped 
cushion the impacts of the forced market openings by storing imported rice for long 
periods of time thereby rendering them suitable only for limited uses, by reselling im-
ported rice to the food processing industries rather than directly to consumers, and by 
re-exporting some of the imported rice as food aid.  
 
Reviewing the way in which the quota systems introduced in the URAA have been 
managed strongly suggests that there is a need for more precise rules so as to avoid 
the clearly unintentional effects mentioned above. An important component of such a 
reform should be to give private traders increased access to competing with state trad-
ing enterprises. One obvious change should be to eliminate the possibility of impos-
ing mark-ups on imports in excess of the committed minimum access levels. 
 
Efforts are being made to liberalize state trading in Asian rice markets, but the ten-
dency is to relinquish monopoly powers and to move towards a greater degree of pri-
vate sector participation rather than to completely abandon the principle of state in-
volvement. Moreover, progress on this front is very slow, as the recent reforms of the 
Vietnamese rice trade regime witness.  
 
Tariff Rate Quotas 
The introduction of the tariff rate quota system in the URAA and its associated im-
plementation issues have seemed to increase or at least continue the active participa-
tion of state trading enterprises in agricultural trade, however. Some countries have 
even established state trading enterprises with the explicit task of administering the 
TRQs.  
 
 
 
                                                 
48 With respect to wheat trade, Young and Abbott (1998) find that countries in which STEs handle 
trade are somewhat less responsive to price differences between suppliers and therefore more 
likely to rigidly depend on historical shares of import sources as compared with countries where 
private firms seek the most economic source of supply. 
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Box 5.3. Import quotas 
 
An import quota restricts the volume of imports irrespective of the prevailing market conditions, and so in an 
expanding market a quota will become increasingly restrictive. Unless the quotas are auctioned, an import 
quota does not generate revenue for the government. An import quota generates quota rent, however, 
which accrues to those agents – domestic or foreign – that have access to quotas.  
 
From an economic point of view the preferred method of quota administration is an auction after which li-
censes may be sold freely on the market. An alternative is the direct allocation of the right to import fixed 
amounts of the good to importing firms free of charge. The government does not earn revenue, but the 
quota rents accrue to the importing firms. In practice, however, quotas are often allocated according to 
specific criteria (firm size, trading experience, relations to the government, etc.), which make it relevant for 
companies to engage in unproductive lobbying activities to gain access to these licenses. 
 
The effect of a binding import quota can be analyzed in a framework similar to that used to illustrate the ef-
fects of an export quota in Box 4.1. The demand schedule for imports will have the same kinked form as 
the demand schedule seen from the exporter point of view in the case of an export quota. An import quota 
results in forced scarcity of imports, thereby raising the price of the commodity on the domestic market 
above the price that would prevail in the free trade situation. 
 
 
 
The TRQ system was meant to increase market access by allowing a certain quantity 
of imports enter the market subject to relatively low in-quota tariffs with additional 
imports being charged a somewhat higher over-quota tariff (Box 5.4 describes the 
system). A key concern relating to the functioning of the TRQs are low fill rates. In 
the case of rice, however, quotas are generally either completely or almost completely 
filled. One of the most contentious issues relating to the rice TRQs is quota admini-
stration. The TRQ system is plagued by precisely the same problems related to quota 
administration as the minimum market access arrangements discussed above. Yet 
there is another problem that has arisen with the introduction of the TRQ system.  
 
Apart from the general issues related to the setting of tariff rates discussed above 
(high bound rates, dirty tariffication, etc.), the over-quota tariff rates have in many 
cases been set prohibitively high so that the resulting effect is that of an ordinary im-
port quota. Japan, for example, switched to the TRQ system in 1999 but there have 
been no over-quota imports due to a prohibitively high over-quota tariff. Furthermore, 
the use of special safeguards in connection with the TRQ system is apparently being 
interpreted as an integral part of the market management systems (Bull and Roberts 
2001). 
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Box 5.4. Tariff Rate Quotas 
 
One of the major innovations of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was the introduction of the 
tariff rate quotas (TRQs). The intention was to allow increased market access at lower tariffs. The principle 
of the TRQ system is that a certain quantity of imports is allowed to enter the import market at relatively low 
tariffs, known as the in-quota tariff. Imports in excess of this quota are charged a higher, over-quota tariff.  
 
Three different possibilities arise, depending on whether or not the quota is binding. In the first case, net 
import demand is below the quota Q . The in-quota tariff int is charged, and no quota rent arises. In the 
second case, net import demand is precisely large enough so that the quota becomes binding at Q . A 
quota rent arises and is equal to the area b. In the third case, net import demand is in excess of the quota. 
The in-quota tariff is charged on the amount up until Q , and the over-quota tariff int is charged on the im-
ports in excess hereof. The quota rent increases to the area a+b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Export subsidies 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture generally prohibits export subsidies 
and those that are in place are to be reduced. The rice policy review reveals that a 
number of countries do support exports, albeit in rather covert ways. Only India and 
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the European Union use explicit export subsidies.49 Furthermore, Vietnam has just 
recently introduced export subsidies after having removed the rice export quota and 
the export tax. The EU provides what they term ‘export restitutions’, which are to be 
reduced in accordance with the URAA commitments. More worrisome, however, are 
the more covert ways in which exporters are being supported because the URAA does 
not cover such forms of assistance that may be equally as trade distorting as explicit 
export subsidies. The EU, for example, mentions in its negotiation proposals to the 
WTO that the provision of subsidized export credits, export credit guarantees, the ty-
ing of food aid to commercial exports as an outlet for surpluses, and the involvement 
of state trading enterprises can all have a distorting effect on export competition and 
should be restricted within the WTO agreements (WTO 2000b). 
 
All the policy instruments mentioned in the EU proposal are in fact prevalent in the 
rice policy regimes surveyed here. The Thai government provides its rice exporters 
with subsidized credits, the Chinese government offers VAT rebates to its rice ex-
porters, US rice exporters are given export credit guarantees, and rice is finally either 
donated or sold on concessional terms through food aid programs in the EU, the US 
and Japan. 
 
Clearly, there is a need to discipline the use of implicit export subsidies in the WTO, 
including the assurance that food aid shipments are not misused as an integral part of 
adjustment mechanisms to dispose of excess production. More complex, however, 
will be to control the potential distortionary effect that exporting STEs might have on 
the world market. Implicit subsidization of exports in this respect may occur if STEs 
are able to price discriminate between the domestic and foreign markets. STEs may 
moreover be able to adjust the volume of exports according to the domestic produc-
tion situation precisely because they are often given exclusive rights to conduct trade. 
Hence there is a need to reevaluate the current WTO rules concerning the conduct of 
state trading enterprises. Ingco and Ng (1998) suggest that financial assistance to STE 
exporters should be counted as explicit export subsidies under the WTO rules and 
thereby subject to reductions. Yet, as discussed at the outset of this chapter, it is not 
necessarily ownership per se that is important from a trade distortion point of view. 
More important are which policy instruments the STEs are set to administer and the 
scope within which they are permitted to use or misuse their connections to the gov-
                                                 
49  Not yet a member of the WTO, Vietnam does not have to abide by these rules. In the case of 
India, it is not clear whether these subsidies are WTO-compatible since developing countries are 
permitted under certain circumstances to use subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing and 
transporting exports. 
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ernment. A lot can be achieved by further disciplining the current use of domestic 
support measures and trade policy instruments such as tariffs and tariff rate quotas. 
This will in itself curtail at least part of the trade distorting power exercised by state 
trading enterprises in rice and other agricultural trade. 
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6. Discussion and prospects from a Vietnamese perspective 
From being a chronic net rice importer in the 1980s, Vietnam has transformed itself 
into the world’s second largest exporter of rice after Thailand in the late 1990s. This 
remarkable achievement has been supported by economic policy reforms initiated in 
1986 enabling market forces to play a greater role in the disposition of economic re-
sources. Vietnam’s future performance on world rice markets depends on continued 
reform of domestic policies and liberalization of the trade regime. However, it is 
equally clear that continued success of Vietnam’s rice exports depends crucially on 
increased market access and the disciplining of other countries’ use of trade-distorting 
domestic support measures and export subsidies.  
 
Vietnam is a country in transition and this is evident in the reforms pertaining to the 
rice sector. Many efforts are indeed being made to liberalize the rice policy regime, 
including the recent lifting of the export quota and the removal of the export tax. 
Clearly, these are very important steps in the right direction since there is evidence 
that the rice export quota has been a constraining factor, not least in the sense that it 
has blocked the transmission of price signals from the world market. Yet in some re-
spects the reform process could be enhanced. This is particularly the case in relation 
to the continued dominant role of state trading enterprises and the very modest par-
ticipation of private agents in rice trade.  
 
Moreover, there is evidence that temptation to resort to trade distorting measures to 
achieve certain domestic policy goals is difficult to resist. Two examples are the re-
cent introduction of rice export subsidies and the raising of the rice import tariffs. In-
troducing export subsidies may cause problems in relation to Vietnam’s application 
for membership of the World Trade Organization. Moreover, subsidies of any sort 
strain government budgets and – as experience from the developed countries wit-
nesses all too well – once in place, such support measures can be difficult to remove. 
Furthermore, rice export subsidies are probably not the most efficient use of scarce 
budgetary resources in the Vietnamese context. Measures to secure water supplies, 
provide irrigation services, and transfer new technologies to farmers may well be bet-
ter uses of such resources in the rice sector.  
 
Vietnamese rice trade policy (and its trade policy in general) is characterized by fre-
quent changes. This has the effect of adding real costs to trade through the uncertainty 
this creates for domestic producers, exporters and foreign buyers. One of the most re-
cent changes in relation to rice is the increase in rice import tariffs. One of the 
motivations for this change has been the desire to curb imports of specialty rice 
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vations for this change has been the desire to curb imports of specialty rice varieties 
so as to encourage domestic production hereof. The Vietnamese Government is very 
keen on improving the quality of its rice in general and on promoting the production 
of specialty rice that can be sold on niche markets in e.g. the European Union and the 
United States. Thailand, India and Pakistan have been highly successful in following 
such as strategy for their jasmine and basmati rice varieties. The idea is that this could 
be one way in which Vietnam could reduce the price discount it must currently accept 
on world markets. Yet one should always be cautious of “picking the winners” 
through the policy regime. It may be that – from an overall economic perspective – 
Vietnamese farmers and exporters should instead focus on high-value crops such as 
coffee, fruits and vegetables rather than specialty rice. Such an evaluation would of 
course need to be based on more detailed market analyses.  
 
In any case, the Vietnamese Government is keenly aware that its agricultural devel-
opment strategy must be broadly based and that diversification is one key to this solu-
tion. Furthermore, as economic development pulls resources out of rice (and other ag-
ricultural) production and the rice supply system changes from the current individual-
family-based supply system to a more market-oriented retail-purchase system, the 
Government will have to deal with the food security concerns that might arise from 
these structural changes.  
 
Hence it may be concluded that it is very important for Vietnam to continue reforms 
of its rice policy regime, and that these reforms must be seen in an economy-wide 
perspective. Yet as this review and evaluation has shown, Vietnam also has a strong 
interest in pressing for reform of other countries’ rice policies since they have highly 
distorting effects on international rice trade. Forums in which these concerns may be 
addressed are the regional trade group ASEAN and the World Trade Organization. 
Not only is there a need to improve market access, but there is also a need for serious 
scrutiny of other countries’ use of export subsidies and domestic support measures.  
 
The key role of rice as a staple food in almost all rice producing countries causes the-
se countries to isolate their domestic markets from the world market as they strive to 
achieve self-sufficiency. Using a combination of domestic support measures and trade 
policy instruments, one of the most important goals is to achieve domestic price stabi-
lity. The problem is that these isolationist policies simply add to the inherent thinness, 
unpredictability and instability of the international rice markets. Only concerted dis-
mantling of these trade-distorting policies will change the situation. 
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As the policy review has made clear, most rice producing countries use state trading 
enterprises as an integrated part of their rice policy regime. There is a general interest 
in a closer scrutiny of the use of state trading enterprises to control foreign trade since 
there are concerns that importing STEs effectively foreclose domestic markets from 
foreign competition, whilst exporting STEs distort export competition on world mar-
kets. Other more explicit distortions that affect trade are domestic support measures. 
Only the developed countries can afford to provide direct support to rice farmers at a 
significant level. Nevertheless, it is important that this support is reduced because it 
provides exporters with unfair price competitiveness and raises market prices in im-
porting countries thereby placing foreign suppliers at a disadvantage.  
 
In terms of trade policy instruments, rice importers use a mix of ad valorem and spe-
cific tariffs. The latter potentially provide higher degrees of protection, but perhaps 
more worrisome is the frequent change of tariff rates in a number of countries, just 
like in Vietnam. This adds to the uncertainty and unpredictability of the international 
rice market. Furthermore, several importing countries have – as part of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture – introduced Tariff Rate Quotas. This mechanism 
was meant to increase market access, but there are substantial problems related to the 
use of TRQs. First of all, over-quota tariffs are often prohibitively high. Secondly, the 
administration of TRQs seems to mean that only selected suppliers benefit from this 
preferential access. Finally, although only a few countries have explicit rice export 
subsidies in place, there are other more covert forms of support to exporters, particu-
larly in the US. Such support measures deserve a closer examination in order to assess 
the extent to which some of them may be classified as export subsidies and hence dis-
ciplined under the WTO. 
 
Simple conclusions cannot be drawn about the extent to which Vietnam’s exports are 
currently being hindered by the rice policies of its trading partners. In terms of the Ja-
panese and Korean rice markets, for example, there is no doubt that there are severe 
import restrictions in place – both explicitly and implicitly – and Vietnam would in 
principle have an interest in these being removed. Yet there is also a consumer prefer-
ence dimension to international rice trade. Demand in these particular markets is pri-
marily for japonica rice varieties whereas Vietnam is predominantly an indica pro-
ducer. Hence it is not entirely clear to what extent a lifting of these import barriers 
would in fact boost Vietnam’s export potential. Vietnamese farmers do seem both 
willing and able to change crop varieties, however, and hence there may be scope for 
gaining access to japonica markets in the future. Furthermore, Vietnam might be able 
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to strike deals with the EU and the US for preferential access to these – predomi-
nantly indica – markets as is being provided to several other developing countries. 
 
Finally, it is also relevant to highlight a few policy developments that are expected to 
affect the future of the world rice market in general, and which Vietnamese policy-
makers will need to take into account. First of all, there is evidence that the nature of 
state trading enterprises is changing. Due to various restructuring and reform proc-
esses, the role of these agencies in rice procurement, domestic marketing and interna-
tional trade is weakening, giving way to increased private sector participation. It is 
not yet clear, however, whether this is improving access to national rice markets. An-
other very important issue is the accession of China to the WTO, and here the expec-
tation is that the government will not deviate from its policy goal of high self-
sufficiency given the very nature of the world rice market. A third policy develop-
ment that will have an impact on the future rice market is the EU’s “Everything But 
Arms” initiative. Rice is regarded as a sensitive commodity in this context and access 
to the EU rice market by the LDCs will not be fully opened until 2009. It is a clear 
expectation that the long period of transition will erode the potential gains to be made 
for these countries, particularly if the EU rice regime is reformed before this date. It 
may therefore be that the reform of the EU rice policy will have more of an impact on 
the world rice market than the EBA initiative. In this context it should be noted that 
Vietnam is not included in the list of LDCs. Fourth, China, India and Myanmar have 
shown interest in the rice pool agreement between Thailand and Vietnam, and so this 
may become an influential factor in the near future, although it is not clear whether it 
is compatible with WTO rules. Finally, the introduction of genetically modified rice 
varieties could also have an impact on the structure of trade and prices. 
 
This report has highlighted a number of issues related to Vietnam’s position in the in-
ternational rice market that warrant further empirical research. It has identified the 
main rice policy instruments of both Vietnam and its major competitors and buyers, 
and has provided preliminary data that may form the basis for further empirical work. 
Given the overriding importance of the rice sector in the Vietnamese economy in 
terms of production, consumption, employment and income generation, an applied 
general equilibrium framework would be appropriate. To this end a thorough under-
standing of the way the different rice policy regimes function is necessary. Further-
more, the policy instruments must be quantified, and this may take the more partial-
based measures such as those presented in this report as a point of departure.  
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Moreover, the importance of the other rice producing countries’ policies for Viet-
nam’s rice trade performance makes it appropriate to view future policy reforms in a 
global perspective. Relevant analyses would include an investigation of the impact of 
Vietnam’s own policy liberalization efforts as well as trade and domestic policy re-
forms of other rice exporters, and the possible extension of market access by import-
ers. As the ongoing debate about preferential trade agreements shows (see e.g. Pana-
gariya 2000 and Srinivasan 1998), the merits of unilateral trade liberalization versus 
regional and multilateral trade liberalization are theoretically ambiguous, and hence 
an empirical evaluation must be resorted to. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Thailand’s top ten rice export markets (on a quantity basis) 1995-1999 
          
 1995   1996   1997  1998   1999 
 
Rank 
 
Country 
%
share
  
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
   
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
              
  1 Indonesia  20.3   Malaysia  11.4   Nigeria  12.5   Indonesia  29.5   Indonesia  18.0 
  2 Iran  10.1   Indonesia  11.3   Indonesia  11.0   Nigeria  8.8   Nigeria  11.0 
  3 Sth Africa  6.2   Iran  8.9   Malaysia  9.8   Iran  6.3   Iran  10.4 
  4 UAE 5.8   Nigeria  8.2   Iran  7.7   Malaysia  6.0   Senegal  5.9 
  5 Singapore  5.8   Singapore  7.1   Singapore  5.9   Sth Africa  5.0   Sth Africa  5.2 
  6 Malaysia  5.8   USA  5.0   Philippines  4.8   Singapore 4.3   Malaysia  5.1 
  7 USA  4.5   Sth Africa  4.5   USA  4.6   USA  3.8   Singapore  4.6 
  8 Benin  4.2   Philippines  3.9   EU 4.3   Togo  3.6   USA  3.9 
  9 Sth Korea 4.1   EU 3.7   Iraq  4.0   EU 3.5   Iraq  3.5 
10 Senegal  3.4   Cuba  3.5   Sth Africa  4.0   Philippines  3.3   Togo  3.4 
  Others  29.8   Others  32.5   Others 31.4   Others 25.8   Others 29.1 
               
    100%     100%     100%   100%   100% 
                            
Thou. tons 4,444   4,345     4,691     5,879   6,249 
 
Note: Not all bilateral export flows in the FAOSTAT database are identified to specific destinations. The total 
amounts of rice exports (measure in metric tons) reported here include unspecified exports, whereas the per-
centage shares are calculated out of total specified trade. Note that China is one of the unidentified partners 
in this data set. 
Source: FAOSTAT (2001)  
 
 
Table A.2. China’s top ten rice export markets (on a quantity basis) 1995-1999 
          
 1995   1996   1997  1998   1999 
 
Rank 
 
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
   
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
  1 Hong Kong 47.1   Libya  39.4   Philippines 21.1   Philippines 37.9   Indonesia 28.9 
  2 Indonesia 28.0   S. Korea 28.3   Iraq 14.2   Indonesia 37.6   Cte d'Ivoire 16.6 
  3 Russia 7.4   Mauritius 9.2   Côte d'Ivoire 11.5   Côte d'Ivoire 5.0   Cuba 8.9 
  4 S. Korea  5.2   Hong Kong  7.1   S. Korea 10.5   Cuba 4.0   Philippines 7.1 
  5 UAE 2.7   Russia 5.7   Cuba 8.3   Iraq 2.7   Russia 6.3 
  6 Macao 2.6   Kazakhstan 3.4   Libya 7.5   S. Korea 2.1   Malaysia 4.9 
  7 Japan 2.4   Uzbekistan 2.9   Kenya 3.1   Libya 1.7   Iraq 4.0 
  8 Mongolia 1.4   Japan 1.2   Ghana 3.0   Malaysia 1.7   Guinea 3.9 
  9 Qatar 0.9   Mongolia 0.9   Russia 2.8   Japan 1.3   S. Korea 3.4 
10 Myanmar 0.7   Kyrgyzstan 0.7   Bulgaria 2.7   Tanzania 1.0   Libya 3.3 
  Others 1.7   Others 1.3   Others 15.2   Others 5.0   Others 12.7 
               
   100%     100%    100%     100%   100% 
               
Thou. tons 45   159   872   3,627   2,544 
 
Note: Same as for Table A.1. 
Source: Obtained directly from the Basic Data Branch, Statistics Division, FAO, September 2001. 
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Table A.3. USA’s top ten rice export markets (on a quantity basis) 1995-1999 
          
 1995   1996   1997  1998   1999 
 
Rank
 
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
%
share
  
Country 
%
share
   
Country 
%
share
  
Country 
%
share
           
  1 Turkey  14.3  Mexico  16.1   Mexico  15.5   Brazil  15.9  Mexico  14.1
  2 EU 10.2  EU 12.7   EU  12.0   Mexico  11.3  EU  12.6
  3 Mexico  9.3  Japan  11.3   Japan  9.1   EU  9.4  Japan  11.6
  4 Iran  8.5  Turkey  11.1   Haiti  7.0   Colombia  8.5  Haiti  7.4
  5 Haiti  7.3  Canada  8.8   Canada  6.9   Japan  7.2  Canada  6.2
  6 SauArabia 6.7  Haiti  8.8   Turkey  6.7   Haiti  5.2  Indonesia  5.9
  7 Canada  5.8  South Africa 8.4   SauArabia 4.7   Canada  4.9  Turkey  5.1
  8 Sth Africa  4.8  Sau. Arabia 7.6   Sth Africa  4.3   Peru  4.5  S.Arabia  4.1
  9 Indonesia  4.1  Peru  5.1   Jordan  3.3   Turkey  4.3  Russia  3.5
10 Ct dIvoire  3.1  Costa Rica  3.9   Domin. Rp 2.7   Sau Arabia 4.1  Nicaragua  2.9
  Others 25.9  Others 6.2   Others 27.7   Others 24.5  Others 26.5
           
   100%   100%    100%    100%   100%
                             
Thou. tons 3,077   2,617     2,504     3,721   2,936
 
Note: Same as for Table A.1. 
Source: FAOSTAT (2001) 
 
 
 
Table A.4. India’s top ten rice export markets (on a quantity basis) 1995-1999 
          
 1995   1996   1997  1998   1999 
 
Rank 
 
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
   
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
              
  1 Indonesia 25.3  Bangladesh  21.1  Saudi Arabia 23.1  Bangladesh  39.6 Bangladesh 37.9 
  2 SauArabia  23.0  Sau Arabia 14.9  Sth Africa  13.5  South Africa  13.5 Sau Arab  20.5 
  3 Kenya  14.4  South Africa 11.2  Sri Lanka  12.5  Sau Arabia 13.1  Russ. Fed  7.3 
  4 UAE  6.0  Indonesia  9.2  Russ. Fed  10.5  Côte dIvoire  4.4 Sth Africa 6.5 
  5 EU 5.2  Sri Lanka  6.2  EU  5.3  Somalia  3.0  Nigeria  4.9 
  6 Bangladsh 4.7  Kenya  6.0  USA 5.1  Russ. Fed  3.0  EU 3.0 
  7 Senegal  4.4  USA  5.3  Somalia  4.5  UAE  2.4  UAE  2.8 
  8 Kuwait  3.7  UAE 4.5  Senegal  4.1  Senegal  2.4  Sri Lanka 2.6 
  9 CôteIvoire 3.5  Iran  3.3  UAE  3.9  EU 2.0  Kuwait  2.1 
10 Iran  2.6  Philippines 2.6  Kuwait  3.4  Nigeria  1.9  Yemen  1.5 
  Others 7.9  Others 15.8  Others 14.5  Others 14.8  Others 11.1 
               
   100%    100%   100%     100%   100% 
                             
Thou. tons 1,589   3,555     1,959     3,934   2,571 
 
Note: Same as for Table A.1. 
Source: FAOSTAT (2001) 
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Table A.5. Pakistan’s top ten rice export markets (on a quantity basis) 1995-1999 
          
 1995   1996   1997  1998   1999 
 
Rank 
 
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
   
Country 
% 
share 
  
Country 
% 
share 
               
  1 Iran  19.9  UAE  19.9   Kenya  17.4   Indonesia  21.1  UAE  15.4 
  2 UAE  14.4  Iran  12.5   UAE  12.1   Kenya  15.0  Bangladesh 11.9 
  3 Bangladsh 14.2  Sau Arabia 9.0   Sri Lanka  9.8   UAE  11.2  Indonesia 11.5 
  4 Indonesia  13.8  Kenya  8.0   Sth Africa  6.3   South Africa  7.3  Sri Lanka 7.1 
  5 SauArabia 6.2  Indonesia  7.6   Armenia  6.0   Oman  4.5  Afghanstn  7.0 
  6 Afghanistn 5.9  Philippines 5.7   Afghanistan  4.7   SauArabia  4.0  Sau Arabia  5.6 
  7 Oman  3.9  Oman  4.9   Sau Arabia 4.0   Sth Korea  3.8  EU 4.8 
  8 Senegal  2.4  Afghanistan  4.2   Indonesia  3.6   Afghanistan  3.3 Oman  4.6 
  9 Kenya  2.3  Sri Lanka  3.5   Oman  3.6   Bangladesh  3.2 Sth Africa 3.9 
10 Peru  1.8  Bangladesh  2.9   Iran  3.0   Iran  3.0  Malaysia  2.7 
  Others 15.1  Others  21.9   Others  29.5   Others 23.5  Others 25.5 
              
   100%  100%     100%   100%   100 % 
                             
Thou. tons 1,611   1,654     1,973     1,983   1,914 
 
Note: Same as for Table A.1. 
Source: FAOSTAT (2001) 
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Table A.6. United States: Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for rice, million USD 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
  
Market price support  A* 5.3 36.7 43.9 8.8 8.4 4.2 0 0 0 0
Output  
subsidies B 214 112.1 301.1 246.2 150.8 11.6 5.8 6.4 26.7 106.6
  H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Input subsidies E2 13.1 15.8 13.4 16.5 16.8 19.5 19.7 21.4 21.4 21.6
  E1 24 26.1 21.2 23.3 23 26.6 26 27.2 26.5 26.4
Land based payments D 0 0 0 0 0 0 74 104.2 155.5 222.9
  C1 13.3 30.4 11.7 25.8 5.1 2.3 -1.1 4.6 25.9 11.2
  C2 562.7 458.3 613.6 569.3 557.8 471.5 0 0 0 0
  F1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  F2 17.1 21.6 17.8 21.9 21.4 24 25.2 25.2 26.2 24
  F3 2.4 3 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.5 1.6 1 0.4 0.3
  G 4.1 5.8 4.2 3.5 3.6 4.5 4.7 8.6 10.4 11.4
Capital payments E3 5.7 5.4 3.3 4.3 3.9 3.9 4 3.6 5.1 3.9
Total PSE 861.7 715.2 1032.6 922.4 793.7 570.6 159.9 202.2 298.1 428.3
            
% PSE**  45 37 49 43 37 26 9 10 15 26
Share of MPS in PSE  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nom. Assist. Coeff. ***  1.8 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4
            
Total direct payments   
(i.e. excluding  market 
price support) 856.4 678.5 988.7 913.6 785.3 566.4 159.9 202.2 298.1 428.3
Value of production 1045.9 1208.3 1058.4 1245.7 1341.1 1590.9 1709.1 1775 1660.5 1217.4
Power of domestic sup-
port 1.819 1.562 1.934 1.733 1.586 1.356 1.094 1.114 1.180 1.352
 
% Output  subsidies 25.0 16.5 30.5 26.9 19.2 2.0 3.6 3.2 9.0 24.9
% Input subsidies 4.3 6.2 3.5 4.4 5.1 8.1 28.6 24.0 16.1 11.2
% Land payments 70.0 76.5 65.7 68.2 75.2 89.1 65.3 71.0 73.3 63.0
% Capital  payments 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 2.5 1.8 1.7 0.9
 
*  The letters refer to the OECD nomenclature. 
**  The percentage PSE is calculated as follows: %PSE = PSE/(Q*Pp + PP)*100, where Q*Pp = Value of 
production at producer prices and PP = Payments to producers = PSE – Market Price Support. 
*** The Nominal Assistance Coefficient is calculated as follows: NACp = {1/(100 - %PSE)}*100. 
Source: OECD PSE database 1999 Edition and own calculations 
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Table A.7. Japan: Producer Support Equivalent (PSE) for rice, billion yen 
            
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
            
Market price support A* 2235.3 2025 2368.2 1800.9 2649.9 2449.4 2399.8 1980.9 1982 2157.4 
Output subsidies B 145.2 141.2 135.5 135.9 94.3 118.5 80.2 126.4 97.4 117.7 
  H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Input subsidies E2 4.7 4.3 4.7 3.8 5.4 5.2 5.5 5 4.5 4.8 
  E1 44.2 42.9 45.3 41.9 44.3 43 40.9 43 38.1 38.3 
Land based  
payments D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  C1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  C2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  F1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  F2 86.3 85.8 73 50.6 37.4 44.6 66.7 66.5 57.9 58.4 
  F3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  G 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital payments E3 38.6 35.9 44.3 42.8 50.6 57.6 53.1 45.7 47.2 37.7 
Total PSE  2554.3 2335.1 2671 2075.9 2881.9 2718.3 2646.2 2267.5 2227.1 2414.3 
            
% PSE**  80 80 84 86 82 85 80 78 84 88 
Share of MPS in PSE  88 87 89 87 92 90 91 87 89 89 
Nom. Assist. Coeff ***  4.9 4.9 6.1 7.1 5.6 6.6 5.1 4.5 6.1 8.1 
             
Total direct payments  
(i.e. excl.  market price 
support) 319 310.1 302.8 275 232 268.9 246.4 286.6 245.1 256.9 
Value of production  2887.2 2623.8 2888.5 2140.2 3273.2 2936.4 3047.3 2628.6 2415.7 2499.8 
Power of domestic 
support  1.110 1.118 1.105 1.128 1.071 1.092 1.081 1.109 1.101 1.103 
            
% Output subsidies  45.5 45.5 44.7 49.4 40.6 44.1 32.5 44.1 39.7 45.8 
% Input subsidies  15.3 15.2 16.5 16.6 21.4 17.9 18.8 16.7 17.4 16.8 
% Land payments  27.1 27.7 24.1 18.4 16.1 16.6 27.1 23.2 23.6 22.7 
% Capital payments  12.1 11.6 14.6 15.6 21.8 21.4 21.6 15.9 19.3 14.7 
 
*  The letters refer to the OECD nomenclature. 
**  The percentage PSE is calculated as follows: %PSE = PSE/(Q*Pp + PP)*100, where Q*Pp = Value of 
production at producer prices and PP = Payments to producers = PSE – Market Price Support. 
*** The Nominal Assistance Coefficient is calculated as follows: NACp = {1/(100 - %PSE)}*100. 
Source: OECD PSE database 1999 Edition and own calculations 
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Table A.8. Korea: Producer Support Equivalent (PSE) for rice, billion won 
            
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
            
Market price support A* 5618.2 5650.9 6040.2 5898.7 5776.9 6160.7 7208.9 7287.3 6302.5 7922.1 
Output subsidies B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Input subsidies E2 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 2 2.6 2.4 2.5 
  E1 24.9 22.5 32.2 38.2 41.1 29.4 51 69.9 81 83 
Land based  
payments D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  C1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  C2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.4 
  F1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  F2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  F3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  G 78.1 75 88.3 64.1 74 50.1 55.6 43.8 42.9 39.8 
Capital payments E3 78 79.5 89.7 112.4 143.5 160 197.7 199.5 146.3 109.8 
Total PSE  5799.2 5827.9 6250.4 6113.4 6035.5 6401.5 7515.2 7603.1 6575.1 8159.6 
            
% PSE**  85 85 87 90 81 88 81 79 71 80 
Share of MPS in PSE 97 97 97 96 96 96 96 96 96 97 
Nom. Assist. Coeff *** 6.9 6.6 7.5 9.8 5.4 8.2 5.3 4.8 3.5 4.9 
             
Total direct payments  
(i.e. excl.  market price 
support) 181 177 210.2 214.7 258.6 240.8 306.3 315.8 272.6 237.5 
Value of production  6606.4 6685.4 7004.6 6592.2 7147.6 7053.8 8970.3 9263.1 8924.2 10013 
Power of domestic 
support  1.027 1.026 1.030 1.033 1.036 1.034 1.034 1.034 1.031 1.024 
            
% Output subsidies  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
% Input subsidies  13.8 12.7 15.3 17.8 15.9 12.7 17.3 23.0 30.6 36.0 
% Land payments  43.1 42.4 42.0 29.9 28.6 20.8 18.2 13.9 15.7 17.8 
% Capital payments  43.1 44.9 42.7 52.4 55.5 66.4 64.5 63.2 53.7 46.2 
 
*  The letters refer to the OECD nomenclature. 
**  The percentage PSE is calculated as follows: %PSE = PSE/(Q*Pp + PP)*100, where Q*Pp = Value of pro-
duction at producer prices and PP = Payments to producers = PSE – Market Price Support. 
*** The Nominal Assistance Coefficient is calculated as follows: NACp = {1/(100 - %PSE)}*100. 
Source: OECD PSE database 1999 Edition and own calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Vietnam in the International Rice Market, FØI  127 
Table A.9. European Union: Producer Support Equivalent (PSE) for rice, mill. Euro 
            
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
            
Market price support A* 328.9 321 347.7 364.6 394.6 308.7 98.2 164.8 96 125.9 
Output subsidies B 57 35.4 20.4 13.1 4 0 0 0 0 0 
  H 1.2 1.9 4.1 4.2 4.4 0.6 1.4 1.1 2.6 2 
Input subsidies E2 2 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.3 2 
  E1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Land based  
payments D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  C1 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 0 0 2 1 
  C2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 83 
  F1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  F2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  F3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  G 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital payments E3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total PSE  389.1 360.8 374.7 384.3 405.1 312.9 101.9 168.3 140.9 213.9 
            
% PSE**  52 49 54 56 55 44 17 20 18 29 
Share of MPS in PSE 85 89 93 95 97 99 96 98 68 59 
Nom. Assist. Coeff *** 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.2 1.8 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4 
             
Total direct payments  
(i.e. excl.  market price 
support) 60.2 39.8 27 19.7 10.5 4.2 3.7 3.5 44.9 88 
Value of production  693.4 689.2 666.9 666.2 726.7 711.2 587.5 829 725.1 641.1 
Power of domestic 
support  1.087 1.058 1.040 1.030 1.014 1.006 1.006 1.004 1.062 1.137 
            
% Output subsidies  96.7 93.7 90.7 87.8 80.0 14.3 37.8 31.4 5.8 2.3 
% Input subsidies  3.3 6.3 9.3 12.2 20.0 57.1 62.2 68.6 5.1 2.3 
% Land payments  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 0.0 0.0 89.1 95.5 
% Capital payments  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
*  The letters refer to the OECD nomenclature. 
**  The percentage PSE is calculated as follows: %PSE = PSE/(Q*Pp + PP)*100, where Q*Pp = Value of pro-
duction at producer prices and PP = Payments to producers = PSE – Market Price Support. 
*** The Nominal Assistance Coefficient is calculated as follows: NACp = {1/(100 - %PSE)}*100. 
Source: OECD PSE database 1999 Edition and own calculations 
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Estimating the Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPCp) for non-OECD 
countries 
 
The Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPCp) measures the ratio between the 
average price received by farmers (at the farm gate), including any payments based on 
output (PO/ton), and the border price (at the farm gate). I.e. NPCp = (Pp + 
PO/ton)/Pb, where Pp is the average price received by producers (at farm gate), 
PO/ton is payments based on output, and Pb is the border price (at farm gate) (OECD 
2001). In the non-OECD countries very little if any output-based support is provided 
to rice producers and so the NPCp’s calculated are based on a comparison of producer 
and border prices.  
 
 
Vietnam: 
 
Producer price: 
The implicit wholesale prices for the period 1997-99 are calculated on the basis of the 
relationship between the 1995 wholesale price in Table 4.3 and the 1995 retail price 
in Table 4.4. The conversion of these prices to the farm gate level proceeds in two 
steps. First of all the prices are converted to wholesale paddy prices by dividing by 
1.75. This coefficient is based on information provided in Minot and Goletti (2000) 
about the margin between the wholesale rice and paddy price in the southern part of 
Vietnam. The data for the South are used because this is where the bulk of Vietnam’s 
rice exports come from. (The corresponding coefficient for the North would be 1.73.) 
In order to convert the wholesale paddy price into farm gate paddy prices the conver-
sion factor is 1.04, again using the data for the South. (The corresponding coefficient 
for the North would be 1.05) The conversion and the final farm gate paddy prices are 
shown in Table A.10. 
 
Table A.10. Converting wholesale rice prices to farm gate paddy prices for Viet-
nam (USD/ton) 
    
 Wholesale rice price Wholesale paddy price Farm gate paddy price 
    
1997 183 105 101 
1998 204 117 113 
1999 183 105 101 
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Reference price:   
The average export prices for 1997-99 are calculated by using the rice export quality 
structure for 1996 given in Table 3.5 and the price quotes provided by the USDA 
(2001). Hence the prices are adjusted to reflect the prevailing quality structure in a 
given year. The quality structure for 1996 is used because these are the latest avail-
able data at this level of detail. The prices used are given in Table A.11. 
 
Table A.11. Export prices, f.o.b. for Vietnam (USD/ton) 
       
 5% brokens 10% brokens 15% brokens 20% brokens* 25% brokens >35% brokens 
       
1997 251 243 235 229 224 216 
1998 287 280 272 258 244 244 
1999 227 222 216 210 205   201** 
 
*  No quotes are given for 20% brokens and so the average prices of 15% and 25% brokens are used. 
** In lack of a quote this price is calculated based on the average ratio of 25%/35% brokens in 1997/98. 
Note: The prices are calculated on a calendar basis. 
Source: USDA (2001) 
 
 
 
This calculation leads to a quality-adjusted average export price, which is then con-
verted to the farm gate level using the same conversion factors as those used above. 
The result is shown in Table A.12. 
 
Table A.12. Converting export prices to border prices at the farm gate level for 
Vietnam (USD/ton) 
    
 
 
 
Export rice price, f.o.b. 
Export prices converted  
to paddy prices 
Border prices measured  
at the farm gate level 
    
1997 235 134 129 
1998 265 151 145 
1999 215 123 118 
 
 
 
Comparing the average producer price, i.e. the paddy price at the farm gate with the 
border price measured at the farm gate reveals the following Producer Nominal Pro-
tection Coefficient for Vietnam as shown in Table A.13. The paddy producers in 
Vietnam are indeed being taxed by the prevailing policies (particularly the export 
quota, the export tax, and the dominant role of the State Trading Enterprises) as is 
evident by the fact that the coefficient is less than unity. 
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Table A.13. Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient for Vietnam 
   
1997 1998 1999 
   
0.78 0.78 0.86 
 
 
 
Thailand: 
 
Producer price:  
Farm gate prices in Thailand are given as shown in the table below. 
 
Table A.14. Farm gate paddy prices in Thailand (USD/ton) 
 
    
 
 
Farm gate paddy price  
Bht/ton 
Exchange rate 
Bht/USD 
Farm gate paddy price 
USD/ton 
    
1997 5,472 31.18 176 
1998 6,629 41.35 160 
1999 5,579 37.88 147 
 
Source: Farm gate paddy prices are from FAS (2001b). Exchange rates are from www.oanda.org. 
 
 
 
Reference price:  
The calendar year average Thai f.o.b. price for 5% brokens is used as the basis for 
calculating the reference price based on the USDA (2001) price series. Since the 
above producer prices are farm gate prices, the border price must be adjusted down to 
the farm gate level as well. In lack of information on margins and internal transporta-
tion costs these prices are adjusted by the same conversion factors as for Vietnam. In 
other words, the prices are first divided by 1.75 to convert what corresponds to 
wholesale rice to wholesale paddy prices. Then prices are divided by 1.04 to convert 
wholesale paddy prices to farm gate prices. The reference price is given as shown in 
the table below. 
 
Table A.15. Reference price for Thailand (USD/ton) 
   
 Thai average f.o.b. price for 5% brokens Reference price 
   
1997 304 167 
1998 305 168 
1999 248 136 
 
Source: Own calculations based on price series from USDA (2001) and conversion factors explained in text. 
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Table A.16. Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient for Thailand 
   
1997 1998 1999 
   
1.05 0.95 1.08 
 
 
 
China: 
 
Producer price:  
Average wholesale market rice prices are available from FAS(2001c) for January 
1998, January 1999 and January 2000. These prices are used as the basis of compari-
son with Chinese f.o.b. prices. The prices are provided for four different qualities. In 
lack of more specific data as to the quality composition of Chinese rice production, 
judging by China’s export structure by destination (Section 3 and Appendix Table 
A.2) it is assumed that only 5% is of the Japonica variety. Hence a weighted average 
is calculated and converted to USD/ton. 
 
Table A.17. Wholesale rice prices in China (USD/ton) 
        
  
Early Indica 
Grade 2 
 
Late Indica 
Grade 2 
 
Japonica 
Special 
 
Japonica 
Standard 
 
Weighted 
average 
Exchange 
rate 
RMB/USD 
 
Wholesale 
price  
            RMB/ton RMB/ton            USD/ton 
        
1998 1243 1329 2166 1806 1321 8.28 160 
1999 1275 1246 2600 2354 1321 8.28 160 
2000 1033 1050 2000 1895 1087 8.28 131 
 
Source: Wholesale prices are from FAS (2001c). Exchange rates are from www.oanda.org 
 
 
 
Given that the producer prices are available at the wholesale level rather than the farm 
gate level, and the fact that information about marketing margins and transportation 
costs are not readily available, these prices will be compared with a f.o.b. price since 
both prices are at a similar marketing level with the only difference being in terms of 
the internal transportation costs. As it is argued in OECD (2001) transportation costs 
exist both between the wholesale and the retail point of consumption as well as be-
tween the miller and the port of export, a crude assumption is that these costs offset 
one another. 
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Reference price:  
Chinese export prices f.o.b. are not readily available. Given that Vietnamese and Chi-
nese rice seem to be competitors on world markets it is chosen to use the Vietnamese 
f.o.b. prices calculated above as an approximation for Chinese f.o.b. prices (Table 
A.12, supplemented by an estimate of USD 174 for the year 2000). This yields the 
following estimates of the Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient for China. 
 
Table A.18. Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient for China 
   
1998 1999 2000 
   
0.60 0.74 0.75 
 
 
 
India: 
 
Producer price:  
The producer price for India must rely on available data on Government support 
prices for paddy. These are given on a marketing year basis and are for this purpose 
adjusted to reflect calendar year prices. The average of support prices for common 
paddy and grade A paddy are used. 
 
Table A.19. Support prices for paddy in India 
      
 Paddy  
(common) 
 
Paddy (grade A) 
 
Simple average 
Exchange rate, 
INR/USD 
Farm gate paddy 
price  
                     INR/ton                        USD/ton 
      
1998 4338 4638 4488 41.29 109 
1999 4775 5075 4925 43.07 114 
2000 5050 5350 5200 44.95 116 
 
Source: Wholesale prices are from FAS (2001n). Exchange rates are from www.oanda.org. 
 
 
 
Reference price:  
To ensure comparability with e.g. the chosen reference price for Thailand, and in lack 
of information about the quality composition of Indian rice exports (by percentage of 
brokens which is how the f.o.b. price series are available), the reference price chosen 
is the Indian 5% brokens f.o.b. price as given in USDA (2001). These prices are pro-
vided in the table below on a calendar basis. Furthermore, in order to obtain a refer-
ence price that is comparable with the farm gate paddy price in the table above, the 
same conversion factors as used for Vietnam are also used for India. 
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Table A.20. Reference price for India USD/ton 
   
 India average f.o.b. price for 5% brokens Reference price 
   
1998 281 154 
1999 268 147 
2000 265* 146 
 
* Based on Jan-Nov 2000 data. 
Source: Own calculations based on price series from USDA (2001) and conversion factors explained in text. 
 
 
 
This yields the following estimates of the Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient 
for India. 
 
Table A.21. Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient for India 
   
1998 1999 2000 
   
0.71 0.78 0.79 
 
 
 
Pakistan: 
 
Producer price:  
Just like for India, the only readily available data are Government support prices for 
paddy. These are given on a marketing year basis and are for this purpose adjusted to 
reflect calendar year prices. A weighted average of support prices for IRRI paddy and 
Basmati paddy are used based on information about the share of paddy rice area dedi-
cated to the premium Basmati varieties. 
 
Table A.22. Paddy support prices for paddy in Pakistan 
      
 
 
 
Paddy (IRRI) 
 
Paddy (Basmati) 
Weighted  
average* 
Exchange rate, 
PKR/USD 
Farm gate paddy 
price  
                   PKR/ton                        USD/ton 
      
1998 4375** 8250 6390 48.73 131 
1999 4583** 8667 6707 51.40 130 
2000 5042 9479 7349 53.94 136 
 
*  Weighted according to the fact that 52% of rice area in 1999/2000 was dedicated to Basmati rice with the 
remainder assumed planted to IRRI and similar rice varieties (FAS 2000f).  
** Based on 1998/99 support price. 
Source: Paddy support prices are from FAO (2001a). Exchange rates are from www.oanda.org. 
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Reference price:  
To ensure comparability with e.g. the chosen reference price for Thailand and India, 
and in lack of information about the quality composition of Pakistani rice exports (by 
percentage of brokens which is how the f.o.b. price series are available), the reference 
price chosen is the Pakistani 5% brokens f.o.b. price as given in USDA (2001). These 
prices are provided in the table below on a calendar basis. The data available for Paki-
stan are very scattered and have in some cases had to rely on estimated prices based 
on an average mark-up over 10% broken rice prices for a given marketing year. Fi-
nally, in order to obtain a reference price that is comparable with the farm gate paddy 
price in the table above, the same conversion factors as used for Vietnam are also 
used for Pakistan. 
 
Table A.23. Reference price for Pakistan USD/ton 
   
 Pakistan average f.o.b. price for 5% brokens Reference price 
   
1998 268 147 
1999 237 130 
2000 199* 109 
 
* Based on Jan-Nov 2000 data.  
Source: Own calculations based on price series from USDA (2001) and conversion factors explained in text. 
 
 
 
This yields the following estimates of the Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient 
for Pakistan. 
 
Table A.24. Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient for Pakistan 
   
1998 1999 2000 
   
0.89 1.00 1.25 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia: 
 
Producer price:  
The producer prices for Indonesia are calculated as production-weighted annual aver-
ages of monthly reportings of prices for dried, unhusked rice (Cere IR-36) in West 
Java as reported by FAS (2001h). Half of the year’s rice production takes place dur-
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ing the months January-April, 30% during May-August and the remaining 20% dur-
ing September-December. 
 
Table A.25. Producer prices in Indonesia USD/ton 
     
 Jan-Apr May-Aug Sep-Dec Production weighted annual average 
     
1997 214 223 154 207 
1998 77 73 146  92 
1999 150 178 176 169 
 
Source: Own calculations based on monthly producer prices, monthly exchange rates and seasonal produc-
tion values in FAS (2001h). 
 
 
 
Reference price:  
In lack of c.i.f. import prices for Indonesia, the calendar year average Thai f.o.b. price 
for 5% brokens is used as the basis for calculating the reference price based on the 
USDA (2001) price series. In order to take account of the transport costs from the 
Bangkok port to the Indonesian border these prices are multiplied by a factor 1.05. 
There is no available information on the precise size of this margin and hence this 
number is a “guestimate” based on the observation that for the calculations of refer-
ence prices for the PSE estimation, the average Thai f.o.b. price is increased by 1.10 
in the Japanese case and the Chinese f.o.b. price by 1.03 in the Korean case (accord-
ing to the documentation of the OECD 1999 PSE tables). Since the above producer 
prices must be interpreted as farm gate prices since this is unhusked rice, the border 
price must then be adjusted down to the farm gate level. In lack of information on 
margins and internal transportation costs these prices are then adjusted by the same 
conversion factors as for Vietnam. In other words, the prices are first divided by 1.75 
to convert what corresponds to wholesale rice into wholesale paddy prices. Then 
prices are divided by 1.04 to convert wholesale paddy prices into farm gate prices. 
The reference price is given as shown in the table below. 
 
Table A.26. Reference price for Indonesia USD/ton 
   
 Thai average f.o.b. price for 5% brokens Reference price 
   
1997 304 175 
1998 305 176  
1999 248 143 
 
Source: Own calculations based on price series from USDA (2001) and conversion factors explained in text. 
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Table A.27. Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient for Indonesia 
   
1997 1998 1999 
   
1.18 0.52 1.18 
 
 
 
The observation that the protection provided to Indonesian rice farmers in 1997 was 
turned to a tax in 1998 follows nicely the fact that the Indonesian Government im-
posed a ban on exports of unhusked and milled rice to secure domestic supplies in 
1998 whereas in 1999, a time with an unexpectedly large domestic rice harvest, the 
Government imposed a ban on all rice imports between March and May that year, 
thereby yet again providing protection of its producers, c.f. section 4.3.1 of the main 
text. 
 
